Voss v. Quicken Loans LLC
| Decision Date | 26 August 2021 |
| Docket Number | 1:20-cv-756 |
| Parties | SAMUEL VOSS, Plaintiff, v. QUICKEN LOANS LLC, et al., Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Southern District of Ohio |
Plaintiff Samuel Voss filed a putative class action suit against Defendants Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems Inc. (“MERS”) and Quicken Loans, LLC (“Quicken”) in state court, alleging that Defendants failed to comply with state law when they did not file an entry of satisfaction of a mortgage on Plaintiff's property within 90 days of the sale of that property. Defendants removed the action to federal court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction. Pending before the Court is Defendants' motion for summary judgment. (Doc. 22; see also Docs. 23-24). Plaintiff has filed an opposing memorandum and supporting exhibits, (see Docs. 28, 30, 32-34), to which Defendants have filed a reply. (see Docs. 35-39). As explained below, this Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, remand to state court is required.
Summary judgment is appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed.R.Civ.P. 56(c). In applying this standard, a court must view the evidence and draw all reasonable inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. See Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587 (1986). The moving party has the burden of showing an absence of evidence to support the nonmoving party's case. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 325 (1986). Once the moving party has met its burden of production, the nonmoving party cannot rest on its pleadings, but must present significant probative evidence to defeat the motion for summary judgment. Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248-49 (1986).
The parties do not dispute the material facts relevant to key jurisdictional issues, including the basis for diversity jurisdiction and the standing of Plaintiff to proceed in this Court. Because the undisputed facts demonstrate that subject matter jurisdiction is lacking, the action will be remanded to state court for further proceedings.
1. On February 5, 2020, Plaintiff Voss purchased a property at 486 Stanley Avenue in Cincinnati, Ohio from Donald Dow, Jr.
2. Prior to the sale, Dow had obtained a loan from Quicken Loans, and executed a mortgage that listed MERS as mortgagee on behalf of Quicken Loans.
3. Dow used the proceeds of the sale of his property to satisfy his obligations to Quicken Loans on February 5, 2020.
4. After Dow satisfied his obligations to Quicken Loans, Quicken Loans prepared a satisfaction of Mr. Dow's mortgage (the “Dow Satisfaction”).
5. Quicken Loans sent the Dow Satisfaction to the Recorder's Office for Hamilton County, Ohio by electronic means on May 26, 2020.
6. The Hamilton County Recorder's Office recorded the Satisfaction of Mortgage on May 27, 2020.
7. Under state law, Ohio Rev. Code § 5301.36(B), the satisfaction of a mortgage must be recorded within 90 days of the lien satisfaction, a deadline that expired for the Dow Satisfaction on May 5, 2020.
Defendants argue that they are entitled to summary judgment on two grounds: (1) because Plaintiff lacks standing to sue under Article III of the United States Constitution; and (2) because Ohio law would excuse the state law violation based upon the impacts of the COVID-19 pandemic and the order issued by the Governor of Michigan in response to the pandemic. (Doc. 22 at 1). Prior to turning to the grounds advanced by Defendants, the undersigned considers sua sponte whether Defendants properly removed this case from state court under diversity jurisdiction. Concluding that diversity jurisdiction is lacking, the Court finds remand to state court to be appropriate for that reason alone.
In addition, however, the Court agrees with Defendants that Plaintiff lacks standing to sue in federal court under Article III. Plaintiff's lack of standing also deprives this Court of jurisdiction and requires remand. Based upon the conclusion that this Court lacks jurisdiction and that remand is required, the Court declines to reach Defendants' second argument, that the COVID-19 pandemic excused Defendants' compliance with Ohio R.C. § 5301.36(B).
Defendants removed this case from state court on the basis of diversity jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1332. As the removing party, Defendants bear the burden of showing that jurisdiction exists. “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $75, 000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between ... citizens of different States.” Id. On the record presented, the complaint clearly alleges that complete diversity exists insofar as the parties are citizens of different states. However, in order for removal to be proper, Defendants also were required to show that the “amount in controversy” exceeds $75, 000. The requisite amount-in-controversy is not apparent from the face of the complaint.
It is incumbent upon the district court to raise the question of subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte whenever it appears from the pleadings or otherwise that jurisdiction is lacking. Louisville & Nashville R.R. Co. v. Mottley, 211 U.S. 149, 29 S.Ct. 42 (1908). Not only is a court permitted to raise the issue of its subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte, it must do so when a question as to its jurisdiction arises. Clarke v. Mindis Metals, Inc., No. 95-5517, 1996 WL 616677, at *3 (6th Cir.Oct.24, 1996) () (emphasis added) (citing Community First Bank v. Nat'l Credit Union Admin., 41 F.3d 1050, 1053 (6th Cir.1994)).
The essence of Plaintiff's claim is that Defendants violated a state statute that requires the satisfaction of a mortgage to be filed within 90 days. When a mortgage satisfaction is not timely filed, Ohio R.C. § 5301.36(C) specifically provides for “damages” in the set amount of $250.00 to accrue to “the mortgagor of the unrecorded satisfaction and the current owner of the real property to which the mortgage pertains.” Plaintiff seeks statutory damages for himself, and on behalf of a putative class of other Ohio property owners who are entitled to statutory damages under Ohio R.C. § 5301.36(C) based upon the Defendants' failure to file the satisfaction of their liens within the 90-day period.
In order to meet the requirements of diversity jurisdiction for a putative class action, [2] a named plaintiff's individual damage claim must exceed $75, 000. See generally, Siding and Insulation Co., Inc. v. Acuity Mut. Ins. Co., 754 F.3d 367, 373 (6th Cir. 2014); Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Allapattah Services, Inc., 125 S.Ct. 2611, 2620, 545 U.S. 546, 558 (2005) (). Here, Plaintiff seeks damages “in an amount to be determined at trial, including, but not limited to, the amount of $250.00 for each violation of R.C. § 5301.36 et seq., ” injunctive relief “[r]equiring Defendants to comply with R.C. § 5301.36, ” “costs and expenses of this lawsuit and reasonable attorneys' fees, ” prejudgment interest, and any other “equitable relief” deemed appropriate. (Complaint at 10-11, emphasis added).
Defendants seize upon the “not limited to” language to argue that Plaintiff could be seeking damages in excess of $75, 000. They note that in addition to the provision for an automatic sum of $250.00 in statutory damages, § 5301.36 “does not preclude or affect any other legal remedies or damages that may be available.” R.C. § 5301.36(C). Defendants reason that this case is analogous to an action to quiet title in which the object of the litigation is the property itself. Therefore, they assert that the entire value of Plaintiff's residential property ($300, 000) is “at issue” in this litigation.
It is true that in cases where the entire property is the object of the litigation, an action to quiet title satisfies the amount-in-controversy requirement if the value of the property at issue exceeds $75, 000.
When construing the amount in controversy requirement of a federal statute limiting the appellate jurisdiction of the federal courts, the Supreme Court once stated that “a suit to quiet the title to parcels of real property, or to remove a cloud therefrom, by which their use and enjoyment by the owner are impaired, is brought within the cognizance of the court, under the statute, only by the value of the property affected.” Smith v. Adams, 130 U.S. 167, 175 ... (1889) ( Act of March 3, 1885, ch. 355, 23 Stat. 443). Thus, the fair market value of [the subject parcel of land] speaks to the amount in controversy, not the damages that Plaintiff has alleged.
Johnson v. Shank, 2014 WL 794760, at *5 (S.D. Ohio 2014); see also 1 McGhee v. Citimortgage Inc., 834 F.Supp.2d 708, 712 (E.D. Mich. 2011) (); Planning and Development Dept. v. Daughters of Union Veterans of Civil...
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