Volkswagen de Puerto Rico v. LABOR RELATIONS BD. OF PR
| Decision Date | 31 December 1970 |
| Docket Number | Civ. No. 249-70. |
| Citation | 331 F. Supp. 1043 |
| Parties | VOLKSWAGEN de PUERTO RICO, Plaintiff, v. LABOR RELATIONS BOARD OF PUERTO RICO and Asociacion Insular De Guardianes, Independiente, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Puerto Rico |
McConnell, Valdes, Kelley & Sifre, by Radamés A. Torruella, San Juan, P. R., for plaintiff.
Edwin Tyler Albizu, San Juan, P. R., for Dept. of Justice of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico.
Marta Ramirez de Vera, Santurce, P. R., for the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Bd.
This is an action in which Plaintiff seeks a declaratory judgment stating that section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, as amended, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), deprives the Puerto Rico and Associación Insular de Guardi referred to as the Board of jurisdiction over suits alleging the violation of collective bargaining agreements between labor unions and employers affecting commerce, based on the theory that such jurisdiction may only be vested in a state body from which there may be removal to a United States District Court.
Plaintiff also requests this Court in aid of its jurisdiction for a temporary restraining order to stay the proceedings before the Board in Case CA-4140, in the matter of Volkswagen de Puerto Rico and Asociación Insular de Guardianes de Puerto Rico, Independiente, until the Court resolves this Declaratory Judgment suit.
The Board issued a Resolution staying said proceedings, making moot Plaintiff's request.
Within the period to answer complaint, the Board filed a Motion to Dismiss this Declaratory Judgment suit alleging that the Court lacks jurisdiction over the subject matter to entertain the declaratory judgment sought by Plaintiff. The hearing on this Motion was held July 31, 1970.
Based on the arguments and the briefs duly filed by the parties before this Court, we make the following
The Board's proceeding in case CA-4140, supra, is an administrative investigation of a complaint of unfair labor practices under section 8(1) (f) of the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Act, 29 L. P.R.A. § 69(1) (f), which makes the violation of a collective bargaining agreement an unfair labor practice. The Board's jurisdiction over the unfair practice of violation of collective contract with respect to parties engaged in interstate commerce has been recognized by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court: El Mundo, Inc. v. PRLRB, 62 LRRM 2184, 92 PRR 834 (1965), certiorari denied 384 U.S. 932 (1966); Cadillac Uniform Linen Supply v. PRLRB, decision issued in Dec. 10, 1969; Beaunit v. PRLRB, 93 PRR 509 (1966); Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. PRLRB, 86 PRR 382 (1962); PRLRB v. ILA, 73 PRR 616 (1952).
In PRLRB v. ILA, supra, the Supreme Court of Puerto Rico recognized the Board's jurisdiction over this matter based in that the violation of a collective bargaining contract is not regulated as an unfair labor practice under the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947. The Puerto Rico Supreme Court declared that Congress, in giving the federal courts authority to entertain a suit for violation of a collective bargaining contract under section 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), had not expressed preemption of the field of such a violation as to oust state regulation; Section 301 merely vested the federal courts with authority to entertain a suit for damages for violation of a contract, which suit was in the nature of private rights as distinguished from unfair labor practice proceedings which essence is different. The nature of the Board's function to prevent and to remedy unfair labor practices is in pursuance of public rights and public policy, and not in the nature of private rights as are actions under section 301.
The ruling made in 1952 by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in the ILA case, supra, that the power of the federal courts over breaches of collective contracts under section 301(a) is not exclusive, was affirmed by the United States Supreme Court in Charles Dowd Box Company, Inc. v. Courtney et al., 368 U. S. 502, 82 S.Ct. 519, 7 L.Ed.2d 483 (1962), putting to rest the controversy. The Puerto Rico Labor Relations Act, by Mr. Fred Barela, p. 181.
In Charles Dowd Box Co., supra, the court interpreted that the "The legislative history of the enactment nowhere suggests that, contrary to the clear import of the statutory language, Congress intended in enacting section 301(a) to deprive a party to a collective bargaining contract of the right to seek redress for its violation in an appropriate state tribunal."
The ILA and Charles Dowd rulings were followed by the Puerto Rico Supreme Court in P. R. Telephone Co. v. PRLRB, supra, where the Court stated that section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, 29 U.S. C. § 185(a),
And in the El Mundo case, supra, the Puerto Rico Supreme Court expressed:
We have already stated that the violation of a collective agreement is not sanctioned as and unfair labor practice in the federal legislation of labor-management relations. The fact that the federal legislation grants for said violation, an action for damages —Section 301, Taft-Hartley Act—and that action for damages is within the jurisdiction of the courts, whether federal or state, does not preclude our Labor Relations Board as an administrative agency from taking cognizance under our Act of such a violation as an unfair practice. This question has already been clearly decided by this Court. Puerto Rico Telephone Co. v. Labor Relations Board, ___ P.R.R. ___, decided April 13, Labor Relations Board v. I.L.A. 73 PRR 568.
In Smith v. Evening News Assn., 371 U.S. 195, 83 S.Ct. 267, 9 L.Ed.2d 246 (1962), an action under section 301, supra, the Court refused to apply the preemption doctrine established in San Diego Building Trades Council v. Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 79 S.Ct. 773, 3 L.Ed.2d 775, and like cases and ruled that the jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board to deal with unfair labor practice which also violate a collective bargaining contract, is not displaced by section 301, but it is not exclusive and does not destroy jurisdiction of courts in suits brought under section 301. "Section 301(a) permits suits for breach of a collective bargaining agreement regardless of whether the particular breach is also an unfair labor practice within the jurisdiction of the NLRB." Vaca v. Sipea, 64 LRRM 2369, 385 U.S. 895, 87 S.Ct. 199, 17 L.Ed.2d 129.
In American Motors Corp. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 32 Wis.2d 237, 145 N.W.2d 137, 1966, following Tecumseh Products Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 23 Wis.2d 118, 126 N.W.2d 520, the Supreme Court of Wisconsin, ruled that the state labor board could assume jurisdiction over disputes of breach of collective contract, provided it applies federal law in accordance with Section 301, as ruled in Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Ala. (1957) 353 U.S. 448, 77 S.Ct. 912, 1 L.Ed.2d 972. The Court analyzed that the method of enforcing collective agreements by the Wisconsin Board, as well as by the Puerto Rico Labor Relations Board among other state boards, was in force before section 301(a) was enacted. Therefore, it concluded that when Congress rejected the handling of violations of collective contracts as unfair practices by the National Labor Relations Board and enacted section 301(a) of the Labor Management Relations Act of 1947, it left the enforcement of such contracts to the usual processes of the law and did not foreclose state administrative action in this area. Concurrent state-federal jurisdiction over violations of collective contracts include state courts and agencies, for states are free to allocate judicial power between courts and agencies. A state is free to allocate judicial power within its own boundaries as it sees fit, without contravening any federal interests: Tecumseh Products Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, supra, following Dreyer v. Illinois, 187 U.S. 71, 23 S.Ct. 28, 47 L.Ed.2d 79.
In cases of concurrent power over commerce, state law remains effective so long as Congress has not manifested an unambiguous purpose that it should be supplanted. Algoma Plywood & Veneer Co. v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board (1949) 336 U.S. 301, 69 S.Ct. 584, 93 L.Ed. 691.
In Alcoa Steamship Company v. Vélez, 376 F.2d 521 (1967), our circuit decided that the Puerto Rico Workmen's Accident Compensation Act was inapplicable to seamen employed in continental United States and working temporarily in navigable territorial waters of Puerto Rico as crew members of vessels owned by firms incorporated in the States. The said decision was based in that the seamen involved were insured under the federal maritime law and the field is regulated by the generally accepted law of the flag.
The said case is not applicable to the case before this court because the regulation of the subject matter in this case is not covered or preempted by any federal law or uniform policy.
As federal labor contract law does not give exclusive jurisdiction to federal district courts under 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) over breaches of collective bargaining contracts, but permits its enforcement by the...
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Volkswagen de Puerto Rico, Inc. v. Puerto Rico Lab. Rel. Bd.
...the court also adopted that part of defendants' brief which dealt with the merits. The district court opinion is reported at 331 F.Supp. 1043 (D. P.R.1970). 1 It is not altogether clear whether the district court dismissed on jurisdictional or substantive grounds. While the complaint was di......