Vontress v. State

• Citation: 325 P.3d 1114,299 Kan. 607
• Decision Date: 30 May 2014
• Docket Number: No. 102,904.,102,904.
• Parties: Damon VONTRESS, Appellant, v. STATE of Kansas, Appellee.
• Court: United States State Supreme Court of Kansas

299 Kan. 607

325 P.3d 1114

Damon VONTRESS, Appellant,

v.STATE of Kansas, Appellee.

No. 102,904.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

May 30, 2014.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and the appellate court's review is unlimited.

2. When interpreting a statute, the fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. When language is plain and unambiguous, there is no need to resort to statutory construction. An appellate court merely interprets the language as it appears; it is not free to speculate and cannot read into the statute language not readily found there.

3. Generally, an appellate court does not consider issues raised for the first time at oral arguments. However, it has authority to address issues that it has raised there on its own.

4. An action under K.S.A. 60–1507 is a separate civil action that is generally governed by the rules of civil procedure. But those rules do not apply if they are displaced by a more specific provision.

5. Statutes complete in themselves, relating to a specific subject, take precedence over general statutes or over other statutes that deal only incidentally with the same question. When a statute dealing generally with a subject conflicts with another statute dealing specifically with a certain phase of that subject, the specific statute controls.

6. K.S.A. 60–1507(f) alone controls whether a 60–1507 motion is timely because it is more specific than the general time limitation exception in K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–206(b).

7. Manifest injustice under K.S.A. 60–1507 must be determined under the totality of the circumstances.

8. In determining whether the defendant has shown a manifest injustice under the totality of the circumstances, the district court should consider the following, non-exhaustive factors: (1) whether the prisoner provides persuasive reasons or circumstances that prevented him or her from filing the K.S.A. 60–1507 motion within the 1–year time limitation; (2) whether the merits of the prisoner's claim raise substantial issues of law or fact deserving of the district court's consideration; and (3) whether the prisoner sets forth a colorable claim of actual innocence.

9. Under the totality of the circumstances in this case, movant has failed to prove a manifest injustice to extend the 1–year time limitation in K.S.A. 60–1507(f).

Michael P. Whalen, Law Office of Michael P. Whalen, of Wichita, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Julie A. Koon, assistant district attorney, argued the cause, and Nola Tedesco Foulston, district attorney and Steve Six, attorney general, were with her on the brief for appellee.

The opinion of the court was delivered by NUSS, C.J.:

Damon Vontress contends the district court and Court of Appeals both erred in denying his motion for habeas relief as untimely under K.S.A. 60–1507(f). While admitting his motion was untimely filed after the 1–year limit in K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(1), Vontress argues the summary denial of his motion caused “a manifest injustice” which entitled him to an extension of the time limit under K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(2). Both lower courts rejected this argument with varying rationales. We granted review to clarify the manifest injustice standard in K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(2).

We conclude a prisoner's failure to provide the reasons for the delay does not automatically exclude the late-filed motion. Rather, manifest injustice must be determined based on the totality of the circumstances in each case. But because there was no manifest injustice established under the totality of the circumstances here, we affirm the denial of Vontress' motion.

Facts and Procedural Background

A jury convicted Vontress of first-degree murder, aggravated robbery, aggravated battery, and criminal possession of a firearm. The district court imposed a mandatory 40–year prison sentence for the murder convictionand consecutive sentences of 78 months, 41 months, and 8 months for the remaining counts. On direct appeal, we concluded that the convictions for aggravated robbery and aggravated battery were multiplicitous and reversed the conviction for the latter. We otherwise affirmed. See State v. Vontress, 266 Kan. 248, 257, 970 P.2d 42 (1998).

Ten years after this court's decision, Vontress filed the present motion for habeas relief under K.S.A. 60–1507, asserting Kansas law on premeditation is unconstitutional. The State responded Vontress' motion was untimely and therefore barred by K.S.A. 60–1507(f). The district court conducted a nonevidentiary hearing at which it denied the motion. Its journal entry provides in relevant part:

“2. In the instant motion, movant asserts Kansas law is unconstitutional. He specifically contends, ‘Kansas Law on Premeditation is itself unconstitutional’ and he cites various cases dating back to 1887.

“3. Movant is not entitled to relief because his motion is untimely. [Citation omitted.] The motion is untimely because his direct appeal was final in 1998 and he fails to show that manifest injustice justifies review of his motion. [Citation omitted.] Notably, the basis of his attack is caselaw dating from 1887 and he has not provided any indication or suggestion that justifies him waiting ten years to attack Kansas law.

....

“6. The motions, files and records conclusively show the movant is not entitled to the relief requested.”

The Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's denial solely because Vontress failed to allege “any circumstances [that] prevent[ed] him from [timely] filing his motion.” Vontress v. State, 45 Kan.App.2d 430, 433, 249 P.3d 452 (2011). Because Vontress failed to justify the untimeliness of his motion, the panel majority concluded that he had failed to show manifest injustice under K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(2) allowing him to proceed. Consequently, the panel did not consider whether the underlying merits of Vontress' motion—Kansas law on premeditation is unconstitutional which invalidated his murder conviction—demonstrated a manifest injustice sufficient to extend the 1–year time limitation of K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(1).

Judge Leben's concurring opinion argued the majority's interpretation of manifest injustice in K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(2) is too narrow. He concluded his colleagues erred in refusing to consider the merits of Vontress' argument because a motion's merits could establish manifest injustice in some circumstances, e.g., an inmate showing actual innocence. But Judge Leben concurred in the majority's result because Vontress “presented neither a reason for his delayed filing nor a potentially valid claim.” 45 Kan.App.2d at 433, 249 P.3d 452. We granted Vontress' petition for review, obtaining jurisdiction under K.S.A. 60–2101(b).

Analysis

Issue: The Court of Appeals panel majority incorrectly interpreted the manifest injustice standard set out in K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(2).

K.S.A. 60–1507(a) authorizes certain prisoners to file a motion attacking their sentence. It states in part: “A prisoner ... may, pursuant to the time limitations imposed by subsection (f), move the court which imposed the sentence to vacate, set aside or correct the sentence.” (Emphasis added.) The time limitation imposed by subsection (f) provides:

“ Time limitations. (1) Any action under this section must be brought within one year of: (i) The final order of the last appellate court in this state to exercise jurisdiction on a direct appeal or the termination of such appellate jurisdiction; or (ii) the denial of a petition for writ of certiorari to the United States supreme court or issuance of such court's final order following granting such petition.

“(2) The time limitation herein may be extended by the court only to prevent a manifest injustice.” (Emphasis added.)

Because Vontress' convictions were final before the effective date of K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(1), he had until June 30, 2004, to timely file a motion. See Tolen v. State, 285 Kan. 672, 674, 176 P.3d 170 (2008). Vontress did not file his motion until November 10, 2008, more than 4 years after the deadline.

In attacking the panel majority's opinion, Vontress argues that K.S.A. 60–1507(f)(2) does not require a movant to explain the reasons for filing an untimely motion. Rather, he contends that because there are no other avenues through which he may pursue his constitutional claims, justice demands that he be heard regardless of the time limitation. Accordingly, the court's manifest injustice inquiry requires consideration of the merits of the motion.

The State responds that the manifest injustice inquiry is limited to the reasons for delay. In support, it cites federal caselaw requiring habeas petitioners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (2012) to show extraordinary circumstances caused the delay to qualify for equitable tolling of the statute's 1–year limit.

At oral argument before this court, we asked counsel whether the general timeliness rule for civil actions in K.S.A.2013 Supp. 60–206(b)(1)(B) applies to untimely 60–1507 motions. Specifically, we questioned whether a habeas movant must comply with both 60–1507(f) and 60–206(b)(1)(B). Both counsel were uncertain how the two provisions interact. But the State later filed a letter of additional authority under Supreme Court Rule 6.09(b) ( 2013 Kan. Ct. R. Annot. 50) contending that 60–206(b)(1)(B) does not apply to 60–1507 motions.

Standard of review

This case requires us to interpret K.S.A. 60–1507(f). Statutory interpretation is a question of law, and this court's review is unlimited. State v. Holt, 298 Kan. 469, 474, 313 P.3d 826 (2013). Accordingly, we are not bound by the lower courts' interpretation. State v. Hopkins, 295 Kan. 579, 581, 285 P.3d 1021 (2012). When interpreting statutes, we are mindful that

“ ‘ “[t]he fundamental rule to which all other rules are subordinate is that the intent of the legislature governs if that intent can be ascertained. When language is plain and unambiguous, there is no...