Vlahos v. State, 02-154.

Decision Date27 August 2003
Docket NumberNo. 02-154.,02-154.
Citation2003 WY 103,75 P.3d 628
PartiesEduardo VLAHOS, Appellant (Defendant), v. The STATE of Wyoming, Appellee (Plaintiff).
CourtWyoming Supreme Court

Representing Appellant: Kenneth M. Koski, State Public Defender; Donna D. Domonkos, Appellate Counsel; and Ryan R. Roden, Senior Assistant Appellate Counsel.

Representing Appellee: Patrick J. Crank, Attorney General; Paul S. Rehurek, Deputy Attorney General; and D. Michael Pauling, Senior Assistant Attorney General.

Before HILL, C.J., and GOLDEN, LEHMAN, KITE, and VOIGT, JJ.

KITE, Justice.

[¶ 1] Eduardo Vlahos appeals from his conviction for conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery under Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 6-1-303(a) and 6-2-401(a) and (c)(ii) (LexisNexis 2003), claiming violation of his right to a speedy trial, insufficiency of the evidence, ineffective assistance of counsel, and improper jury instructions on the law of accomplice/coconspirator testimony. We find no error and affirm.

ISSUES

[¶ 2] Mr. Vlahos presents the following issues:

ISSUE I

Whether Appellant was denied his right to a speedy trial when the trial court failed to bring him to trial within 120 days from his arraignment and fail[ed] to obtain the Wyoming Supreme Court's permission to extend his trial date beyond 180 days from arraignment before the 180 days elapsed?

ISSUE II
Was the evidence insufficient to convict Appellant of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery, as sufficient independent evidence did not exist to corroborate accomplice/co-conspirator testimony?
ISSUE III
Whether the trial court erred by failing to instruct the jury on the applicable law in Wyoming regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony, and by failing to give the jury a cautionary instruction regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony?
ISSUE IV
Did plain error occur[ ] when the trial court failed to instruct the jury on the law regarding accomplice/co-conspirator testimony and the requirement that independent evidence corroborate such testimony, and [failed] to either find as a matter of law that certain witnesses were accomplices/co-conspirators or [submit] that question to the jury?
ISSUE V
Did Appellant receive ineffective assistance of counsel when trial counsel failed to request the trial court to give the jury instructions regarding testimony of accomplices and co-conspirators?

The State of Wyoming phrases the issues as:

I. Was Appellant denied his rights to a speedy trial?
II. Was the evidence sufficient to support Appellant's conviction of conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery?
III. Did error, plain or otherwise, occur due to any failure to instruct the jury regarding the testimony of accomplices or co-conspirators, or can defense counsel be deemed ineffective for failing to seek such instructions?
FACTS

[¶ 3] On May 3, 2001, two men robbed Security First Bank in Cheyenne. Mr. Vlahos and his sixteen-year-old half-brother, Marco Buckley, were arrested in connection with the robbery and charged with aggravated robbery and conspiracy to commit aggravated robbery.

[¶ 4] The case went to trial on December 17, 2001. Among the state's witnesses were Mr. Buckley, Matthew Munoz, Justin Hoskins, Jessie Ray Walters, and Kimberly Ross, each of whom testified concerning his or her participation in or knowledge of plans by Mr. Vlahos and Mr. Buckley to rob a bank.

[¶ 5] Mr. Buckley testified that, beginning in April 2001, he had numerous conversations with Mr. Vlahos about robbing a bank in Colorado or Cheyenne. Together, he and Mr. Vlahos discussed the robbery with others, including Mr. Munoz, Mr. Hoskins, and Mr. Walters. He and Mr. Vlahos planned the details of the robbery, including that they would wear masks, hats, gloves, and colored contact lenses and use false names. They went together to purchase the masks, steal the gloves, and borrow the gun used in the robbery. They planned the respective roles they would play once they were inside the bank, ultimately deciding that Mr. Buckley would hold the gun while Mr. Vlahos got the money. Mr. Buckley described what occurred inside the bank, testimony that was corroborated by bank employees who were working that day. He identified himself and Mr. Vlahos in photographs taken by the bank security camera. He described what happened after they left the bank and what they did with the money they took from the bank.

[¶ 6] Mr. Hoskins testified that in early April 2001 he was involved in conversations with Mr. Vlahos, Mr. Buckley, and Mr. Munoz about robbing a bank in Fort Collins, Colorado. Mr. Hoskins was to be the driver, Mr. Munoz was to be the lookout, and Mr. Vlahos and Mr. Buckley were to rob the bank. Within a couple of weeks of that conversation, Mr. Hoskins was arrested on unrelated charges and placed in Frontier Correctional System, and he had no more involvement in discussions with Mr. Vlahos about robbing a bank.

[¶ 7] Mr. Walters also testified that he was involved in discussions with Mr. Vlahos and Mr. Buckley about robbing a bank. He corroborated the testimony about the plan to wear gloves, masks, and colored contact lenses. He testified that Mr. Vlahos seemed to be "the brains of this operation," the person who "thought it out," and seemed to have some experience with robberies. Mr. Walters said he dropped out of the discussions in late April 2001 after he realized Mr. Vlahos and Mr. Buckley were serious about robbing a bank.

[¶ 8] Mr. Munoz testified that he, Mr. Vlahos, Mr. Buckley, and Mr. Hoskins talked five or six times about robbing a bank in Colorado. He said Mr. Vlahos did most of the talking during these discussions. Mr. Munoz dropped out of the discussions after he had a falling out with Mr. Buckley about a month before the robbery occurred.

[¶ 9] Ms. Ross, who was Mr. Vlahos' girlfriend, testified that she overheard discussions between Mr. Vlahos and Mr. Buckley about robbing a bank. Mr. Hoskins, Mr. Walters, and Mr. Munoz were part of some of the discussions. She heard them discussing details of the plan, including wearing masks, gloves, and colored contact lenses, using walkie-talkies and a police scanner, and carrying a gun. She also testified that, on the day of the robbery, Mr. Vlahos and Mr. Buckley came to her house with a black duffel bag. She said they were nervous and agitated and removed an object from the bag. They banged the object on the floor to get it open, and inside was a large amount of money, some of which they distributed to her and others.

[¶ 10] On December 19, 2001, the jury found Mr. Vlahos not guilty of aggravated robbery but guilty of conspiracy to commit the same. The trial court sentenced him to serve a term of not less than twenty-two years nor more than twenty-five years in the Wyoming Department of Corrections.

DISCUSSION
A. Speedy Trial

[¶ 11] Mr. Vlahos claims he was denied his right to a speedy trial because the trial court did not bring him to trial within 120 days of his arraignment, did not obtain this Court's permission to continue his trial beyond 180 days from arraignment, and denied his request for dismissal as a result of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) violations. The state contends there was no speedy trial violation because Mr. Vlahos in essence consented to, and in some cases requested, the delays and has not shown that prejudice resulted from the delays.

[¶ 12] We review a speedy trial claim according to the mandates of W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) and, where necessary, the four-part constitutional test articulated in Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 530, 92 S.Ct. 2182, 33 L.Ed.2d 101 (1972). Hauck v. State, 2001 WY 119, ¶ 12, 36 P.3d 597, ¶ 12 (Wyo. 2001). Mr. Vlahos was arraigned before the amendment to W.R.Cr.P. 48(b) became effective; therefore, we use the version of that rule which was in effect prior to September 1, 2001. Under W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(2), criminal charges had to be brought to trial within 120 days after arraignment unless the trial was continued in accordance with W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4) and (5), which provided:

(4) Continuances not to exceed six months from the date of arraignment may be granted by the trial court as follows:
(A) On motion of defendant supported by affidavit; or
(B) On motion of the attorney for the state or the court if:
(i) The defendant expressly consents;
(ii) The state's evidence is unavailable and the prosecution has exercised due diligence; or
(iii) Required in the due administration of justice and the defendant will not be substantially prejudiced; and
(C) If a continuance is proposed by the state or the court, the defendant shall be notified. If the defendant objects, the defendant must show in writing how the delay may prejudice the defense.

(5) Any request to continue a trial to a date more than six months from the date of arraignment must be directed to the court to which appeals from the trial would be taken and may be granted by that court in accordance with paragraph (4).

(Emphasis added.)

[¶ 13] The amended version of this rule, which was effective September 1, 2001, requires criminal charges to be brought to trial within 180 days following arraignment. The amended version also changes the "six month" time period in W.R.Cr.P. 48(b)(4) and (5) to "180 days." Mr. Vlahos concedes the old version of the rule applies.

[¶ 14] The record reflects the following events concerning the speedy trial issue. Mr. Vlahos was arraigned on June 8, 2001, and the trial began on December 17, 2001-192 days later. By order dated June 12, 2001, the trial court set the trial to begin on September 17, 2001-101 days after the arraignment and within the 120 days mandated by the rule. The June 12, 2001, setting order advised the parties as follows:

This case is hereby, and one or more others have been or may be set for jury trial on the 17th day of September, 2001, at 9:00 a.m. If on that date, this case and one or more others remain for trial (have not been disposed of by plea or agreement for plea) one will go to trial and the others will be continued, pursuant to
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