Von Rueden v. State

• Decision Date: 24 June 1897
• Citation: 96 Wis. 671,71 N.W. 1048
• Parties: VON RUEDEN ET AL. v. STATE.
• Court: Wisconsin Supreme Court

96 Wis. 671

71 N.W. 1048

VON RUEDEN ET AL.

v.STATE.

Supreme Court of Wisconsin.

June 24, 1897.

Error to municipal court, Waukesha county; D. S. Fullar, Judge.

Joseph Von Rueden and others were convicted of interrupting and molesting an assembly, and bring error. Affirmed.

The plaintiffs in error, Joseph Von Rueden, John Bealand, and Edward Sargeant, were arrested, tried, and convicted of having, on the 15th day of June, 1896, at the town of Eagle, in Waukesha county, “willfully and unlawfully and maliciously interrupted and molested an assembly or meeting of people lawfully and peaceably assembled on the public highway for the purpose of listening to a certain lecture delivered by one M. J. Fanning, in said town, in this: that the accused then and there made loud noises by blowing tin horns and firing shotguns for the purpose of interrupting said meeting, and molesting the people there peaceably assembled, contrary to the statute,” etc. The defendants pleaded in bar that June 24, 1896, the same identical cause of action was pending against them, before the same court, and they were placed on trial and in jeopardy (annexing to said plea a copy of the former complaint); that after testimony taken, the court having jurisdiction, etc., on their motion they were acquitted, and discharged from custody. The complaint was identical with the one upon which they were tried in the present case, except that it did not state how or by what means the accused disturbed the alleged meeting. There was no reply to the plea, but the record shows that when the defendants were brought before the court on the first complaint for trial, and a witness had been sworn, they objected to the introduction of any evidence under the complaint, on the ground that it did not state facts sufficient to constitute a cause of action, and the court sustained the objection, and the defendants were discharged. The court overruled the plea in bar. A similar objection to the second complaint was made and overruled, and the trial proceeded, the defendants having pleaded not guilty. After verdict of guilty, a motion for a new trial was made, and also a motion in arrest of judgment, founded on alleged defects in the complaint and proceedings, and that the statute (Rev. St. § 4597) did not apply to cases of disturbance of other than religious meetings, or meetings for other like purposes. These motions were denied, and the court sentenced each of the defendants to pay a fine of $5 and the costs of prosecution, and in default of payment of the same that each of the defendants be committed to jail, at hard labor, until the fine and costs are paid, or they are discharged, not exceeding three months.D. J. Hemlock, for plaintiffs in error.

W. H. Mylrea, Atty. Gen., for the State.

PINNEY, J. (after stating the facts).

1. The statute under which the plaintiffs in error were convicted provides that: “Any person who shall, at any time, willfully interrupt or molest any assembly or meeting of people, for religious worship or for other purposes, lawfully and peaceably assembled, shall be punished by fine,” etc. Rev. St. § 4597. It is objected that the complaint is defective in not showing that the meeting mentioned was assembled for worship, or other like purpose, and that the nature and purpose of the lecture or assembly should have been stated to enable the court to say that it was a lawful assemblage. The contention is that the rule of construction “noscitur a sociis” applies, and that the statute is not applicable to all assemblies for meetings of people, lawfully and peaceably assembled. The right of the people peaceably to assemble to consult for the common good is so important in a free government that it has been secured by constitutional provision (Const. art. 4, § 1), and there is no statute, that we are aware of, which extends to and protects all assemblies and meetings of people, lawfully and peaceably assembled, from interruption or molestation, unless the statute quoted has such general application. The rule which counsel invokes is a familiar one, and has been frequently applied, especially in the interpretation of criminal statutes, and he has cited many cases illustrating its use and application. Bevitt v. Crandall, 19 Wis. 583;Edson v. Hayden, 20 Wis. 684;Morse v. Insurance Co., 30 Wis. 534; Jensen v. State, 60 Wis. 578, 19 N. W. 374;State v. Black, 75 Wis. 490, 44 N. W. 635. The cases on this subject will be found, upon examination, to rest mainly upon the rule that “when there are general words followingparticular and specific words, the former must be confined to things of the same kind” (Suth. St. Const. § 268), and the rule laid down by Lord Bacon is that “the coupling of words together shows that they are to be understood in the same sense” (Broom, Leg. Max. 588). The rule “noscitur a sociis” is one of interpretation only, and will not prevail where it is clear that the words were not used in the same sense. Here are no associated words. There is a single purpose specified in the statute, namely, to protect religious meetings, and it is followed by language evidently intended to extend the same protection to all meetings for other purposes which are clearly within the policy and purpose of the act. It is said that the general object of the act sometimes requires that the final generic word shall not be restricted in meaning by its predecessors (End. Interp. St. § 410), and that the rule invoked is merely an aid in ascertaining the legislative intention, and does not justify the court in restraining the operation of the statute within limits narrower than those intended by the legislature. Woodworth v. State, 26 Ohio St. 196. The limitation in the statute is to all meetings of people ...