Vodak v. City of Chicago
| Decision Date | 27 February 2009 |
| Docket Number | No. 03 C 2463.,03 C 2463. |
| Citation | 624 F.Supp.2d 933 |
| Parties | Kevin VODAK et al, individually and on behalf of others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v. CITY OF CHICAGO, Former Superintendent Terry G. Hillard; Chief Philip Cline; Chief Jerry Robinson, Deputy Chief Tom Byrne, Deputy Chief Ralph Chiczewski, Commander John Killacky, Commander Sam Christian, Commander David Doherty, Commander Marianne Perry, Commander John R. Risley, Commander Joseph Griffin, Commander Daniel Dugan, Commander Charles Williams, Lieutenant Kevin Ryan, Lieutenant Neil Sullivan, Lieutenant Dave Sobscyzk, Assistant Deputy Frank Limon; Former Assistant Deputy Superintendent Ron Huberman, Counsel Karen Rowan, Counsel Thomas Epach, Jr., Officer Barker, Officer Bilyj, Officer M. Black, Lieutenant Carson Earnest, Officer L Coleman, Officer E. Cortez, Officer W. Clucas, Officer A. Dakuras, Officer C. Decicco, Officer G. Gamboa, Officer E. Gedrekis, Officer R. Hagen, Officer L. Heise, Officer D. Herrera, Officer R. Hughes, Officer Hunt, Officer K. Jaros, Officer Johnson, Officer A. Kizziah, Officer D. Koonig, Officer T. Lieber, Officer T. Loconte and Officer K. McClearn, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Illinois |
James Russell Fennerty, James R. Fennerty & Associates, LLC, Jeffrey David Naffziger, Christensen & Ehret LLP, Melinda L. Power, West Town Community Law Office, Chicago, IL, for Plaintiff.
Richard Thomas Sikes, Jr., Audrey Lane Brodrick, Jeffrey J. Mayer, Joseph P. Roddy, Richard Bruce Levy, Suzanne Miriam Rose, Terrence J. Sheahan, Kellye L. Fabian, Freeborn & Peters, LLP, Chicago, IL, for Defendants.
On March 20, 2003, a large group of protestors gathered in Chicago's federal plaza to demonstrate their disapproval of the United States' military action in Iraq. The original group, numbered between five thousand and ten thousand, left the Federal Plaza and began to march northward. The protestors did not have a permit to assemble or to march. As the march proceeded, thousands more individuals joined the original group. Although the march proceeded on various streets at different times throughout the evening, the primary march proceeded north on Lake Shore Drive and approximately one to two thousand marchers eventually converged in the area of Chicago Avenue and Mies Van der Rohe Way. At some point, approximately 313 individuals were arrested within this area. They were charged with reckless conduct and transported to area police stations. Approximately 800 were detained in the area for a few hours. All of the cases were eventually dismissed.
As a result, two federal cases were filed against the Chicago Police Department and individual officers: one involving individual plaintiffs (Beal v. City of Chicago, 04 C 2039, 2007 WL 1029364 (N.D.Ill. Mar. 30, 2007) and a class action (Vodak v. City of Chicago, 03 C 2463)). Both cases were subsequently transferred to this Court's docket. On March 30, 2007, this Court granted in part and denied in part motions for summary judgment in Beal. On January 5, 2009, this Court consolidated the two cases for trial due to the similarity of the issues, facts and law and for the efficient adjudication of the matters. The Vodak Plaintiffs and the City Defendants cross-moved for summary judgment.
The Class is represented by the following Plaintiffs: Sarah Bergstrand ("Bergstrand"), Prudence Browne ("Browne"), Robert Castillo ("Castillo"), Patrick Donnell ("Donnell"), Matthew Gaines ("Gaines"), Angela Garcia ("Garcia"), Kathleen Gruber ("Gruber"), Steven Hudosh ("Hudosh") Elizabeth Johnson ("Johnson"), Sophia Sieczowski ("Sieczowski") and Kevin Vodak ("Vodak"). Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 1.1 These Plaintiffs represent a Class of people that was surrounded by Chicago Police Department Officers on March 20, 2003 on Chicago Avenue east of Michigan Avenue and west of Mies Van Der Rohe Way. Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 2. The class is divided into three subclasses. Id. at ¶ 3. Subclass A-1 (represented by Browne, Gaines, Garcia, Johnson and Sieczowski) consists of persons detained in the bounded area but not taken into custody. Id. Subclass A-2 (represented by Bergstrand, Castillo, Donnell and Vodak) consists of persons who were taken into police custody but released without charges. Id. Subclass A-3 (represented by Gruber and Hudosh) consists of persons taken into custody and charged with a criminal offense. Id. The Vodak action also includes Individual Plaintiffs who have elected not to join the class: Sharon Ambielli ("Ambielli"), John Pennycuff ("Pennycuff"), Daniel Pineda ("Pineda"), Aaron Robin ("Robin") and Brad Thomson ("Thomson"). Pl. 56.1 at ¶ 4. In addition to other claims, these individual Plaintiffs bring claims of violations of their Fourth Amendment rights subject to the same analysis as those of the class members.
Defendants are the City of Chicago and several Chicago Police Department members, including both command personnel and officers: Former Superintendent Terry G. Hillard ("Superintendent Hillard"); Former Police Chief Philip Cline ("Cline"); Chief Jerry Robinson ("Chief Robinson"), Deputy Chief Tom Byrne ("Deputy Chief Byrne"), Deputy Chief Ralph Chiczewski ("Deputy Chief Chiczewski"), Commander John Killacky ("Commander Killacky"), Commander Sam Christian ("Commander Christian"), Commander David Dougherty ("Commander Dougherty"), Commander Marienne Perry ("Commander Perry"), Commander John R. Risley ("Commander Risley")2, Commander Joseph Griffin ("Commander Griffin"), Commander Daniel Dugan ("Commander Dugan"), Commander Charles Williams ("Commander Williams"), Lieutenant Kevin Ryan ("Lieutenant Ryan"), Lieutenant Neil Sullivan ("Lieutenant Sullivan"), Lieutenant Dave Sobscyzk ("Lieutenant Sobscyzk"), Assistant Deputy Frank Limon ("Assistant Deputy Limon"), former Assistant Deputy Superintendent Ron Huberman ("Assistant Deputy Superintendent Huberman"), counsel Karen Rowan ("counsel Rowan"), counsel Thomas Epach, Jr. ("counsel Epach"), Officer Barker, Officer Bilyj, Officer M. Black ("Officer Black"), Lieutenant Carson Earnest ("Lieutenant Earnest"), Officer L. Coleman ("Officer Coleman"), Officer E. Cortez ("Officer Cortez"), Officer W. Clucas ("Officer Clucas"), Officer A. Dakuras ("Officer Dakuras"), Officer C. Decicco ("Officer Decicco"), Officer G. Gamboa ("Officer Gamboa"), Officer E. Gedrekis ("Officer Gedrekis"), Officer R. Hagen ("Officer Hagen"), Officer L. Heise ("Officer Heise"), Officer D. Herrera ("Officer Herrera"), Officer R. Hughes ("Officer Hughes"), Officer Hunt, Officer K. Jaros ("Officer Jaros"), Officer Johnson, Officer A. Kizziah ("Officer Kizziah"), Officer D. Koonig ("Officer Koonig"), Officer T. Lieber ("Officer Lieber"), Officer T. Loconte ("Officer Loconte"), and Officer K. McClearn ("Officer McClearn") (collectively the "Officer Defendants"). The Parties subsequently agreed to dismiss Officers Robinson, Christian, Dougherty, Sullivan, Limon, Perry and Hunt.
The Plaintiffs claim that they were falsely arrested and imprisoned in violation of the Federal Constitution (Count I) and Illinois Constitution (Count VII) as well as Illinois state law (Count VIII), that they were maliciously prosecuted (Count X), that the officers violated their First Amendment Rights (Count II), and that the officers conspired together to violate their rights (Count XI). The Individual Plaintiffs bring claims of Excessive Force (Count III), deliberate indifference to medical needs (Count IV), deprivation of property (Count V) and assault and battery (Count IX). In addition, Plaintiffs seek to hold the City liable under theories of municipal liability (Count VI) and respondeat superior (Counts XII-XIII). The City brings a Counterclaim against the Plaintiffs seeking damages for the additional costs of providing government services incurred as a result of Plaintiffs' violations of several municipal ordinances.
The parties now bring four Motions for Summary Judgment. The Defendant Chicago Police Department members bring a Motion for Summary Judgment on all of Class Plaintiffs' claims alleging that they are entitled to qualified immunity and therefore are entitled to summary judgment on Plaintiff's Fourth and First Amendment claims and also that Plaintiffs cannot set forth evidence to support their claims of civil conspiracy, false arrest, and malicious prosecution. Defendant City of Chicago brings a Motion for Summary Judgment on Plaintiffs' claims of municipal liability, claiming that any unlawful arrests are not pursuant to a municipal policy or custom and were not a result of decisions made by a policymaker. Plaintiffs bring a Motion for Summary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment claims, claiming that they have established as a matter of law that the Defendant Officers arrested them without probable cause, and a Motion for Summary Judgment on the City's Counterclaim, claiming that there is no evidence that the Plaintiffs violated or intentionally violated any law and that they did not proximately cause any damages the City may have suffered. For the reasons stated below, Defendant Chicago Police Department Officers' Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, Plaintiffs Motion for Summary Judgment on their Fourth Amendment claims is denied, the City's Motion for Summary Judgment is granted, and Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment on the City's Counterclaim is granted.
As an initial matter, Plaintiffs bring a Motion to Strike Defendant Officers' Rule 56.1 Statement of Facts in support of their Motion for Summary Judgment, to strike several statements of fact therein discussing civil disobedience training that took place prior to the demonstration at issue and to strike three exhibits submitted in the record: 1) a flyer proposing "...
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