Volkswagen of America, Inc. v. Marinelli

• Decision Date: 27 August 1993
• Docket Number: Nos. 1911644,1911645,s. 1911644
• Citation: 628 So.2d 378
• Parties: Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,772 VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., et al. v. Lyla MARINELLI, etc., and John J. Madonia, etc.
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court

Page 378

628 So.2d 378

Prod.Liab.Rep. (CCH) P 13,772

VOLKSWAGEN OF AMERICA, INC., et al. v. Lyla MARINELLI, etc., and John J. Madonia, etc.

Nos. 1911644, 1911645.

Supreme Court of Alabama.

Aug. 27, 1993.

Jere F. White, Jr., and Harlan I. Prater IV of Lightfoot, Franklin, White & Lucas, Birmingham, and Ian Ceresney, Michael Hoenig, and William C. Guida of Herzfeld & Rubin, New York City, for appellants.

R. Ben Hogan III and James R. Pratt III of Hogan, Smith, Alspaugh, Samples & Pratt, P.C., Birmingham, for appellees.

MADDOX, Justice.

These appeals arise from a wrongful death action based on a one-vehicle rollover accident involving a Volkswagen motor vehicle known as a "Thing." Volkswagen's major claim of error is that it was deprived of its right to have its theory of the case presented to the jury by proper instructions, because the trial court instructed the jury on the "crashworthiness doctrine" rather than on the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine ("AEMLD").

Volkswagen also claims: (1) that it was entitled to an instruction on comparative fault; (2) that the trial court improperly allowed an expert to testify concerning a statistical analysis of the rollover comparison of the accident vehicle with other vehicles; (3) that the jury reached a quotient verdict; and (4) that certain jurors were guilty of misconduct in failing to disclose their prior involvement in litigation.

The accident occurred in March 1989, on Blue Ridge Boulevard in Hoover, Alabama, at a point where the boulevard passes underneath Interstate Highway 65. Blue Ridge Boulevard is a two-lane paved road with one eastbound lane and one westbound lane. The speed limit for the road is 25 miles per hour.

Many of the basic facts surrounding the accident were not disputed. Nicholas Marinelli was driving a 1973 Volkswagen Type 181 vehicle, commonly known as a "Thing." The Thing is a convertible utility vehicle with a detachable hardtop roof. ¹ Passengers in the vehicle were Nicholas's sister, Susan Marinelli, who was riding in the right front seat, and her boyfriend, Brian Madonia, who was in the back seat. The three, all teenagers, had been riding around for about 30 minutes before the accident; Nicholas was attempting to teach his sister, who had no driver's license, how to drive. Nicholas had resumed driving at the intersection of Blue Ridge Boulevard and Hackberry Road, and the accident occurred while he was returning to the Marinelli residence. Although the Thing was equipped with functioning seat belts, none of the occupants was wearing a seat belt at the time of the accident.

According to Nicholas Marinelli, an unidentified animal ran in front of the Thing as he was driving eastbound on Blue Ridge Boulevard. Despite the speed limit of 25 miles per hour, he conceded that the vehicle was going "maybe 30" when he first saw the animal approaching from the right side of the road. Nicholas testified:

"[If] it was an animal, I certainly didn't want to hit it. So I went to step on the brakes, and the brake pedal went all the way to the floor like it usually did.

"And everything happened so fast, that I didn't feel like I had time to step on the brake pedal a second time to slow the car down.

"And at the same time I had stepped on the brake pedal, I turned the steering wheel to the right to avoid hitting the animal.

"And since there was no braking action and I was heading off the road at this time, I reached down and pulled up on the emergency brake, and the left rear wheel locked up and the car [skidded] out from--the rear end of the car [skidded] out to the left.

"And when this happened, I turned my steering wheel all the way to the left. And then when I did that, it caught the car from skidding any further, and the rear end came back around. And it almost straightened out, but then it went all the way back around to the right.

"And I didn't have enough time and everything was happening so fast, and the--my hand slipped off the wheel or something, and I couldn't turn the steering wheel back around to counteract the motion of the car, and that's when the car flipped over."

(R. 571-73.)

The Thing crossed Blue Ridge Boulevard to the left, the rear of the vehicle went off the left side of the road and furrowed into the road's shoulder, and the vehicle rolled over as it reentered the road. Although the vehicle was originally travelling toward the east in the eastbound lane, the vehicle came to rest on its wheels in the westbound lane, with the front end facing to the west. ²

At the time of the accident, the Thing's hardtop roof was not being used, and, because none of the occupants was wearing a seatbelt, they were ejected from the vehicle. Nicholas, the driver, was thrown clear of the vehicle and suffered only minor injuries. Susan suffered fatal injuries when the top right corner of the windshield frame came in contact with her head after she fell out of the vehicle. Brian fell out of the vehicle and suffered fatal injuries when an area of the right rear door came down on his abdomen. He died during surgery, from massive internal bleeding from a severely lacerated liver.

Nicholas admitted that he was aware of the Thing's brake problems before the accident. The evidence showed that the vehicle was approximately 15 years old and that Nicholas had purchased the vehicle approximately five months before the accident. He had begun experiencing brake problems a month or two after the purchase. In the five months before the accident, the brakes on the vehicle had been repaired by Alternative Garage on at least three occasions. Before the accident, Nicholas was told by a mechanic at Alternative Garage that the Thing needed new brake drums, and at the time of the accident Nicholas had an appointment to have the vehicle repaired a fourth time. Nicholas attributed the brake problems to the age of the Thing. To compensate for the problems, he "would start to brake earlier than usual and drive the car a little bit slower than [he] would usually drive if the brakes worked." (R. 590-91.) The history of the brake malfunction was never characterized by the plaintiffs as a vehicle defect.

On April 25, 1989, Lyla Marinelli, as mother of Susan Marinelli, a minor, instituted a wrongful death action in the Circuit Court of Jefferson County, Alabama, against Volkswagenwerk Aktiengelellschaft, ^* Volkswagen of America, Inc., Volkswagen de Mexico S.A. de C.V. (jointly "Volkswagen"); James E. Bryan, d/b/a Alternative Garage; and various fictitiously named defendants. John Madonia, as father of Brian Madonia, a minor, also instituted a wrongful death action, on June 26, 1989, against Volkswagen, Alternative Garage, and various fictitiously named defendants. The two actions were consolidated on January 2, 1990.

Volkswagen filed an answer to the complaints and to the amendments made to the complaints. Volkswagen's answer, as amended, stated various defenses, including a lack of causal relation between the decedents' injuries and any conduct on the part of Volkswagen, a denial that the vehicle was defective, and numerous affirmative defenses, including contributory negligence, assumption of the risk, product misuse, failure to use the restraint system provided, and a defense that the decedents' injuries were caused by the acts or omissions of others. Alternative Garage also answered, making a general denial and asserting the affirmative defenses of contributory negligence and assumption of the risk. Alternative Garage was granted a summary judgment on January 29, 1990.

The trial began on April 6, 1992. At the close of the plaintiffs' case, Volkswagen moved for a directed verdict on the grounds, inter alia, that no crashworthiness claim should be presented to the jury. Volkswagen renewed its motion for directed verdict at the close of the evidence, at which time the motion was denied. Over Volkswagen's objection, the trial court instructed the jury on the elements of a crashworthiness claim as established in General Motors Corp. v. Edwards, 482 So.2d 1176, 1191 (Ala.1985), and the jury, after deliberating, returned a verdict on behalf of each plaintiff in the amount of $783,333.

On appeal, Volkswagen raises five issues for our review.

I.

Volkswagen first argues that it was deprived of its right to have its theory of the case presented to the jury by proper instructions because the trial court instructed the jury on the "crashworthiness doctrine" rather than on the AEMLD.

The trial judge charged the jury as follows:

"The plaintiff in this case does not claim that [Volkswagen] caused the accident in question. But the plaintiff claims that Volkswagen--the manufacturer--is liable, meaning legally responsible, under what is known as the Alabama Extended Manufacturer's Liability Doctrine.

"In order for the plaintiff to recover against the manufacturer, the plaintiff has the burden of proving each of the following elements: First, that the deceased was involved in an automobile accident. Well, that's obviously admitted.

"Second, that the automobile in which the plaintiff was a passenger was manufactured by [Volkswagen]. Well, there's no question about that.

"Third, that at the time of [the] accident, the automobile was in substantially the same condition as it was when it left the manufacturer.

"Next, that the automobile was defective; that is to say, ... the plaintiff must prove that the automobile did not meet the reasonable expectations of an ordinary consumer--as to its safety--because it was unreasonably dangerous, [t]hat is, ... not fit for [its] intended purpose, which is to travel the streets and highways.

"In order for the plaintiff to prove that the automobile was defective, the plaintiff must prove that a safer, practical, or alternative design [was] available to the manufacturer at the time it manufactured ... the automobile.

"The existence of a [safer,] practical alternative design must be proved by the plaintiff showing...