Vogel v. Starr
Decision Date | 29 June 1908 |
Citation | 112 S.W. 27,132 Mo.App. 430 |
Parties | JOHN VOGEL, Appellant, v. O. J. STARR, Respondent |
Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Grundy Circuit Court.--Hon. George W. Wanamaker, Judge.
Reversed and remanded.
P. C Stepp, W. D. Stepp and O. N. Gibson for appellant.
(1) When notice of dishonor is mailed, it should be directed to the endorser at his nearest postoffice. Randolph on Com Paper, sec. 1279; Ireland v. Kip, 11 Johns. 231; Ferris v. Saxton, 1 So. 1 (N. J.); Bank v. McGruder (Md.), 6 Harr. & J. 172, 14 Am. Dec. 271-6; Foreman v. Wikoff, 16 La. 20, 35 Am. Dec. 212; Gist v Lybrand, 3 Ohio 307, 17 Am. Dec. 595; Mead v. Carnal (La.), 6 Rob., 73, 39 Am. Dec. 332; Sanderson v. Reinstadler, 31 Mo. 483; Woods v. Neeld, 44 Pa. St. 86; Bank v. Compton, 3 Rob. 4; Nicholson v. Marders, 3 Rob. 242. (2) This general rule is subject to the qualification that although the notice is sent to a more distant office, the service will nevertheless be good, if it further appears that the endorser was accustomed to receive mail there. Bank v. Lane, 3 Hawks 332, 14 Am. Dec. 595; Coal Co. v. Ryerson, 1 Spenc. 129, 40 Am. Dec. 217; Reid v. Payne, 16 Johns. 218; Mead v. Carnal (La.), 6 Rob. 73, 39 Am. Dec. 552; Sanderson v. Reinstadler, 31 Mo. 483; Barrett v. Evans, 28 Mo. 331. (3) But notice sent to the nearest postoffice is a sufficient service in any case. Coal Co. v. Ryerson, 1 Spenc. 129, 40 Am. Dec. 217; Bank v. Lane, 3 Hawks 332, 14 Am. Dec. 595; Bank v. Lawrence, 1 Peter 578; Mercer v. Lancaster, 5 Pa. St. 160; Sanderson v. Reinstadler, 31 Mo. 483; and other cases cited under point 1, supra. (4) Notice will be sufficient, although sent to a wrong place, if the holder has used due diligence in ascertaining the place to which it should be sent. Randolph on Com. Paper, secs. 1286-8, 1279; Bank v. Phillips, 3 Wend. 408; Herbert v. Servin, 12 Vroom 225; Harris v. Robinson, 4 How. 336, 11 Law Ed. 1000. Marsh v. Barr, Meigs 68; Hunt v. Nugent, 18 Miss. 546; Bank v. Pierce, 3 Ala. 321; Palmer v. Whitney, 21 Ind. 58; Fugitt v. Nixon, 44 Mo. 285-8; Bank v. Bender, 21 Wend. 643, 34 Am. Dec. 281. (5) Where the facts are undisputed, what constitutes due diligence is a question of law. Lineville v. Welch, 29 Mo. 203; Fugitt v. Nixon, 44 Mo. 285-8; Sanderson v. Reinstadler, 31 Mo. 483-7.
A. G. Knight and W. G. Collison, for respondent, filed argument.
Action against the endorser of a negotiable promissory note. The failure of the holder to give proper notice of dishonor is the defense interposed. Trial was before the court without the aid of a jury; judgment was entered for defendant and plaintiff appealed.
The note in question is as follows:
A few days after the execution of the note and long before its maturity, Starr, the payee, sold it to plaintiff for value and endorsed it in blank. Later, plaintiff deposited it with the Trenton National Bank for collection. On the last day of grace, October 10, 1896, and within proper hours, the bank handed the note to a notary public for demand and protest. Millard, the maker, had moved to Wisconsin and Starr, the endorser, lived in the country about twelve miles from Trenton. The notary testified:
Starr did not receive the notice until some three months after it was mailed, for the reason that Tindall and not Spickards was his post office. The farm he occupied as a tenant was about one mile nearer Spickards than Tindall, either by wagon road or as the crow flies, and Spickard, though a small town was much larger than Tindall. But Starr had made the latter place his post office address while living on a farm nearer to it than to Spickards and continued to get his mail there. No doubt is suggested in the evidence of the good faith of the notary and of plaintiff's collecting agent in mailing the notice to Starr's nearest post office, nor do we find anything indicative of bad faith on the part of plaintiff, the owner of the note. He was not in Trenton on the date of the protest, nor had he imparted to his collection agent the information he possessed respecting Starr's post office address. Had he done this, we perceive nothing in the facts known to him to support the conclusion that his collection agent and the notary might have acted differently. The farm where plaintiff lived was, perhaps, two miles from that occupied by Starr. While the...
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