Vollemans v. Town of Wallingford
Decision Date | 14 August 2007 |
Docket Number | No. 27332.,27332. |
Citation | 928 A.2d 586,103 Conn.App. 188 |
Court | Connecticut Court of Appeals |
Parties | Peter J. VOLLEMANS, Jr. v. TOWN OF WALLINGFORD. |
John-Henry M. Steele, Middlefield, for the appellant (plaintiff).
Michael J. Rose, with whom was Johanna G. Zelman, for the appellee (defendant).
SCHALLER, McLACHLAN and GRUENDEL, Js.
In Delaware State College v. Ricks, 449 U.S. 250, 101 S.Ct. 498, 66 L.Ed.2d 431 (1980), the United States Supreme Court held that the period for filing a discriminatory discharge complaint accrues when the employer unequivocally notifies the employee of termination. We are asked in this case to adopt that federal precedent as a matter of state law. We decline to do so in light of the remedial purpose of the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act, the legislative history surrounding General Statutes § 46a-82 (e) and the compelling policy considerations that favor a contrary rule. Accordingly, we reverse the judgment of the trial court granting summary judgment in favor of the defendant, the town of Wallingford, on the age discrimination action of the plaintiff, Peter J. Vollemans, Jr.
The following facts are undisputed. The plaintiff became superintendent of the Pierce power plant, which the defendant owned and operated, in 1989. On February 25, 2000, the plaintiff was informed that the plant would be closed and his position eliminated. The defendant closed the plant on June 30, 2000, but retained the plaintiff's services for some time thereafter as it decommissioned the plant. On November 13, 2002, the defendant's personnel director received a letter from the plaintiff's attorney. That letter provided in relevant part:
The plaintiff subsequently was provided written notice of the impending termination of his employment. In a letter to the plaintiff dated December 13, 2002, Raymond F. Smith, the defendant's director of public utilities, informed him that "[t]his letter will serve as final notice of your termination with the [defendant]. . . ." The plaintiff's final day of employment was January 21, 2003.
The plaintiff filed a complaint with the commission on June 3, 2003, which alleged that his employment was terminated "because of his age in violation of the prohibitions in the Connecticut Fair Employment Practices Act [(CFEPA), General Statutes § 46a-51 et seq.]." After conducting a merit assessment review, the commission dismissed the plaintiff's action as untimely under § 46a-82 (e). The commission stated: The commission further issued a release of jurisdiction, authorizing the plaintiff to commence a civil action in the Superior Court.
The plaintiff's December 17, 2003 complaint followed, which repeated his allegation before the commission that the termination of his employment constituted age discrimination in violation of CFEPA.1 Following discovery, the defendant moved for summary judgment on three grounds: (1) that the plaintiff's complaint to the commission was untimely; (2) that the plaintiff failed to establish a prima facie case of age discrimination; and (3) that the defendant had articulated a nondiscriminatory reason for the termination of the plaintiff's employment. The court heard argument on the motion on May 31, 2005. In its memorandum of decision, the court applied the rule set forth in Ricks, holding that "the alleged discriminatory act for the purposes of the timeliness of the plaintiff's appeal to the [commission] in the present case is the date on which the plaintiff received a definite notice of his termination." Finding that the plaintiff had received that notice "sometime before November 13, 2002," the court concluded that no genuine issues of material fact existed regarding the defendant's claim that the plaintiff's complaint to the commission was untimely. It therefore rendered summary judgment in favor of the defendant.2 From that judgment, the plaintiff now appeals.
Our standard of review governing a court's grant of summary judgment is well established. Summary judgment is appropriate when "the pleadings, affidavits and any other proof submitted show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Miller v. United Technologies Corp., 233 Conn. 732, 744-45, 660 A.2d 810 (1995); Practice Book § 17-49. As the court's decision on a motion for summary judgment is a legal determination our review on appeal is plenary. Rosato v. Mascardo, 82 Conn.App. 396, 410, 844 A.2d 893 (2004).
[I]ssue-finding, rather than issue-determination, is the key to the procedure. . . . [T]he trial court does not sit as the trier of fact when ruling on a motion for summary judgment. . . . [Its] function is not to decide issues of material fact, but rather to determine whether any such issues exist." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Barasso v. Rear Still Hill Road, LLC, 81 Conn.App. 798, 802-803, 842 A.2d 1134 (2004). Finally, because this case distills to an issue of statutory interpretation, our review of that issue of law is plenary. See Dark-Eyes v. Commissioner of Revenue Services, 276 Conn. 559, 570, 887 A.2d 848 (2006).
The plaintiff brought the present action under the CFEPA, which proscribes discriminatory employment practices on, inter alia, the basis of age. See General Statutes § 46a-60 (a)(1).3 That statutory scheme sets forth the procedure for filing a complaint thereunder. Section 46a-82 (e) requires that "[a]ny complaint filed pursuant to this section must be filed within one hundred and eighty days after the alleged act of discrimination except that any complaint by a person claiming to be aggrieved by a violation of subsection (a) of section 46a-80 must be filed within thirty days of the alleged act of discrimination." This appeal centers on the plaintiff's compliance with that statute.
Our Supreme Court scrutinized § 46a-82 (e) in Williams v. Commission on Human Rights & Opportunities, 257 Conn. 258, 777 A.2d 645, on appeal after remand, 67 Conn.App. 316, 786 A.2d 1283 (2001), and concluded that the time limit contained therein is not subject matter jurisdictional; id., at 282, 777 A.2d 645; but rather operates as a statute of limitations. Id., at 278, 777 A.2d 645. The court explained: ...
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