Vore v. Osborn
Decision Date | 09 March 2016 |
Docket Number | CIV. 13-5075-JLV |
Parties | THEODORE J. VORE, Plaintiff, v. CLIFFORD L. OSBORN, Defendant. |
Court | U.S. District Court — District of South Dakota |
Plaintiff Theodore Vore filed a complaint against defendant Clifford Osborn seeking recovery for Vore's injuries suffered in a collision between their two motorcycles on August 5, 2012. (Docket 1). Mr. Osborn filed an amended answer and counterclaim seeking recovery for his own injuries. (Docket 7). Mr. Vore filed a reply to the counterclaim. (Docket 8). Mr. Osborn filed two Daubert1 motions challenging the opposing party's expert witnesses and another related motion. (Dockets 55, 57 & 70). Mr. Vore filed a motion to strike. (Docket 68). Each motion will be separately resolved by this order.
Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence governs testimony by expert witnesses and states:
Fed. R. Evid. 702. Rule 703 describes the bases for expert testimony.
An expert may base an opinion on facts or data in the case that the expert has been made aware of or personally observed. If experts in the particular field would reasonably rely on those kinds of facts or data in forming an opinion on the subject, they need not be admissible for the opinion to be admitted. But if the facts or data would otherwise be inadmissible, the proponent of the opinion may disclose them to the jury only if their probative value in helping the jury evaluate the opinion substantially outweighs their prejudicial effect.
As a preliminary matter, "[t]he proponent of the expert testimony must prove its admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence." Lauzon v. Senco Products, Inc., 270 F.3d 681, 686 (8th Cir. 2001) (citing Daubert, 509 U.S. 579 at 592; see also Marmo v. Tyson Fresh Meats, Inc., 457 F.3d 748, 757-58 (8th Cir. 2006) (same).
The trial judge "must ensure that any and all scientific testimony or evidence admitted is not only relevant, but reliable."2 Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589.The subject of an expert's testimony must be scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge. Id. at 589-90. This requirement "establishes a standard of evidentiary reliability."3 Id. at 590; see also Kumho Tire Co. Ltd. v. Carmichael, 526 U.S. 137, 147 (1999) ( )(citing Daubert, 509 U.S. at 589-90).
Although Daubert deals specifically with expert testimony based on scientific knowledge, the Supreme Court extended the principles in Daubert to all expert testimony. Kumho, 526 U.S. at 141. "Proposed testimony must be supported by appropriate validation—i.e., 'good grounds,' based on what is known." Id.
Expert evidence is unreliable, and thus inadmissible, "if it is speculative, unsupported by sufficient facts, or contrary to the facts of the case." United States v. Bailey, 571 F.3d 791, 803 (8th Cir. 2009); see also United States v. Two Elk, 536 F.3d 890, 904 (8th Cir. 2008) ( )(quoting Kudabeck v. Kroger Co., 338 F.3d 856, 861 (8th Cir. 2003)).
Rule 702 requires expert testimony to be relevant, that is, to " 'assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue.' " Daubert, 509 U.S. at 591. "Rule 702's 'helpfulness' standard requires a validscientific connection to the pertinent inquiry as a precondition to admissibility." Id. at 591-92. The issue is one of does the testimony "fit." Id. at 591. " 'Fit' is not always obvious, and scientific validity for one purpose is not necessarily scientific validity for other, unrelated purposes." Id.
In sum, "[f]aced with a proffer of expert scientific testimony, then, the trial judge must determine at the outset, pursuant to Rule 104(a),4 whether the expert is proposing to testify to (1) scientific knowledge that (2) will assist the trier of fact to understand or determine a fact in issue." Id. at 592. "This entails a preliminary assessment of whether the reasoning or methodology underlying the testimony is scientifically valid and of whether that reasoning or methodology properly can be applied to the facts in issue." Id. at 592-93.
Daubert, 509 U.S. at 593-94. A district court may consider all or none of these factors; a court should consider them in cases "where they are reasonable measures of the reliability of expert testimony." Kumho, 526 U.S. at 152. The applicability of these factors will depend on the particular facts of the case. Id. at 150-51.
Margolies v. McCleary, Inc., 447 F.3d 1115, 1121 (8th Cir. 2006). Challenges to the factual basis for an expert's opinion do not generally affect its admissibility. Children's Broadcasting Corp. v. Walt Disney Co., 357 F.3d 860, 865 (8th Cir. 2004) (citing Bonner v. ISP Technologies, Inc., 259 F.3d 924, 929-30 (8th Cir. 2001) (quotingHose v. Chicago Northwestern Transportation Co., 70 F.3d 968, 974 (8th Cir. 1996)).
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit gives "great latitude" to district courts in determining whether expert testimony satisfies the requirements of Rule 702. Allen v. Brown Clinic, P.L.L.P., 531 F.3d 568, 573 (8th Cir. 2008) (citing Craftsmen Limousine, Inc. v. Ford Motor Co., 363 F.3d 761, 776 (8th Cir. 2004)). Regardless of what factors are evaluated, the main inquiry is whether the proffered expert's testimony is sufficiently reliable. Id. at 574 ( ).
Rule 702 requires a flexible approach. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 594. The focus of Rule 702 "must be solely on principles and methodology, not on the conclusions that they generate." Id. at 595. "Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and careful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence." Id. at 596; see also Two Elk, 536 F.3d at 903 ( )(emphasis in original) (quoting Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936, 940-41 (8th Cir. 2005)). "[D]oubts about whether an expert's testimony will be useful should generally be resolved in favor ofadmissibility." Larabee v. M M & L International Corp., 896 F.2d 1112, 1116 n.6 (8th Cir. 1990) ).
The Eighth Circuit reviews under an abuse of discretion standard a district court's ruling admitting expert testimony. United States v. Eagle, 515 F.3d 794, 800 (8th Cir. 2008); see also Kuhmo, 526 U.S. at 152 ( )(quoting General Elec. Co. v. Joiner, 522 U.S. 136, 138-39 (1997)).
Mr. Osborn challenges Richard Kiley on the basis that he is a "motorcycle safety instructor" offering "opinions on motorcycle safety issues." (Docket 56 at p. 3). The seemingly significant and only opinion expressed by Mr. Kiley is "that Osborn contributed to the cause [of] the accident by failing to employ proper defensive driving strategies, namely: failing to keep a proper following distance." Id. Mr. Osborn argues this opinion "involves common sense and simple rules of the road which are well within the common knowledge of lay jurors." Id. Mr. Osborn further objects to the witness' testimony because he "reached [his] conclusion, not by conducting independent tests and/or analysis or by relying on the accident reconstructionists' opinions in this case, but solely on the statements of Osborn and driver safety manuals." Id.
Mr. Osborn contends the witness' testimony is not admissible because the witness "does not know what speed Osborn and Vore were traveling prior to and at the time of impact, the actual distance between Osborn and Vore, or how many feet per second Osborn would have traveled going at his rate of speed." Id. at p. 4. Mr. Osborn argues Mr....
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