Vote Choice, Inc. v. Di Stefano
| Decision Date | 12 January 1993 |
| Docket Number | Civ. A. No. 92-0451-P. |
| Citation | 814 F. Supp. 195 |
| Parties | VOTE CHOICE, INC.; Gun Owners Political Action Committee; Elizabeth Leonard; Pasquale E. Melaragno; Jane Doe; Rhode Island Affiliate, American Civil Liberties Union, Inc.; and Hasbro, Inc., Plaintiffs, v. Joseph DI STEFANO, in his official capacity as Chairman of the Rhode Island Board of Elections; Edward Grace in his capacity as Chairman of the Rhode Island Public Telecommunications Authority; and James Malachowski, in his capacity as Administrator for the Rhode Island Division of Public Utilities, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Rhode Island |
Matthew F. Medeiros, Neal J. McNamara, Flanders & Medeiros, Providence, RI, for plaintiff.
Anthony J. Bucci, Jr., Licht & Semonoff, Providence, RI, for defendant.
Donald G. Elbert, Jr., Providence, RI, Carol F. Lee, Roger M. Witten, Eric Mogilnicki, Wilmer, Cutler & Pickering, Donald J. Simon, Sonosky, Chambers, Sachse & Endreson, Washington, DC, for amicus—Common Cause of R.I. and Common Cause.
The plaintiffs in this case present a constitutional challenge to several provisions of Rhode Island's recently amended campaign finance law. The challenged provisions attempt to regulate and/or prohibit certain contributions and expenditures with respect to corporations, political action committees ("PACs"), and publicly-financed candidates. Specifically, plaintiffs challenge: R.I.G.L. § 17-25-10.1(j), a provision banning independent corporate expenditures to influence a ballot question; R.I.G.L. § 17-25-10(a)(3), a provision allegedly requiring corporations to establish PACs for the purpose of making contributions and expenditures to influence a ballot question; R.I.G.L. § 17-25-15(c)(1), a provision requiring public disclosure of all contributions to Rhode Island PACs; and R.I.G.L. § 17-25-30, a provision of Rhode Island's public financing scheme that grants free television advertising and a higher aggregate contribution limit to publicly funded candidates.1
Having received all papers from the parties, including amici2, I now consider the constitutionality of each of these provisions under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. For the reasons stated below, I find that:
(I) R.I.G.L. § 17-25-10.1(j), to the extent that it prohibits corporations from making independent expenditures to influence the outcome of a ballot question, violates plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments;
(II) R.I.G.L. § 17-25-10(a)(3) does not require corporations, profit or non-profit, to establish PACs for the purpose of making contributions and expenditures to influence the outcome of a ballot question, and, therefore, does not violate plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments;
(III) R.I.G.L. § 17-25-15(c)(1)'s PAC disclosure requirement violates plaintiffs' rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments;
(IV) R.I.G.L. § 17-25-30's incentive provisions for publicly funded candidates do not violate plaintiffs' First or Fourteenth Amendment rights; and
(V) R.I.G.L. §§ 17-25-30's free television advertising provisions are consistent with, and not preempted by, § 315 of the Communications Act, 47 U.S.C. § 315.
I will address each of these provisions in turn.
R.I.G.L. § 17-25-10.1(j) provides:
No entity other than an individual, a political action committee which is duly registered and qualified pursuant to the terms of this chapter, political party committee authorized by title 17 of the general laws, or an authorized committee of an elected official or candidate established pursuant to this chapter shall make any contribution to or any expenditure on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate, ballot question, political action committee or political party.
On its face, this provision appears to prohibit corporations from engaging in any political activity, whether through direct contributions to any candidate, PAC or political party, or through independent expenditures on behalf of or in opposition to any candidate, ballot question, PAC or political party. Plaintiffs American Civil Liberties Union, Inc. ("ACLU") and Hasbro, Inc. ("Hasbro") challenge that aspect of § 17-25-10.1(j) that prohibits independent corporate expenditures to influence ballot questions.
In an earlier Memorandum and Order of this Court dated October 23, 1992, relying directly upon First National Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 98 S.Ct. 1407, 55 L.Ed.2d 707 (1978), I permanently enjoined enforcement of § 17-25-10.1(j) "to the extent it prohibits corporations from making any independent contributions and expenditures with respect to ballot questions." In its Post-Hearing Memorandum, the Board suggests a clarification of the permanent injunction Order.
The Board argues persuasively that the instant challenge extends only to § 17-25-10.1(j)'s ban on independent corporate expenditures in connection with ballot questions. Both the Amended Complaint and the evidence presented at the preliminary injunction hearing indicate that plaintiffs ACLU and Hasbro wished to expend their own funds (i.e., make an independent expenditure) to defeat a ballot question in the November 1992 general election. Plaintiffs made no allegation and presented no evidence, however, that Hasbro or the ACLU desired to contribute funds (as opposed to making an independent expenditure) directly to any other entity, such as a PAC, formed for the purpose of defeating that ballot question. Accordingly, there are no challenges to and, therefore, no issues involving corporate contributions to entities such as PACs with respect to ballot questions, nor any challenges to the ban on corporate contributions and independent expenditures with respect to candidates or political parties.
Because plaintiffs have raised, and offered documentary evidence in support of, this narrow challenge to § 17-25-10.1(j), and for the reasons I have already stated in my October 23, 1992 Memorandum and Order, I hereby amend and limit my permanent injunction to enjoin the Board from enforcing only that portion of § 17-25-10.1(j) that prohibits corporations from making any independent expenditures with respect to ballot questions. This ruling is consistent with the teachings of Bellotti, as well as with the allegations raised, and facts adduced, by plaintiffs at the preliminary injunction hearing.3
R.I.G.L. § 17-25-10(a)(3) addresses the lawful methods of contributing to influence a ballot question. It provides, in pertinent part:
Plaintiffs ACLU and Hasbro allege that this provision requires corporations to establish PACs in order to make contributions or expenditures to influence a ballot question. So interpreted, plaintiffs argue, this PAC requirement impermissibly burdens their free speech rights under the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See Federal Election Com. v. Massachusetts Citizens for Life, Inc., 479 U.S. 238, 107 S.Ct. 616, 93 L.Ed.2d 539 (1986) ().
The Board argues that the clear purpose of § 17-25-10(a)(3) is to focus responsibility for the accurate filings of campaign finance reports on campaign treasurers or deputy treasurers. It further contends that the provision does not, and has never been interpreted to, require corporations to establish PACs for the purpose of making contributions and expenditures with respect to ballot questions.4 In support of its position, the Board asks this Court to take judicial notice of the public records maintained by the Board of Elections in the form of campaign finance reports filed prior to 1992 under Chapter 17-25 of the Rhode Island General Laws. These records, the Board avers, demonstrate that corporate contributions and expenditures prior to 1992 were made directly and not through PACs, and that the Board has always regarded such contributions and expenditures as lawful under the provisions of § 17-25-10(a)(3).
I acknowledge that, from a purist's standpoint, the wording of § 17-25-10(a)(3) is susceptible to plaintiffs' interpretation. However, the language of § 17-25-10(b), quoted supra note 4 (), and the weight of the evidence concerning historical enforcement of § 17-25-10(a)(3), amply support the Board's interpretation that § 17-25-10(a)(3) does not require corporations, profit or non-profit, to establish PACs. As a mere record keeping and enforcement measure, it does not unduly impinge upon any constitutional rights of plaintiffs ACLU and Hasbro. Therefore, I dismiss all plaintiffs' claims with respect to this provision.5
Section 17-25-15(c)(1), a new provision of the campaign finance law, requires all Rhode Island PACs, with the exception of labor union and corporate check-off plans, to report the source and amount of all contributions, regardless of amount ("first dollar disclosure"). It provides, in pertinent part:
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