Volusia Cnty. Cattlemen's Ass'n, Inc. v. W. World Ins. Co.
| Decision Date | 27 October 2016 |
| Docket Number | Case No: 6:15–cv–1239–Orl–41DAB |
| Citation | 218 F.Supp.3d 1343 |
| Parties | VOLUSIA COUNTY CATTLEMEN'S ASSOCIATION, INC., Plaintiff, v. WESTERN WORLD INSURANCE COMPANY, Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Florida |
Darren Jay Elkind, Paul Elkind & Branz, PA, Deltona, FL, for Plaintiff.
Chris Ballentine, Fisher Rushmer, P.A., Orlando, FL, for Defendant.
THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 31) and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment (Doc. 39). The parties filed their respective responses in opposition. (Pl.'s Resp. to Def.'s Mot. Summ. J., Doc. 36; Def.'s Resp. to Pl.'s Mot. Summ. J., Doc. 38). Defendant also filed a Reply to Plaintiff's Response (Doc. 41). For the reasons set forth herein, Defendant's Motion for Summary Judgment will be granted, and Plaintiff's Amended Motion for Summary Judgment will be denied.
This is a declaratory judgment action brought by Plaintiff, Volusia County Cattlemen's Association, Inc., against its insurer Western World Insurance, Company, seeking a declaratory judgment that Defendant has a duty to defend and indemnify Plaintiff in an underlying tort suit. (See generally Compl., Doc. 2). Plaintiff also seeks an award of attorney's fees. The parties agree that none of the facts are disputed and that the Court's interpretation of two policy exclusions will determine the issue of coverage and thus whether the insurer had a duty to defend and indemnify Plaintiff in the underlying lawsuit.
Defendant issued Plaintiff a commercial general liability insurance policy, which was in effect during the relevant time period. (Compl. ¶ 4; see also Commercial Lines Policy, Doc. 2–1, at 2).1 The policy requires Defendant to defend and indemnify Plaintiff against claims of bodily injury or property damage to which the insurance applies. (Commercial General Liability Coverage Form, Doc. 2–1, at 31). The policy explicitly states that the insurer has no duty to defend claims that are not covered under the policy. (Id. ). Included in the policy are multiple exclusions and conditions that limit coverage. (Common Policy Conditions, Doc. 2–1, at 7–30). The parties dispute the applicability of two exclusions in particular: the "Rodeo Performance Limitation Endorsement," ("Rodeo Performance Exclusion," Doc. 2–1, at 26), and the "Athletic or Sports Participants Exclusion," ("Athletic Exclusion," Doc. 2–1, at 25).
On May 12, 2015, Desiree Cicero brought the underlying tort suit against Plaintiff in the Seventh Judicial Circuit in and for Volusia County, Florida, seeking to recover for personal injuries she sustained while attending Plaintiff's annual "Cracker Day." (See generally Cicero's Original Compl., Doc. 2–1, at 55). Cicero's Complaint alleged that every year, for a fee, members of the public can attend Plaintiff's Cracker Day, which is a day-long affair with rodeo-type exhibitions and other amusements. (Id. at 56). As set out in Cicero's Complaint, one of the regular events at Cracker Day is the "cash grab"—an event where those attending Cracker Day are invited to enter a fenced area populated by full grown bulls with money attached to their bodies. (Id. ). Those participating attempt to grab money from the bulls who are not in any way restrained or controlled.2 (Id. ). On April 27, 2013, Cicero attended the Cracker Day and participated in the cash grab. (Id. ). While participating, Cicero was "violently gored by one of the three roaming bulls, causing serious and permanent injury." (Id. at 57). Cicero further alleged that Plaintiff breached its duty of care "by allowing participants to interact with unrestrained bulls in an attempt to grab cash," failing to take precautions, and failing to warn of the potential dangers associated with participating in the cash grab. (Id. ).
Cicero's Complaint was presented to Defendant. (Compl. ¶ 6). Defendant denied coverage. (Id. ; see also W. Letter Den. Coverage, Doc. 2–1, at 60). In doing so, Defendant explicitly declined to pay "for any judgment or settlement" or to pay for an attorney to defend the suit brought by Cicero. (W. Letter Den. Coverage at 60–61). Defendant stated in the letter that the denial was based on the applicability of two policy exclusions—the "Rodeo Performance Exclusion" and the "Athletic Exclusion." (Id. at 60–63). Thereafter, Plaintiff instituted this suit, seeking a declaratory judgment as to its rights under the insurance policy and attorney's fees.
(Compl. ¶¶ 11, 14). The parties have now filed cross-motions for summary judgment.
Summary judgment is appropriate when the moving party demonstrates "that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute is genuine "if the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc. , 477 U.S. 242, 248, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986). A fact is material if it may "affect the outcome of the suit under the governing law." Id. "The moving party bears the initial burden of showing the court, by reference to materials on file, that there are no genuine issues of material fact that should be decided at trial." Allen v. Bd. of Pub. Educ. , 495 F.3d 1306, 1313–14 (11th Cir. 2007). Stated differently, the moving party discharges its burden by showing "that there is an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case." Celotex Corp. v. Catrett , 477 U.S. 317, 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986).
However, once the moving party has discharged its burden, the nonmoving party must "go beyond the pleadings and by her own affidavits, or by the depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, designate specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for trial." Id. at 324, 106 S.Ct. 2548 (quotation omitted). The nonmoving party may not rely solely on "conclusory allegations without specific supporting facts." Evers v. Gen. Motors Corp. , 770 F.2d 984, 986 (11th Cir. 1985). Nevertheless, "[i]f there is a conflict between the parties' allegations or evidence, the [nonmoving] party's evidence is presumed to be true and all reasonable inferences must be drawn in the [nonmoving] party's favor." Allen , 495 F.3d at 1314.
It is undisputed that Florida law governs the interpretation of the insurance policy at issue. In Florida, "[s]ummary judgment is appropriate in declaratory judgment actions seeking a declaration of coverage when the insurer's duty, if any, rests solely on the applicability of the insurance policy, the construction and effect of which is a matter of law." Northland Cas. Co. v. HBE Corp. , 160 F.Supp.2d 1348, 1358 (M.D. Fla. 2001) ; see also Gas Kwick, Inc. v. United Pac. Ins. Co. , 58 F.3d 1536, 1538–39 (11th Cir. 1995) (). "Florida law provides that insurance contracts are construed in accordance with the plain language of the policies as bargained for by the parties." Westport Ins. Corp. v. VN Hotel Grp., LLC , No. 6:10–cv–222–ORL–28KRS, 2011 WL 4804896, at *2 (M.D. Fla. Oct. 11, 2011), aff'd , 513 Fed.Appx. 927 (11th Cir. 2013) (quotation omitted). "The scope and extent of insurance coverage is determined by the language and terms of the policy." Id. (quotation omitted).
"[T]he Florida Supreme Court has made clear that the language of the policy is the most important factor." James River Ins. Co. v. Ground Down Eng'g, Inc. , 540 F.3d 1270, 1274 (11th Cir. 2008) (quotation omitted). Additionally, "insurance contracts are construed according to their plain meaning." Id. at 1274 (quoting Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co. , 913 So.2d 528, 532 (Fla. 2005) ). "[I]f a policy provision is clear and unambiguous, it should be enforced according to its terms whether it is a basic policy provision or an exclusionary provision." Taurus Holdings, Inc. , 913 So.2d at 532 (quotation omitted).
Where the "relevant policy language is susceptible to more than one reasonable interpretation, one providing coverage and the [other] limiting coverage, the insurance policy is considered ambiguous." Westport Ins. Corp. , 2011 WL 4804896, at *2 (quoting Auto–Owners Ins. Co. v. Anderson , 756 So.2d 29, 34 (Fla. 2000) ). In order for an insurance contract to be found ambiguous, "[t]here must be a genuine inconsistency, uncertainty, or ambiguity in meaning that remains after resort[ing] to the ordinary rules of construction." Valiant Ins. Co. v. Evonosky , 864 F.Supp. 1189, 1191 (M.D. Fla. 1994) (quotation omitted). "[A] court may not rewrite the policy or add meaning to create an ambiguity." Id. Additionally, the mere fact that policy language requires interpretation does not render the language ambiguous. Id. "Ambiguous policy provisions are interpreted liberally in favor of the insured and strictly against the drafter who prepared the policy." Westport Ins. Corp. , 2011 WL 4804896, at *2 (quoting Auto–Owners Ins. Co. , 756 So.2d at 34 ). Moreover, "[e]xclusionary clauses are construed even more strictly against the insurer than coverage clauses," and the insurer has the burden of demonstrating that an exclusion in a policy applies. Id. (quotation omitted).
"An insurer's duty to defend is distinct from and broader than the duty to indemnify." Lime Tree Vill. Cmty. Club Ass'n v. State Farm Gen. Ins. Co. , 980 F.2d 1402, 1405 (11th Cir. 1993) (quotation omitted). Whether an insurer has a duty to defend "is determined by examining the allegations in the complaint filed against the insured." Id. ; see also Goldberg v. Nat'l Union Fire Ins. Co. of Pittsburgh, PA. , 143 F.Supp.3d 1283, 1293 (S.D. Fla. 2015) ("[A]n insurer's duty to defend its insured against legal action...
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