Voelker v. Tyndall
| Decision Date | 25 November 1947 |
| Docket Number | 28302. |
| Parties | VOELKER v. TYNDALL, Mayor, et al. |
| Court | Indiana Supreme Court |
Appeal from Marion Circuit Court; Lloyd D. Claycombe, Judge.
Earl J. Wynn, of Indianapolis, for appellant.
Arch N. Bobbitt and Henry B. Krug, both of Indianapolis, for appellees.
Appellant filed his amended complaint for replevin in the court below averring, among other things, that he was arrested by officers of the Indianapolis Police Department and charged with the misdemeanor of 'Disorderly Conduct.' That upon his arrest the policeman took his fingerprints with ink on white cards, and his signature, and placed one such card on file in the department, and sent one to the F.B.I. That upon trial of the case in a Municipal Court of Marion County he was acquitted. Thereafter he demanded such fingerprints cards and signature, which demand was refused; that he is the owner and entitled to possession of such fingerprints and name; and that the defendants claim a right to detain the same by virtue of Acts 1945, Ch. 344 p. 1622, § 47-846 et seq., Burns' 1940 Repl.Supp. particularly §§ 47-857, 47-858, 47-859, 47-863, 47-865 and 47-866. That so much of this legislation as permits the appellees to retain such fingerprints and signature is unconstitutional being in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, and Art 1, §§ 1 and 21 of the Constitution of Indiana. That the fingerprints and signatures are of the value of $10,000 and their detention is unlawful. He prays judgment for possession, and damages for their detention.
Appellees' general demurrer to the complaint was sustained. Appellant refusing to plead over, judgment was rendered against him, from which this appeal is taken.
Many of appellant's contentions have been determined by this court in the recent case of State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall et al., 1946, 224 Ind. 364, 66 N.E.2d 755 and on second appeal, 1947, Ind.Sup., 74 N.E.2d 914.
Appellant bases his claim for possession and damages for detention upon the doctrine of the Right of Privacy. This is a well-established doctrine, derived from natural law and guaranteed by both the Federal and State Constitutions. As between man and man it must be respected. Appellant has cited many authorities to that effect.
However, this right has its limitations. Society too, has its rights. Under our form of government citizens have rights--which even the government may not invade and should the government trespass upon such rights the courts should grant redress. But the citizen has obligations and duties to the community, and to the government which he must keep and perform. To preserve rights for himself he must aid in preserving them for all. There must be cooperation, and always the rights of the individual must be balanced with the duties incumbent upon him as a citizen. Barber v. Time, Inc., 1942, 348 Mo. 1199, 159 S.W.2d 291. State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall et al., supra.
Long before the enactment of the statute complained of and before the value of fingerprints as a means of identification was known, this court had held that: '* * * if, in the discretion of the sheriff, he should deem it necessary to the safekeeping of a prisoner and to prevent his escape, or to enable him the more readily to retake the prisoner if he should escape, to take his photograph, and a measurement of his height, and ascertain his weight, name, residence, place of birth, occupation, and the color of his eyes, hair, and beard, as was done in this case, he could lawfully do so. * * *' State ex rel. Burns v. Clausmeier et al., 1900, 154 Ind. 599, 602, 603, 57 N.E. 541, 542, 50 L.R.A. 73, 77 Am.St.Rep. 511. We have heretofore held the statute complained of to be a constitutional exercise of the police power of the state. State ex rel. Mavity v. Tyndall et al., 1947, Ind.Sup., 74 N.E.2d 914. We adhere to that decision and adopt it as a determination of the constitutional questions presented in this case.
The pertinent question left for determination as between the appellant, an individual citizen, and the appellees, as officers of the City of Indianapolis, in their official and representative capacity, is: Who has a right to the possession of the fingerprints and signature in question?
A bureau of criminal identification and...
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