Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n

• Decision Date: 10 August 1951
• Docket Number: No. 13425.,13425.
• Citation: Voris v. Texas Employers Ins. Ass'n, 190 F.2d 929 (5th Cir. 1951)
• Parties: VORIS et al. v. TEXAS EMPLOYERS INS. ASS'N et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit

190 F.2d 929 (1951)

VORIS et al. v. TEXAS EMPLOYERS INS. ASS'N et al.

No. 13425.

United States Court of Appeals Fifth Circuit.

July 11, 1951.

Rehearing Denied August 10, 1951.

Leonard E. Choate, Asst. U. S. Atty., Beaumont, Tex., Herbert P. Miller, Atty., Dept. of Labor, Washington, D. C., Warren G. Moore, U. S. Atty., Tyler, Tex., Fred A. White, John T. Lindsey, Port Arthur, Tex., for appellants.

David C. Marcus, Beaumont, Tex., for appellees.

Before HUTCHESON, Chief Judge, and BORAH, and RUSSELL, Circuit Judges.

BORAH, Circuit Judge:

This appeal is from a judgment setting aside and enjoining enforcement of a compensation order of the Deputy Commissioner for the Eighth Compensation District, awarding death benefits to the widow and minor children of Arthur Heinrich under the provisions of the Longshoremen's and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act.¹

On October 8, 1948, Arthur Heinrich was an employee of the Burton Construction Company and engaged in the repair of the Motor Vessel Lanora, which was then upon navigable waters of the United States. On that day Heinrich suffered painful burns of the face and hands and general shock of undetermined degree as the result of an explosion aboard the vessel. Thereafter, he developed manic-depressive insanity and on May 21, 1949, shot himself. As a result of the gunshot wound, he died on June 10, 1949.

The Deputy Commissioner found that Heinrich's wound was self-inflicted with the intention of killing himself; that the act was carried out in a fit of mental despondence and depression resulting primarily from the effects of the explosion; that the act was the result of an irrational state of mind and uncontrollable impulse; and that it was not an act occasioned by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself as contemplated by section 3(b) of the Act.

Pursuant to these findings, the Deputy Commissioner entered an award which directed the employer and its insurance carrier, Texas Employer's Insurance Association, to pay compensation to the widow and minor children of the deceased, as well as certain hospitalization expenses and expenses attendant upon the burial of the deceased. Thereupon, the employer and its insurance carrier brought this action in the court below under the provisions of Section 21(b) of the Act to set aside and enjoin the enforcement of the award. The District Court, after reviewing the record made before the Deputy Commissioner, found that the award was not in accordance with law and was wholly unsupported by the evidence. Judgment was accordingly entered, setting aside and enjoining its enforcement.

The crucial and controlling question presented by this appeal is whether there is legal and factual support² for the Deputy Commissioner's conclusion that the deceased's act was not the result of a willful intention to kill himself within the meaning of section 3(b) of the Statute. This section provides that, "No compensation shall be payable if the injury was occasioned solely by the intoxication of the employee or by the willful intention of the employee to injure or kill himself or another."

In considering a compensation order a reviewing court must look to see whether it is forbidden by law, or is without reasonable legal basis. Our first inquiry, therefore, is whether there is a reasonable legal basis for the Deputy Commissioner's action.

In construing insurance policies excluding recovery for death by suicide, it is the established rule of the Supreme Court that if one whose life is insured intentionally kills himself when his reasoning faculties are so far impaired by insanity that he is unable to understand the moral character of his act, even if he does understand its physical nature, consequences, and effects, it is not a "suicide" or "self-destruction" within the meaning of those words in a clause excepting such risks from the coverage of the policy. Connecticut Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U.S. 468, 473, 14 S.Ct. 155, 37 L.Ed. 1148. In the early case of Mutual Life Ins. Co. v. Terry, 15 Wall. 580, 21 L.Ed. 236, the court said, "If the assured, being in possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties, from anger, pride, jealousy, or a desire to escape from the ills of life, intentionally takes his own life, the proviso attaches, and there can be no recovery. If the death is caused by the voluntary act of the assured, he knowing and intending that his death shall be the result of his act, but when his reasoning faculties are so far impaired that he is not able to understand the moral character, the general nature, consequences and effect of the act he is about to commit, or when he is impelled thereto by an insane impulse, which he has not the power to resist, such death is not within the contemplation of the parties to the contract, and the insurer is liable." The cited cases clearly draw a distinction between the intention of a person in possession of his ordinary reasoning faculties and the intention of a person whose reasoning faculties are sufficiently impaired. A similar distinction should be and has been drawn under section 3(b) of the Act between a willful intention of the employee to kill himself and an act of self-destruction which, because of his mental condition due to insanity, is not willful.

So far there is no difficulty. The difficulty arises in determining the meaning of the word "insanity" to be applied in a particular situation. In Delinousha v. National Biscuit Co., 248 N.Y. 93, 161 N.E. 431, 432, a case involving the question whether, under Sec. 10 of the New York Workmen's Compensation law, Consol. Laws, c. 67, the provisions of which are in substance identical with those contained in Section 3(b) of the Act, death benefits might be awarded if an injury causes insanity, which in turn causes suicide, the court refers to this difficulty. "It may be said safely that insanity is a symptom of some functional derangement of tissues of the brain. As this derangement is more or less deep seated, so the resulting symptoms are more or less profound. The legal effect differs under varying circumstances. Insanity for one purpose may not be insanity for another. * * *"

Then presenting instances, including the instance of the enforcement of a policy of insurance excepting death by suicide if the insured kills himself while insane, the court proceeds:

"Here, however, there is no agreement as to the precise meaning of the word — the extent of the mental deficiency which it connotes. In some courts it means inability to recognize the physical nature of the act. Cooper v. Mass. Mut. Life Ins. Co., 102 Mass. 227, 3 Am.Rep. 451. In others, unconsciousness that the act will cause death, or the presence of an irresistible insane impulse. Van Zandt v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 55 N.Y. 169, 14 Am.Rep. 215. Still elsewhere such an impairment of reason that, while the act is intentional and voluntary, the insured still does not understand its moral quality and its general nature or effect, or where an irresistible impulse is present. Conn. Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Akens, 150 U.S. 468, 14 S.Ct. 155, 37 L.Ed. 1148. And again the absence of criminal intent — of an evil motive. Eastabrook v. Union Mutual Life Ins. Co., 54 Me. 224, 89 Am.Dec. 743.

"The New York rule, a compromise between the two extreme views, and formulated in the Van Zandt Case, 55 N.Y. 169, 14 Am.Rep. 215, has been followed here. Newton v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., 76 N.Y. 426, 32 Am.Rep. 335; Penfold v. Universal Life Ins. Co., 85 N.Y. 317, 39 Am.Rep. 660; Meacham v. N. Y. State Mutual Ben. Assn., 120 N.Y. 237, 24 N.E. 283. In Newton v. Mutual Ben. Life Ins. Co., Judge Rapallo restates it. If, he says, the insured `acted under the control of an insane impulse caused by disease, and derangement of his intellect, which deprived him of the capacity of governing his own conduct in accordance with reason,' the suicide is not a voluntary act."

Turning to the precise question before us, the court concludes: "While helpful, the decisions as to insurance policies are not strictly analogous to claims arising under the Workmen's Compensation Law. The courts there are attempting to decide the meaning of an ambiguous clause in a contract. What was the intent of the parties. But here we deal with a statute intended to redress the incidence of that economic loss inevitable in industry. It is to be construed liberally. Death benefits are allowed if the injury results naturally and unavoidably in disease, and the disease causes death. This is so if the injury causes insanity from gangrenous poisoning or otherwise, and the insanity directly causes suicide; in other words, if the suicide is not the result of discouragement, of melancholy, of other sane conditions, but of brain derangement. If that is the cause, an award may be made. Death is then the proximate and direct result of the accident within the meaning of the statute." (Emphasis supplied.)

In 71 C.J. 638, the generally accepted view of the law of the American cases where, as here, it is claimed that insanity, meaning thereby some form of mental derangement, has deprived the act of willful intention, is thus summarized: "Provided the insanity results from a compensable accident and not from a brooding over the injury or other causes, the suicide of an employee while insane may entitle his dependents to compensation therefor; thus, where there follows as a direct result of the accident an insanity of such violence as to cause the victim to take his own life through an uncontrollable impulse or in a delirium of frenzy without conscious volition to produce death, there is a direct and unbroken causal connection between the physical injury and the death; however, where the suicide is the result of voluntary and willful choice determined by a moderately intelligent mental power with knowledge of the purpose and effect of the act, even though dominated by a disordered mind, a new and independent agency...