Vodopich v. Trojan Mining Co.
| Decision Date | 15 January 1921 |
| Docket Number | 4732. |
| Citation | 180 N.W. 965,43 S.D. 540 |
| Parties | VODOPICH v. TROJAN MINING CO. |
| Court | South Dakota Supreme Court |
Appeal from Circuit Court, Lawrence County; James McNenny, Judge.
Proceedings for compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Matt Vodopich, the employee against the Trojan Mining Company, the employer, wherein petition was filed for setting aside on the ground of fraud release signed by the employee. The petition was denied by the Industrial Commissioner, and the decision reversed by the circuit court on appeal and from the judgment of the circuit court the employer appeals. Judgment of the circuit court reversed.
W. G Rice, of Deadwood, for appellant.
E. A Steinback, of Lead, for respondent.
On May 13, 1918, Vodopich, respondent, suffered a sprained ankle from accident while in the employ of appellant. He received the legal compensation and medical relief required by the Workmen's Compensation Law (Rev. Code 1919, §§ 9436-9491) from the date until October 15, 1918, on which date he returned to the employ of appellant at the same wages he received prior to the accident. He continued in such employ until the latter part of February, 1919. On October 17, 1918, he signed a complete release of any further claim upon appellant on account of such injury, and made no claim for further compensation until March, 1919. In June, 1919, a petition was filed with the Industrial Commissioner asking that the release be set aside on the grounds of fraud and misrepresentation in its procurement, and that the matter be reopened and heard before a board of arbitration. A hearing was had upon said petition, and much testimony taken. The Industrial Commissioner found that there was no evidence of fraud in the securing of the release, and that the pain then suffered by respondent was caused by flat feet, instead of the sprain, and denied the petition. Upon appeal the circuit court of Lawrence county reversed that decision, and remanded the cause for further proceedings. From the judgment of the circuit court the mining company has appealed to this court.
It is claimed by appellant that in order to justify the reopening of the cause it was incumbent upon respondent to show that the release was procured by misrepresentation, and that he signed the same without knowing its contents. This is not the law as applied to the Workmen's Compensation Act. Section 9448, Rev. Code 1919, provides:
"No contract or agreement, express or implied, no rule, regulation or other device, shall in any manner operate to relieve any employer in whole or in part of any obligation created by this article except as herein provided."
Section 9467, Rev. Code 1919, provides:
"If the employer and employee reach an agreement in regard to the compensation under this law, a memorandum thereof shall be filed with the Industrial Commissioner by the employer or employee, and unless the commissioner shall within twenty days, notify the employer and employee of his disapproval of the agreement, by registered letter sent to their addresses as given on the memorandum filed, the agreement shall stand as approved and be enforceable for all purposes under the provisions of this article."
We are of the opinion that it is the plain intent of the Workmen's Compensation law that, while fraud or misrepresentation in obtaining the release would be a ground for setting it aside, yet an injured employee is not required to establish the fact that an agreement for release of further liability was entered into by reason of the fraud or misrepresentation of the employer before he can have the cause reopened. Where such an agreement is signed and approved by the Industrial Commissioner under the provisions of section 9467, Rev. Code 1919, equitable grounds for setting aside the release must be established before the cause can be reopened. Foley v. Detroit United Ry., 190 Mich. 507, 157 N.W. 45. If in this case the employee believed the results of the sprain were ended at the time he signed the release, but it afterwards developed that further pain and suffering were attributable to the sprain, that would justify the reopening of the case. Bradbury, Workmen's Compensation (3d Ed.) pp. 1137-1149.
Appellant further contends that it would next be incumbent upon respondent to show that the injury was the proximate cause of his present disability, before he could be entitled to further recovery. With this contention we agree. Section 9490, Rev. Code 1919, provides:
"In this article unless the context otherwise requires: *** 'Injury' or 'personal injury' shall mean only injury by accident arising out of and in the course of the employment and shall not include a disease in any form except as it shall result from the injury."
Assuming, without deciding, that if respondent was afflicted with flat feet at the time of the injury and that if the injury accelerated or brought on the present painful condition of his right foot, such disability would be held to be the proximate result of the injury, yet respondent did not sustain the burden upon him of showing that the condition of flat feet resulted from or was accelerated by the injury. One physician was of the opinion that the condition of flat feet was of long standing. There was no testimony to the effect that respondent did not have flat feet prior to the accident. Aside from respondent's own testimony as to present pain, and that it was occasioned by the accident, the evidence of these several physicians was to the effect that, while the accident might possibly have accelerated or increased the painful condition arising from flat feet, it was to the effect that the accident had not done so. We cannot say therefore that the clear preponderance of the evidence was against the finding of the Industrial Commissioner. In fact we think it supports his decision.
The Industrial Commissioner heard the...
To continue reading
Request your trial