Volentine v. Bechtel, Inc.

• Decision Date: 19 November 1998
• Docket Number: No. 1:98CV1609(TH).,1:98CV1609(TH).
• Parties: Anthony VOLENTINE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BECHTEL, INC. and Mobil Chemical Company, Inc., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Texas

27 F.Supp.2d 728

Anthony VOLENTINE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. BECHTEL, INC. and Mobil Chemical Company, Inc., Defendants.

No. 1:98CV1609(TH).

United States District Court, E.D. Texas, Beaumont Division.

November 19, 1998.

David Arthur Brandom, Jane Swearingen Brown, Tom Swearingen, Provost & Umphrey, Beaumont, TX, for Plaintiffs.

Elizabeth A. Hall, Victor Scott Kneese, Bracewell & Patterson, Houston, TX, for Defendant Bechtel, Inc.

Robert J. Hambright and Gilbert ("Buddy") Irvine Low, Orgain, Bell & Tucker, Beaumont, TX, for Defendant Mobil Chemical Co.

MEMORANDUM AND OPINION ORDER

HEARTFIELD, District Judge.

Before this Court is Bechtel, Inc.'s and Mobil Chemical Company's Motion for Summary Judgment [14]. Having considered the motion, the response, and the reply to the response, this Court hereby GRANTS Bechtel, Inc.'s and Mobil Chemical Company's Motion for Summary Judgment [14].

1. Facts

The autumn of 1996 brought together Bechtel, Inc. ("Bechtel"), Mobil Chemical Company — a division of Mobil Oil Corporation ("Mobil"), and some three hundred and eight (308) individual plaintiffs who bring this lawsuit. In August 1996, Mobil began work on its Olefins Expansion Project (the "Expansion Project") in Beaumont, Texas. In order to complete the Expansion Project, Mobil hired Bechtel as the general contractor; and C.A. Turner Contractors ("C.A.Turner") came on board as a subcontractor. All three hundred and eight (308) plaintiffs in this lawsuit worked for subcontractor C.A. Turner at Mobil's Expansion Project.

April 13, 1998 was just like any other spring day in Beaumont, Texas. However, that fair, 60-degree day was anything but normal for the employees at Mobil's Expansion Project. In fact, when the day was said and done and the red-orange sun had vanished beneath the clouded horizon, some three hundred and eight (308) of C.A. Turner's employees were fired from Mobil's Expansion Project.

Fired for what? In fact, our story begins April 9, 1998, just a few days before the firing of the three hundred and eight (308) Plaintiffs. On April 9, 1998, Bechtel's construction site manager for the Expansion Project, Sam Stoddard, sent a letter to all Bechtel subcontractors — including C.A. Turner — informing them that there would no longer be organized breaks or organized break areas because of the alleged abuse of breaks. Apparently, Bechtel determined that en masse breaks were, quite logically, creating productivity problems. As a result, Bechtel decided to eliminate en masse breaks. However, Bechtel advised C.A. Turner that its employees could take breaks as needed, but C.A. Turner would have to pay for them.¹ C.A. Turner declined to pay for the breaks. When the employees took en masse breaks in contravention of Bechtel's directive, Bechtel terminated its contract with C.A. Turner which had the practical effect of firing C.A. Turner's employees from Mobil's Expansion Project. This lawsuit resulted.

2. Summary Judgment Standard

Rule 56(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure states: "A party against whom a claim, counterclaim, or cross-claim is asserted or a declaratory judgment is sought may, at any time, move with or without supporting affidavits for a summary judgment in the party's favor as to all or any part thereof." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 2552, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). Furthermore, Rule 56(c) states, in part: "The judgment sought shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." Thus, summary judgment is proper when, after a reasonable period for discovery, one party is unable to show a genuine issue as to a material fact on which he will bear the burden of proof at trial, provided that judgment against him is appropriate as a matter of law. Nebraska v. Wyoming, 507 U.S. 584, 589, 113 S.Ct. 1689, 1694, 123 L.Ed.2d 317 (1993); Celotex 477 U.S. at 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548. The moving party need not negate the elements of the non-moving party's case. Id. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548; Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir.1994) (en banc) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548, and Lujan v. National Wildlife Fed'n., 497 U.S. 871, 888, 110 S.Ct. 3177, 3188-89, 111 L.Ed.2d 695 (1990)). Rather, the moving party need only "demonstrate the absence of a genuine issue of material fact." Celotex, 477 U.S. at 323, 106 S.Ct. 2548.

The non-moving party does not overcome the absence of a genuine issue of material fact by simply "creating some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 586, 106 S.Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L.Ed.2d 538 (1986), by making "conclusory allegations," Lujan, 497 U.S. at 871-73, 110 S.Ct. 3177, by presenting "unsubstantiated assertions," Little, 37 F.3d at 1075, or by proffering only a "scintilla" of evidence. Id. When the non-moving party fails to make a sufficient showing on an essential element of his case, the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law. Id. Nonetheless, when considering a motion for summary judgment, the trial court must construe all evidence in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and resolve all doubts against the moving party. Eastman Kodak Co. v. Image Technical Servs., Inc., 504 U.S. 451, 456, 112 S.Ct. 2072, 2076, 119 L.Ed.2d 265 (1992). With this standard in mind, this Court now turns to the particular question before it — namely, whether Garmon and its progeny preempts this lawsuit.

3. Please, Don't Squeeze the Garmon

Defendants argue that Garmon and its progeny preempt all of Plaintiffs' claims because they lie within the exclusive jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board established by the National Labor Relations Act.² Specifically, Defendants claim that this entire lawsuit is preempted by Sections 7 and 8 of the National Labor Relations Act ("NLRA").³ 61 Stat. 140, 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158. With the creation of the NLRA, Congress established a "comprehensive amalgam of substantive law and regulatory arrangements ... to govern labor-management relations affecting interstate commerce." Local 926, Int'l. Union of Operating Engineers v. Jones, 460 U.S. 669, 675-76, 103 S.Ct. 1453, 1458, 75 L.Ed.2d 368 (1983). In San Diego Building Trades Council, Local 2020 v. Garmon the Supreme Court noted the considerable deference afforded the NLRA by the courts: "[T]he unifying consideration of our decisions has been regard to the fact that Congress has entrusted administration of the labor policy for the Nation to a centralized administrative agency, armed with its own procedures, and equipped with its specialized knowledge and cumulative experience." 359 U.S. 236, 242, 79 S.Ct. 773, 778, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (1959). Thus, key to the NLRA — this "centralized administrative agency" — is its freedom from fragmentation by state-law causes of action intruding upon its broad jurisdiction. Realizing the need to protect this jurisdiction from such fragmentation, the Supreme Court in Garmon held:

When it is clear or may fairly be assumed that the activities which a State purports to regulate are protected by § 7 of the National Labor Relations Act, or constitute an unfair labor practice under § 8, due regard for the federal enactment requires that state jurisdiction must yield. To leave the States free to regulate conduct so plainly within the central aim of federal regulation involves too great a danger of conflict between power asserted by Congress and requirements imposed by state law ... When an activity is arguably subject to § 7 or § 8 of the Act, the States as well as the federal courts must defer to the exclusive competence of the National Labor Relations Board if the danger of state interference with national policy is to be averted.

359 U.S. at 245, 79 S.Ct. at 780, 3 L.Ed.2d 775 (emphasis added). The Supreme Court established this rule to prevent state-law distortion of well-developed, federal labor law. There is, as always, a loophole to this rule. "Under Garmon, a state may regulate conduct that is of only peripheral concern to the Act or which is so deeply rooted in local law that the courts should not assume that Congress intended to preempt the application of state law." Belknap v. Hale, 463 U.S. 491, 509, 103 S.Ct. 3172, 3182, 77 L.Ed.2d 798. That is, the "Court has permitted exceptions to Garmon preemption when the state or federal court will decide issues `that do not threaten significant interference with the NLRB's jurisdiction.'" Hobbs v. Hawkins, 968 F.2d 471, 476 (5th Cir.1992) (citing Windfield v. Groen Div., Dover Corp., 890 F.2d 764, 767 (5th Cir.1989)).

Garmon and its progeny are anything but black-letter law. Faced with "Congress' utter lack of guidance on this important issue [preemption by the NLRA]," the Supreme Court "has struggled to enunciate a governing theory and apply it in particular cases." Windfield 890 F.2d at 766-67. Thus, the courts, under the guidance of the Supreme Court and Garmon, have struggled to define the otherwise blurry boundary between broad NLRA preemption and permissible state causes of action. Spear-heading this struggle, the Court has since refined the analytical framework established under Garmon:

The critical inquiry, therefore, is not whether the State is enforcing a law relating specifically to labor relations or one of general application but whether the controversy presented to the state court is identical to (as in Garner) or different from (as in Farmer) that which could have been, but was not, presented to the Labor Board. For it is only in the former situation that a state court's exercise of jurisdiction necessarily involves a risk of interference with the unfair labor practice jurisdiction of the Board which the arguably prohibited branch...