Vodonick v. Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n, Inc. (In re Property)
| Decision Date | 01 March 2016 |
| Docket Number | No. 2:15-cv-00539-JAM-EFB,2:15-cv-00539-JAM-EFB |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of California |
| Parties | JOHN VODONICK, Plaintiff, v. FEDERAL NATIONAL MORTGAGE ASSOCIATION, INC., a federally chartered corporation, all persons claiming any right, title or interest in certain real property; and DOES 1 through 50, inclusive, Defendants. |
Defendant Federal National Mortgage Association ("Fannie Mae") moves for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(c) on two of the three requested declarations of the first claim for relief and the third, fourth and fifth claims for relief in Plaintiff John Vodonick's ("Vodonick") First Amended Complaint ("FAC"). This motion was opposed by Vodonick. For the reasons set forth below, the Court grants in part and denies in part, Fannie Mae's motion.1
According to the allegations in the FAC:
Vodonick owns and resides in real property known as 15240 Willow Ridge Court in Nevada City, California ("Vodonick Property"). FAC ¶ 3. The Vodonick Property neighbors a property located at 15230 Willow Ridge Court in Nevada City, California ("Neighboring Property"). Id. ¶ 4. Both properties were once a single parcel that bordered Mosquito Creek, a tributary of Deer Creek. Id. ¶ 7. The single parcel was divided into five parcels at some point immediately prior to October 29, 1987, which is when Vodonick acquired title by deed to the Vodonick Property. Id. ¶ 9.
On July 12, 1988, Vodonick received an easement over the Neighboring Property from the then-owners of the Neighboring Property, Tim R. Smith and Peggy A. Smith ("The Smiths"), in order to access Mosquito Creek. Id., Exh. 2. The scope of the easement was clarified in an easement deed entered into between Vodonick and the Smiths on September 22, 1988 and recorded on September 27, 1988. Id., Exh. 1. Since this time, Vodonick has continuously exercised his rights in the easement and has paid all property taxes separately assessed upon the easement. Id. ¶¶ 12-13.
The Smiths conveyed the Neighboring Property to Ronald B. Claridge and Michelle J. Claridge ("The Claridges") by a grantdeed that was recorded on September 27, 1988. Request for Judicial Notice ("RJN"), Exh. 1. The grant deed reserved "an easement for access and recreation over the easterly five feet . . . and the Norhterly 50 feet." Id. The Trustee of Ronald B. Claridge then transferred the Neighboring Property to Robert D. Story and Stephanie L. Story ("The Storys") by a grant deed that was recorded on December 3, 1997. RJN, Exh. 2.
A promissory note related to Neighboring Property was assigned to Fannie Mae and declared to be in default on or around August 1, 2014. FAC ¶ 15; Id., Exh. 3. Fannie Mae issued a notice on October 31, 2014, that the Neighboring Property would be sold at a public foreclosure auction on November 26, 2014 at 12:30 p.m. Id. ¶ 17; Id., Exh. 4. Vodonick was interested in acquiring the Neighboring Property and dispatched an agent to the auction. Id. ¶¶ 18-19. But the auction did not take place and no party announced a continuance of the sale. Id. ¶ 19. Instead, the Neighboring Property was apparently sold at a public auction on or about December 1, 2014. Id. ¶ 20. Vodonick never received notice of this postponed foreclosure sale and alleges that he would have attended and made a good faith bid on the property. Id. On December 2, 2014, First American Title Insurance Company, acting as Trustee of Neighboring Property for the foreclosure sale, conveyed the Neighboring Property to Fannie Mae. Id. ¶ 21; Id., Exh. 5.
Vodonick asserts five claims for relief in his FAC. The first claim for relief seeks declarations that (1) the purported deed to Fannie Mae is "null, void and of no effect," (2) Vodonick is vested in title and interest to the easement, and (3) Vodonickis vested in fee title to the portion of the Neighboring Property that contains the easement. Id. at 7. The second claim for relief seeks to quiet title to the easement by implication, pursuant to California Code of Civil Procedure section 760.020. Id. at 7-8. The third claim for relief seeks to quiet title to an agreed boundary line for the easement. Id. at 8. The fourth claim for relief seeks to quiet title by a prescriptive easement. Id. at 8-9. And the fifth claim for relief seeks title to the easement by adverse possession. Id. at 9.
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure ("Rule") 12(c), states that "[a]fter the pleadings are closed—but early enough not to delay trial-a party may move for judgment on the pleadings." For the purposes of Rule 12(c), the pleadings are closed once an answer has been filed. Doe v. United States, 419 F.3d 1058, 1061 (9th Cir. 2005). Since Fannie Mae has filed its answer and the motion will not delay trial, a Rule 12(c) motion is appropriate at this time.
Rule 12(c) motions are "functionally identical" to Rule 12(b) motions. Dworkin v. Hustler Magazine Inc., 867 F.2d 1188, 1192 (9th Cir. 1989). "Judgment on the pleadings is proper when the moving party clearly establishes on the face of the pleadings that no material issue of fact remains to be resolved and that it is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Hal Roach Studios, Inc. v. Richard Feiner & Co., 896 F.2d 1542, 1550 (9th Cir. 1989). Just as in Rule 12(b) motions to dismiss,courts must accept as true the allegations of the non-moving party. Id.
Vodonick seeks judicial notice pursuant to Federal Rule of Evidence 201 of the following two documents: (1) a deed from the Smiths to the Claridges recorded on September 27, 1988 (RJN, Exh. 1), and (2) a deed from the Trustee of the Trust of Ronald B. Claridge to the Storys dated December 1, 1997 and recorded on December 3, 1997 (RJN, Exh. 2).
A court may take judicial notice of a fact that is not reasonably disputed if it "can be accurately and readily determined from sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be questioned." Fed. R. Evid. 201(b)(2). On a motion to dismiss, courts are allowed to consider "matters of public record." Northstar Fin. Advisors Inc. v. Schwab Investments, 779 F.3d 1036, 1042 (9th Cir. 2015) (quoting Coto Settlement v. Eisenberg, 593 F.3d 1031, 1038 (9th Cir. 2010)).
The documents submitted by Vodonick are in the public record and are not subject to reasonable dispute, and Fannie Mae has not objected to their judicial notice. As such, the Court grants Vodonick's request for judicial notice of these two documents. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n, 55 F. Supp. 3d 915, 927 (N.D. Tex. 2014); Fed. Nat. Mortgage Ass'n v. Davis, 963 F. Supp. 2d 532, 543 (E.D. Va. 2013).
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Fannie Mae first moves for judgment on the pleadings with respect to two of the three declarations that Vodonick seeks on his first claim for relief.
First, Fannie Mae objects to Vodonick's claim for a declaration that Fannie Mae's interest in the Neighboring Property is null and void. Fannie Mae argues that Vodonick, as an easement holder, was not entitled to personal notice of the foreclosure sale on the Neighboring Property and thus has no standing to make this challenge. Mot. at 3; Reply at 2. In opposition, Vodonick argues that Fannie Mae's interest in the Neighboring Property is null and void because the foreclosure sale was fraudulently conducted prior to the delivery of the trustee's deed. Opp. at 6. Specifically, Vodonick argues that the postponement of the foreclosure sale failed to meet the notice requirements of California Civil Code Sections ("Section") 2924f and 2924g(d). Id. at 6-7.
California has an extensive web of regulations that govern the process for non-judicial foreclosure sales. Section 2924f establishes the initial procedural notice requirements for a foreclosure sale, while Section 2924g(d) establishes the notice requirements for postponed foreclosure sales. Section 2924g(d) explicitly states that 2924f regulations are only required for postponed sales if the sale is postponed for more than 365 days.Cal. Civ. Code § 2924g(c)(2). Vodonick alleges that the foreclosure sale in this case was delayed by only one week. FAC ¶¶ 17, 20. Thus, the procedural notice requirements imposed by Section 2924f are irrelevant in this case. Fannie Mae was not required to abide by any of the procedures found in Section 2924f for its second foreclosure sale, and that sale cannot be rendered null and void for any alleged violations of Section 2924f.
Cal. Civ. Code § 2924g(d). Vodonick specifically alleges that his agent "appeared at the time and place noticed for the public auction . . . [but] the auction did not take place nor did anyone announce a continuance of the auction date and time." FAC ¶ 19. This allegation, taken as true for the purposes of this motion, sufficiently demonstrates that Fannie Mae violated Section 2924g(d). The issue then becomes whether this alleged violation renders the subsequent sale completely null and void.
Vodonick cites In re Kekauoha-Alisa, 674 F.3d 1083 (9th Cir. 2012), to support his claim that the failure to provide an oral declaration of the postponement renders a subsequent sale void. In In re Kekauoha-Alisa, the debtor sued the creditor for a violation of Hawaii Revised Statute (HRS) section 667-5, which...
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