Vlso v. Gullo
Decision Date | 29 January 1934 |
Docket Number | 32572 |
Citation | 153 So. 3,179 La. 8 |
Court | Louisiana Supreme Court |
Parties | VlSO v. GULLO et al |
153 So. 3
179 La. 8
VlSO
v.
GULLO et al
No. 32572
Supreme Court of Louisiana
January 29, 1934
Rehearing Denied February 26, 1934
Appeal from First Judicial District Court, Parish of Caddo; T. F. Bell, Judge.
Suit by Joe Viso against Sam Gullo and another. From an adverse judgment, plaintiff appeals.
Judgment set aside, and case remanded.
Sidney G. Myers and E. W. & P. N. Browne, all of Shreveport, for appellant.
Herold, Cousin & Herold, of Shreveport, for appellees.
OVERTON, Justice. O'NIELL, C. J., absent.
OPINION
[179 La. 9] OVERTON, Justice.
Sam Gullo and Joe Viso conducted for a number of years a grocery store under the name of Sam Gullo & Co. When times were good the business prospered fairly well, but when prosperity ceased, the firm became involved, and was unable to meet its liabilities as they matured. As a result it became necessary to liquidate the partnership. Thereafter Viso continued to operate the business for himself on property owned by the individual members of the firm.
According to the allegations of the petition, at some time prior to May 28, 1932, Gullo proposed to Viso that, in order to place the property [179 La. 10] then occupied by him as a store and owned by each individually, beyond the reach of their creditors, a simulated sale should be effected whereby the title would be placed in the name of one Nick Cecola, who is one of the defendants in this case. Gullo persuaded Viso, the petition sets forth, to sign the proposed simulated sale, which was done on May 28, 1932. The petition then alleges that it was agreed that the deed would not be delivered to Cecola then, but instead would be placed in the hands of V. L. Campisi, a friend of all parties, pending a final decision by the plaintiff of the propriety of the contemplated transaction. It appears from the same instrument, namely, the petition, that a few days later Viso having finally decided the propriety of consummating the transaction, refused to permit the completion of it by the delivery of the deed, and that, accordingly, the deed was returned by Campisi and placed [153 So. 4] in the possession of Gullo. It also appears from the petition that while the deed still remained in the custody of Gullo, all parties to the transaction, including Cecola, agreed that the deed should not be delivered for registry, but that it should be destroyed.
The petition also sets forth that, notwithstanding the foregoing agreement not to register, but to destroy the deed, Gullo, with full knowledge that he was violating the agreement, either delivered the deed to Cecola, who had...
To continue reading
Request your trial