Vlaming v. W. Point Sch. Bd.
| Decision Date | 19 August 2020 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action No. 3:19-cv-773 |
| Citation | 480 F.Supp.3d 711 |
| Parties | Peter VLAMING, Plaintiff, v. WEST POINT SCHOOL BOARD, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Shawn Ashley Voyles, McKenry Dancigers Dawson PC, Virginia Beach, VA, Jonathan Caleb Dalton, Alliance Defending Freedom, Washington, DC, for Plaintiff.
Alan Schoenfeld, Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, New York, NY, Bruce Berman, Pro Hac Vice, Paul Wolfson, Pro Hac Vice, Tania Faransso, Pro Hac Vice, Wilmer Cutler Pickering Hale & Dorr LLP, Washington, DC, Stacy Leann Haney, Haney Phinyowattanachip PLLC, Richmond, VA, for Defendant West Point School Board.
Stacy Leann Haney, Haney Phinyowattanachip PLLC, Richmond, VA, for Defendants Laura Abel, Jonathan Hochman, Suzanne Aunspach.
John A. Gibney, Jr., United States District Judge From 2012 to 2018, Peter Vlaming taught French at West Point Public Schools. During a class exercise in 2018, Vlaming referred to John Doe,1 a transgender male student, by female pronouns. Shortly thereafter, the West Point School Board ("the School Board") suspended Vlaming and ordered him to refer to Doe by male pronouns. When Vlaming refused, the School Board fired him.
Vlaming sued the School Board and three School Board members in their official capacities2 in the King William County Circuit Court, alleging that the School Board violated the Virginia Constitution and other state laws by firing him. The defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, 1443, and 1446. Vlaming has moved to remand, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction because he has only asserted state law claims. Because the Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over this case, it will remand this case to the King William County Circuit Court.3
In 2012, Vlaming began working as a French teacher at West Point High School. In May, 2018, the School Board appointed Vlaming as a salaried teacher for the 2018-2019 school year. Vlaming's contract guaranteed him at least 200 days of employment and monthly salary payments from September, 2018, to August, 2019.
Early in the 2018 school year, Vlaming met with Doe—a student who had recently transitioned from female to male—Doe's parents, and the school guidance counselor regarding Doe's transition. Because Doe wished to go by a traditionally male name and pronouns, Vlaming let his students pick a new name for his French class that semester. During class, Vlaming referred to Doe by his chosen name but avoided using pronouns. Outside of Doe's presence, however, Vlaming referred to Doe using pronouns that aligned with Doe's biological sex.
In late October, 2018, Doe, his parents, and school administrators spoke with Vlaming about using pronouns matching Doe's gender identity. Assistant Principal Suzanne Aunspach also gave Vlaming written guidance regarding the rights of transgender students. She warned Vlaming that he was potentially violating federal law and School Board policy by using pronouns that did not match Doe's gender identity. Aunspach told Vlaming "that he should use male pronouns or his job could be at risk." (Compl. ¶ 78.) Vlaming explained that his conscience and religious beliefs prohibited him from using pronouns that do not match a person's biological sex. Aunspach warned Vlaming that failure to comply could lead to termination. Principal Jonathan Hochman told Vlaming that he would receive a formal letter of reprimand because he did not use pronouns matching Doe's gender identity.
During a class exercise on October 31, 2018, Vlaming used female pronouns to refer to Doe. After the incident, Doe withdrew from the class. On Hochman's recommendation, Superintendent Laura Abel placed Vlaming on administrative leave pending an investigation. On November 6, 2018, Vlaming received a reprimand and final warning letter, which treated his refusal to use male pronouns to refer to Doe as harassment or retaliation based on gender identity. On November 7, 2018, Abel ordered Vlaming to refer to Doe using pronouns matching his gender identity in all contexts or face termination, and prohibited Vlaming from avoiding the use of pronouns at all. Vlaming told Abel he could not comply with the order due to his religious beliefs. Abel recommended that the School Board fire him. At a public hearing on December 6, 2018, the School Board fired Vlaming and immediately stopped paying him.
On January 2, 2019, the School Board sent Vlaming a letter explaining that it fired him for violating its policies against discrimination and harassment and for failing to comply with Abel's, Hochman's, and Aunspach's orders. Vlaming contends that the School Board did not adequately develop its policies and investigation and reporting processes. He also alleges that it did not comply with its formal complaint, investigation, and appeals process before firing him.
Vlaming filed this suit in state court, asserting that the School Board's decision violated numerous rights guaranteed to him by the Virginia Constitution and the Virginia Code: (1) freedom of speech (Counts I to III); (2) free exercise of religion (Counts IV to V); (3) due process (Count VI); and (4) freedom from governmental discrimination (Count VII). Vlaming also alleges that the School Board violated the Dillon Rule and the Virginia Code when it enacted non-discrimination policies that were more stringent than Virginia laws (Count VIII). Vlaming further contends that the defendants breached their employment contract with him (Count IX).
The defendants removed the case to this Court pursuant to 28 U.S.C. §§ 1331, 1441, 1443, and 1446, asserting that the case involves federal questions related to Title IX and the U.S. Constitution. They also argue that the School Board's decision to fire Vlaming amounts to either an "act under color of authority derived from any [l]aw providing for equal rights" or a "refus[al] to do any act on the ground that it would be inconsistent with such law." (Dk. No. 1, ¶ 7); see 28 U.S.C. § 1443(2). Vlaming contends that the defendants have improperly removed the case.
In support of federal jurisdiction, the defendants argue that (1) the complaint raises a federal question pursuant to § 1331, and (2) Title IX provides a basis for jurisdiction pursuant to § 1443(2). Vlaming moves to remand, arguing that the Court lacks jurisdiction over this case.5
Federal courts have jurisdiction over "all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1331. Typically, cases arise under § 1331 when federal law creates the cause of action. See Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Thompson , 478 U.S. 804, 808, 106 S.Ct. 3229, 92 L.Ed.2d 650 (1986). In a "slim category" of cases, Gunn v. Minton , 568 U.S. 251, 258, 133 S.Ct. 1059, 185 L.Ed.2d 72 (2013), federal courts have jurisdiction over cases in which state law supplies the cause of action, but "the plaintiff's right to relief necessarily depends on resolution of a substantial question of federal law," Franchise Tax Bd. v. Constr. Laborers Vacation Tr. , 463 U.S. 1, 28, 103 S.Ct. 2841, 77 L.Ed.2d 420 (1983). "Under the longstanding well-pleaded complaint rule, ... a suit ‘arises under’ federal law ‘only when the plaintiff's statement of his own cause of action shows that it is based upon [federal law].’ " Vaden v. Discover Bank , 556 U.S. 49, 60, 129 S.Ct. 1262, 173 L.Ed.2d 206 (2009) (quoting Louisville & Nashville R. Co. v. Mottley , 211 U.S. 149, 152, 29 S.Ct. 42, 53 L.Ed. 126 (1908) ). A court cannot base its jurisdiction on a defense or counterclaim. Id.
"The ‘mere presence of a federal issue in a state cause of action’ is not enough to confer jurisdiction." Burrell v. Bayer Corp. , 918 F.3d 372, 380 (4th Cir. 2019) (quoting Merrell Dow , 478 U.S. at 813, 106 S.Ct. 3229 ). A defendant must show that the that is "(2) actually disputed, (3) substantial, and (4) capable of resolution in federal court without disrupting the federal-state balance approved by Congress." Id. at 379 (internal quotations omitted). The case must meet all four requirements under § 1331 for a federal court to have jurisdiction over the case. See Pressl v. Appalachian Power Co. , 842 F.3d 299, 303 (4th Cir. 2016). The removing party bears the burden of establishing jurisdiction. Mulcahey v. Columbia Organic Chems. Co. , 29 F.3d 148, 151 (4th Cir. 1994). Courts must "construe removal jurisdiction strictly because of the ‘significant federalism concerns’ implicated." Dixon v. Coburg Dairy, Inc. , 369 F.3d 811, 816 (4th Cir. 2004) (quoting Mulcahey , 29 F.3d at 151 ).
First, to "necessarily raise" a federal issue, it must be "essential to resolving a state law claim, meaning that ‘every legal theory supporting the claim requires the resolution of a federal issue.’ " Burrell , 918 F.3d at 383 (quoting Dixon , 369 F.3d at 816 ). Courts "look only to the necessary elements of the [plaintiff's] causes of action to determine whether they raise federal questions under § 1331." Id. at 382. They do not consider "affirmative defenses that might be anticipated." Id. A case does not arise under federal law if the plaintiff "can establish all the necessary elements entirely independently of federal law." Id. "[S]o long as even one theory for each of the [plaintiff's] claims does not require interpretation of federal law, resolution of the federal-law question is not necessary to the disposition of their case." Id. at 383 (quotations omitted).
Second, an "actually disputed" issue "really and substantially involves a dispute or controversy respecting the validity, construction, or effect of [federal] law." Shulthis v. McDougal , 225 U.S. 561, 569, 32 S.Ct. 704, 56 L.Ed. 1205 (1912). Practically speaking, "if a federal issue does exist, it is ‘actually disputed.’ " Va....
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