Vollette v. Watson
Decision Date | 01 April 2013 |
Docket Number | Civil Action No. 2:12cv231. |
Citation | 937 F.Supp.2d 706 |
Court | U.S. District Court — Eastern District of Virginia |
Parties | Nan VOLLETTE, et al., Plaintiffs, v. Bill WATSON, et al., Defendants. |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
David Paul Morgan, Cravens & Noll, PC, Rebecca Kim Glenberg, ACLU of Virginia Richmond, VA, for Plaintiffs.
Jeffrey A. Hunn, Jeff Wayne Rosen, Pender & Coward PC, Virginia Beach, VA, for Defendants.
This matter is before the Court on a motion for Summary Judgment jointly filed by all of the defendants (collectively “Defendants”) against each of the nine plaintiffs (collectively “Plaintiffs”) in this consolidated action. After examination of the briefs and the record, the Court determines that a hearing is unnecessary, as the facts and legal arguments are adequately presented, and the decisional process would not be aided significantly by oral argument. Fed.R.Civ.P. 78(b); E.D. Va. Loc. Civ. R. 7(J). For the reasons set forth below, Defendants' motion seeking summary judgment is GRANTED, in part, and DENIED, in part.
Each of the Plaintiffs was previously a contractor working at the Portsmouth City Jail (“the Jail”), which is overseen by defendant Sheriff Bill Watson (“Sheriff Watson”).2 As contractors, the Plaintiffs regularly worked in the Jail, but were directly employed by either “Aramark” (a food services company) or “Correct Care Solutions” (a medical services company).
According to Sheriff Watson's testimony at the May 16, 2012 preliminary injunction hearing conducted in this case, as of April 2011 he had “continuous reliable information” indicating that nurses and other contractors were bringing contraband into the Jail. Prelim. Injun. Tr. 53, ECF No. 20 (hereafter “Tr.”). Sheriff Watson claims that on April 22, 2011, as a result of receiving this information, all nine Plaintiffs, and at least two other contractors, were required by Defendants to undergo a strip search before being allowed to perform their employment duties at the Jail. Sheriff Watson testified that, in addition to the contractors, he also required all “jail officers” to be strip searched. Tr. 56. Disputed facts exist as to whether the strip searches involving the Plaintiffs also included a “visual body cavity” inspection. Compare ECF No. 31–12 through 31–16, with ECF No. 34–1 through 34–9, and ECF No. 49–1, at 5–7. “Contraband” was found on four of the Plaintiffs, consisting of three cell phones and one “jump drive.” 3 ECF. No. 31–1. However, none of the Plaintiffs found with contraband had their Jail security clearances revoked at the time of the April 2011 searches.
On April 27, 2012, approximately one year after the April 22, 2011 strip searches were performed, each of the nine Plaintiffs in this consolidated set of cases filed a separate federal complaint in a separate civil case including the following Counts: (1) a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (hereafter “Section 1983”) count seeking money damages and a permanent injunction based on an unreasonable search in violation of the Fourth Amendment; (2) two Virginia law false imprisonment claims seeking money damages; (3) a Virginia common law civil conspiracy claim seeking money damages; and (4) a punitive damages claim associated with the Section 1983 Fourth Amendment claim and a punitive damages claim associated with the civil conspiracy claim. In addition to the claims recited above, Plaintiff Yolanda Vines and Plaintiff Verita Braswell each advanced a battery claim seeking money damages based on the assertion that physical contact was made by one of the Defendants during the strip searches.
The next business day after such suits were filed, Sheriff Watson revoked the Jail security clearances of the six Plaintiffs that were still working at the Jail. Those six Plaintiffs (collectively “Injunction Plaintiffs”) 4 then amended their complaints to add an injunctive relief Section 1983 claim asserting that the revocation of their security clearances was in retaliation for filing this lawsuit, and was therefore a violation of their First Amendment rights to free speech. The Injunction Plaintiffs' newly added claim sought preliminary and permanent injunctive relief in the form of immediate reinstatement of their security clearances and a permanent bar on any further retaliation. After conducting an evidentiary hearing on May 16, 2012, this Court denied the request for preliminary injunctive relief in its Injunction Opinion issued on July 24, 2012. ECF No. 37.
Subsequent to the filing of the amended complaints, Plaintiffs were granted leave of Court to again amend their complaints to clarify that the Defendants were being sued in their “official capacities” as well as their “individual capacities.” Each of the Injunction Plaintiffs filed a second amended complaint in May 2012.5 For administrative ease, and with agreement of counsel, all nine separately filed civil cases were then consolidated into case number 2:12cv231. ECF No. 17.
Presently before the Court is Defendants' summary judgment motion, which raises: (1) immunity defenses as a bar to Plaintiffs' suit; and (2) asserts that the undisputed facts support a ruling in Defendants' favor on the merits. Plaintiffs oppose summary judgment, arguing primarily that material factual disputes preclude summary resolution of Plaintiffs' claims. Subsequent to the filing of the motion for summary judgment, the Court afforded all parties an opportunity to submit supplementary evidence relevant to the summary judgment motion. This matter is therefore ripe for review.
The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide that a district court shall grant summary judgment in favor of a movant if such party “shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(a). The mere existence of some alleged factual dispute between the parties “will not defeat an otherwise properly supported motion for summary judgment; the requirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Anderson v. Liberty Lobby Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247–48, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986).
If a movant has properly advanced evidence supporting entry of summary judgment, the non-moving party may not rest upon the mere allegations of the pleadings, but instead must set forth specific facts in the form of exhibits and sworn statements illustrating a genuine issue for trial. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–24, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). At that point, “the judge's function is not himself to weigh the evidence and determine the truth of the matter but to determine whether there is a genuine issue for trial.” Anderson, 477 U.S. at 249, 106 S.Ct. 2505. In doing so, the judge must construe the facts and all “justifiable inferences” in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, and the judge may not make credibility determinations. Id. at 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505;T–Mobile Northeast LLC v. City Council of City of Newport News, Va., 674 F.3d 380, 385 (4th Cir.2012). Because a ruling on summary judgment “necessarily implicates the substantive evidentiary standard of proof that would apply at the trial on the merits[,] ... [t]he mere existence of a scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff's position will be insufficient” to overcome a defendant's well-founded summary judgment motion. Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252, 106 S.Ct. 2505.
As indicated above, in addition to seeking summary judgment on the merits of several of Plaintiffs' claims, Defendants assert Eleventh Amendment immunity as a bar to Plaintiffs' official capacity claims seeking monetary damages, and assert qualified immunity as a bar to Plaintiffs' individual capacity claims seeking monetary damages. Plaintiffs appear to abandon their official capacity claims seeking monetary damages based on Defendants' invocation of Eleventh Amendment immunity, but pursue their official capacity claims seeking injunctive relief. Pls.' Opp'n to S.J. 23–24, ECF No. 34. In contrast, Plaintiffs' squarely challenge Defendants' assertion of qualified immunity as to the individual capacity claims seeking monetary damages. In an effort to fully consider the numerous, and distinct, legal issues in this difficult area of the law, the Court separately addresses Plaintiffs' official capacity and individual capacity claims below. After conducting such analysis, the Court finds that Defendants have demonstrated that they are immune from suit as to certain claims for relief. However, because disputed facts preclude completion of the immunity analysis as to other claims, and because the immunities invoked by Defendants do not extend to all claims for relief, a trial remains necessary in this case.
(Eleventh Amendment Immunity)
The Eleventh Amendment to the Constitution of the United States provides that “[t]he judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.” U.S. Const. amend. XI. “Although the terms of the amendment only prohibit suits against a state by citizens of other states and foreign countries, the Supreme Court, in 1890, in Hans v. Louisiana, held that it would be ‘anomalous' to allow states to be sued by their own citizens.” E. Chemerinsky, Federal Jurisdiction § 7.3, at 432 (6th ed. 2012) (citing Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 18, 10 S.Ct. 504, 33 L.Ed. 842 (1890)); see Lytle v. Griffith, 240 F.3d 404, 408 (4th Cir.2001) (quoting Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663, 94 S.Ct. 1347, 39 L.Ed.2d 662 (1974)) (Eleventh Amendment, “it is well established that ‘an unconsenting State is immune from suits brought in federal courts by her own citizens' ”) that, notwithstanding the express language of the . When ...
To continue reading
Request your trial-
Riddick v. Watson
... ... Cook , No. 6:18cv73, 2018 WL 4935457, at *1 (W.D. Va. Oct. 11, 2018) ("In Virginia an action against a sheriff in his official capacity has been held to be an action against the state for the purpose of this immunity."); Vollette v. Watson , 937 F. Supp. 2d 706, 714-15, 715 n.7 (E.D. Va. 2013) (stating that a "Virginia Sheriff, as an arm of the State, is not subject to official capacity Section 1983 monetary liability," and noting that with respect to such claims Virginia has not waived, nor has Congress abrogated, its ... ...
-
Rollins v. Kjellstrom & Lee, Inc.
... ... (declining consideration of arguments raised about a claim only in reply because opposing party did not have a full opportunity to respond); Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706, 726 (E.D.Va.2013) (rejecting attempt to assert new legal and factual arguments in reply while noting that the opposing ... ...
-
Faiaz v. Colgate Univ.
... ... 178 F.Supp.2d at 1066. See also Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706, 72829 & n. 20 (E.D.Va.2013) (distinguishing McAndrew on the basis of the subsection of 1985, but also specifically ... ...
-
Mathis v. McDonough
...— U.S. —, 133 S. Ct. 9 (2012) (reversing holding that plaintiff was not entitled to attorney's fees); accord Vollette v. Watson, 937 F. Supp. 2d 706, 720 (E.D. Va. 2013). 18. As noted, I have not been asked in the Motion to determine the adequacy of the allegations as to whether Muse was ac......
-
8.3 Statutory Business Conspiracy
...67 Va. Cir. 269 (Charlottesville 2005).[57] Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 428, 362 S.E.2d 699, 708 (1987); see also Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp2d 706, 727 (E.D. Va. 2013) (quoting Fox with approval).[58] Fox, 234 Va. at 428 (where the court noted that a concert promoter's claim against the ......
-
12.8 Miscellaneous Issues
...Charles E. Brauer Co. with approval).[163] Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 428, 362 S.E.2d 699, 708 (1987); see also Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp.2d 706, 727 (E.D. Va. 2013).[164] The doctrine does not apply if the agent is acting outside the scope of the agency relationship at the time the wr......
-
8.4 Defenses
...Charles E. Brauer Co. with approval).[114] Fox v. Deese, 234 Va. 412, 428, 362 S.E.2d 699, 708 (1987); see also Vollette v. Watson, 937 F.Supp2d 706, 727 (E.D. Va. 2013).[115] The doctrine does not apply if the agent is acting outside the scope of the agency relationship at the time the wro......