Vogler v. Greimann

Decision Date30 June 1948
Docket NumberNo. 5836.,5836.
Citation78 F. Supp. 575
PartiesVOGLER v. GREIMANN et al.
CourtU.S. District Court — District of Alaska

Warren A. Taylor, of Fairbanks, Alaska, for plaintiff.

Maurice T. Johnson, of Fairbanks, Alaska, for defendants.

PRATT, District Judge.

The Federal Government built, and thereafter maintained a suspension bridge about 400 feet long, wholly within the limits of the municipality of Fairbanks, Alaska. It runs in a northerly and southerly direction over the navigable Chena River. Wooden rails approximately 6 × 6 inches in width form two lanes across the bridge. A center line of these rails is bolted to the center part of the bridge, and another line of rails is bolted on each side of the bridge against the steel trestle-work. The minimum width of each of these lanes is 8 feet 1½ inches, and the average width is 8 feet 2½ inches.

As used hereinafter the word "bridge" includes the approaches, and the word "highway" includes bridges and approaches on such highway.

The defendants have twenty busses which they operate in Fairbanks and nearby vicinity. The bodies of all of these busses are exactly eight feet wide. On the 17 larger busses the outside edge of the tires is flush with the outside edge of the body of the bus. On three of the busses the distance from outside of tire to outside of tire is seven feet two inches. All of these busses are frequently crossing the said bridge, transporting passengers, including school children.

The evidence clearly shows that when the large busses travel in the lanes laid out by the wooden rails, the sides of the tires are rubbed and torn by the rails and bolts, so that the life of a tire is decreased about fifty percent. Also, the doors of these busses, when on the bridge, cannot be opened more than 7 inches, thus creating some danger to passengers in case it should be necessary to unload quickly. To drive the large busses within the lanes also creates the hazard of the bus being struck by on-coming busses, automobiles, trucks and vehicles which are also wide. Busses driven within the lanes have at times crashed against the sides of the bridge, or the railings.

The smaller busses, being ten inches less in width between the outsides of the tires, are less difficult to maneuver within the lanes, but are subject to the same danger as the larger busses of being struck by vehicles in the other lane. In fact, the smaller busses, being eight feet wide and having ten inches less of spread between the outsides of the tires, are more subject to being struck by vehicles in the other lane for the following reasons, to-wit: With five inches on each side of the tire for maneuvering, there is the tendency of the bus driver to pull his vehicle to the left, giving the right side of his bus as much clearance as possible from the bridge trestle-work and rail, which constitutes a menace in case the bus should strike a rock or other obstacle, or should lean over against the bridge by reason of striking the guard rail. In giving the clearance on the right, the body of the bus is thus projected over the center rail and into the other lane.

The body of the average vehicle projects several inches beyond the outside wall of the tires, making it possible for such body to project into the adjoining lane, although the tires are restricted by the center rail. The defendants have had the experience of their busses being struck by vehicles in the adjoining lane, and the glass windows of the bus being broken and thrown among the passengers.

As the eight foot wide lane gives the ordinary passenger car, which is approximately 5½feet wide, fifteen inches on each side of the car body, and about two extra inches on account of the wheels being set in, it would seem that at least that much space beyond the width of the vehicle should be allowed busses which are more difficult than passenger cars to maneuver. To fail to allow busses such space under the experience of the defendants of constant damage being caused and a danger to them and to their passengers being ever present by the narrow lanes, would seem clearly unreasonable and discriminatory and illegal. If the defendants were to permit their busses to be driven in the lanes and a passenger were injured, the defendants would be subject to ordinary damages, and to exemplary damages, under the conditions which are shown to have been known to them.

As a result of the above experience, the defendants have instructed their drivers not to enter the bridge until it is clear of vehicles coming from the opposite direction, but to enter only when the bridge is clear, and then to straddle the center rail. This, of course, requires vehicles coming from the opposite direction to wait until the busses are across the bridge and approaches.

The plaintiff, driving an ordinary passenger car, has been forced to wait for the busses to pass, at various times, and on the theory that the bus was legally required to travel entirely within the lanes marked out on the bridge, has brought this suit for an injunction requiring the defendants to operate their busses in such a manner, and to cease straddling the center rail.

Bridges are a part of public highways. 11 C.J.S., Bridges, § 45, page 1076.

"The power to regulate and control public bridges is vested in the state legislature, subject to constitutional limitations, and the exercise of such power may be delegated to * * * municipal authorities." 11 C.J.S., Bridges, § 48, page 1077.

The Legislature of the Territory of Alaska authorized municipal corporations to regulate "the use and operation of motor vehicles within the municipality" by general ordinance. Sec. 2383, 21st subdivision, C.L.A. '33.

Thus, the town of Fairbanks had power to regulate traffic upon said bridge, there being no law or regulation of the United States or Territory of Alaska relative to such traffic.

The town council of Fairbanks has been reluctant to pass such ordinances because...

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2 cases
  • McDaniel v. Hiatt
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Pennsylvania
    • 2 Julio 1948
  • Commonwealth of Virginia v. Stiff
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Western District of Virginia
    • 24 Agosto 1956
    ...a designated speed there was no interference with his federal duties by requiring him to observe the state law. In Vogler v. Greimann, D.C.Alaska, 78 F.Supp. 575, at page 577 we find the following "The driver of a government mail vehicle, while engaged in his official duty, must comply with......

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