Voykin v. Estate of DeBoer

• Decision Date: 06 July 2000
• Docket Number: No. 88227.,88227.
• Parties: Mark VOYKIN, Appellee, v. ESTATE OF Gordon DeBOER, Appellant.
• Court: Illinois Supreme Court

733 N.E.2d 1275

192 Ill.2d 49

248 Ill.Dec. 277

Mark VOYKIN, Appellee, v. ESTATE OF Gordon DeBOER, Appellant.

No. 88227.

Supreme Court of Illinois.

July 6, 2000.

Theodore A.E. Poehlmann and Stephen J. Tasch, of Woodstock, for appellant.

Saul M. Ferris, of Ferris, Thompson & Zweig, Ltd., of Gurnee, for appellee.

Timothy J. Harris, of Broderick, Steiger & Maisel, of Chicago, for amicus curiae Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel.

Mark D. Prince, of Hughes & Prince, of Carbondale, for amicus curiae Illinois Trial Lawyers Association.

Justice RATHJE delivered the opinion of the court:

This appeal presents the question of whether a defendant must present medical or other competent evidence of a causal or relevancy connection between a plaintiff's prior injury, prior accident, or preexisting condition and the injury at issue.

BACKGROUND

This action arose from an automobile accident between plaintiff, Mark Voykin, and decedent, Gordon DeBoer. The evidence at trial established that, on January 31, 1996, decedent's car collided with the rear of plaintiff's car. Although plaintiff did not seek medical attention on the evening of the accident, the next morning, at his wife's suggestion, he sought treatment from Dr. Chinyung See for neck and back pain. Subsequently, in the circuit court of Lake County, plaintiff sued decedent for injuries suffered in the accident. After suit had been filed, but before trial, decedent died, and his estate was substituted as defendant.

During the trial, plaintiff sought to bar and defendant sought to introduce evidence that, in April 1991, approximately five years before the accident, plaintiff had suffered an injury to his lower back. Plaintiff argued that such evidence was not admissible unless defendant presented expert testimony demonstrating that the prior and present injuries were causally related. Defendant contended that expert testimony was not necessary because the injuries were to the same part of the body and continuity existed between the injuries. The trial court allowed defendant to question plaintiff and Dr. See about this prior injury and to introduce evidence relating to the treatment of plaintiff's prior injuries. The trial court also allowed defendant to introduce evidence that plaintiff had previously suffered "neck problems" and had been treated for carpal tunnel syndrome.

After defendant rested, the trial court granted plaintiff's motion for a directed verdict as to defendant's negligence. The court specifically stated, however, that it was not ruling on the questions of causation or injury. The jury returned a verdict in defendant's favor, and the trial court entered judgment on the verdict. In his post-trial motion, plaintiff argued that he should receive a new trial because defendant should not have been permitted to introduce evidence of plaintiff's prior injury without providing expert testimony to demonstrate a causal connection between the past and present injuries. The trial court denied plaintiff's motion, and plaintiff timely appealed.

The appellate court reversed and remanded for a new trial. The court examined recent decisions from other districts of the appellate court and concluded that evidence of prior injuries should not be admitted unless the defendant presents "evidence of causation between prior and present injuries." 306 Ill.App.3d 689, 695, 239 Ill.Dec. 688, 714 N.E.2d 607. The court further explained that expert testimony would normally be necessary if the injuries were "complex." 306 Ill.App.3d at 696, 239 Ill.Dec. 688, 714 N.E.2d 607. Thereafter, this court granted defendant's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315). We also granted the motions of the Illinois Association of Defense Trial Counsel and the Illinois Trial Lawyers Association to file briefs as amici curiae.

ANALYSIS

History of the Same Part of the Body Rule

The "same part of the body rule," a doctrine developed in the appellate court, permits a defendant to introduce evidence that the plaintiff has previously suffered injuries similar to those at issue. Brown v. Baker, 284 Ill.App.3d 401, 404, 219 Ill. Dec. 754, 672 N.E.2d 69 (1996). Under the same part of the body rule, evidence of a prior injury is admissible without any showing that it is causally related to the present injury as long as both the past and present injuries affected the same part of the body. Brown, 284 Ill.App.3d at 404, 219 Ill.Dec. 754, 672 N.E.2d 69. If the injury is not to the same part of the body, the defendant must demonstrate a causal connection between the current injury and the prior injury. Bailey v. Wilson, 299 Ill.App.3d 297, 303, 233 Ill.Dec. 405, 700 N.E.2d 1113 (1998); see also Elliott v. Koch, 200 Ill.App.3d 1, 14, 146 Ill.Dec. 530, 558 N.E.2d 493 (1990).

Although this court has never addressed the applicability of the same part of the body rule, the appellate court universally applied the rule until 1996. At that time, the Appellate Court, Fifth District, reconsidered the rule. The court noted that, under the rule as it was currently being applied, a childhood knee injury could arguably be admissible in an action involving a later knee injury, "without any further showing of relevance or causation, even if the prior injury had completely healed and been symptom free for decades." Brown, 284 Ill.App.3d at 404-05, 219 Ill.Dec. 754, 672 N.E.2d 69. The court concluded that such a rule of evidence invited the jury to speculate on the nexus between the prior and current injuries. Brown, 284 Ill. App.3d at 405, 219 Ill.Dec. 754, 672 N.E.2d 69. The court concluded that, if the prior injury has "long since healed and has shown no recurring symptoms, a defendant should not be permitted to introduce evidence of the prior injury without establishing causation." Brown, 284 Ill.App.3d at 405, 219 Ill.Dec. 754, 672 N.E.2d 69.

Subsequently, the First District relied upon Brown and concluded that, "absent competent and relevant evidence of a causal connection between the preexisting condition and the injury complained of, evidence of the preexisting condition is inadmissible." Cancio v. White, 297 Ill.App.3d 422, 430, 232 Ill.Dec. 7, 697 N.E.2d 749 (1998); see also Lagestee v. Days Inn Management Co., 303 Ill.App.3d 935, 946-47, 237 Ill.Dec. 284, 709 N.E.2d 270 (1999) (holding that "the defendant is required to present medical or other competent evidence of a causal or relevancy connection between plaintiff's prior injury, prior accident, or preexisting condition and the injury at issue as a prerequisite of admissibility").

After Cancio was decided, the Fourth District reconsidered and reaffirmed the same part of the body rule. Bailey, 299 Ill.App.3d at 304, 233 Ill.Dec. 405, 700 N.E.2d 1113. In so doing, the court held that "[a]s long as there is some evidence of the nature, extent, duration, or treatment of the previous injury, an independent showing of causation is unnecessary." Bailey, 299 Ill.App.3d at 304, 233 Ill.Dec. 405, 700 N.E.2d 1113.

Plaintiff asks us to follow the reasoning of Brown, Cancio, and Lagestee and to discard the same part of the body rule. Defendant requests that we adopt the same part of the body rule.

Shifting the Burden of Proof

Defendant's chief argument in favor of the same part of the body rule is that requiring a defendant to present evidence of causation impermissibly shifts the burden of proof to defendant. The problem with defendant's argument is that this court rejected it in 1962.

In Caley v. Manicke, 24 Ill.2d 390, 182 N.E.2d 206 (1962), the plaintiff recovered $20,000 for injuries sustained in a car accident. On appeal, the defendant argued that the trial court erred in striking evidence of the plaintiff's prior and subsequent accidents. This court, in rejecting that claim, noted that the issue "was fully and correctly resolved by the Appellate Court and we adopt its views in such regard." Caley, 24 Ill.2d at 395, 182 N.E.2d 206.

In Caley, the defendant sought to question the plaintiff regarding accidents occurring before and after the accident at issue. The defendant's theory was that these other accidents were the cause of the plaintiff's injuries. The defendant contended that, because the plaintiff always bears the burden of proving proximate cause, the defendant did not need to demonstrate a connection between the other accidents and the plaintiff's injuries.

The appellate court rejected the defendant's argument. It explained that, although the burden of proof never shifts between the parties, the "burden of going forward with the evidence may shift from party to party." Caley v. Manicke, 29 Ill.App.2d 323, 327, 173 N.E.2d 209 (1961). The court further reasoned that, although the defendant bore the burden of demonstrating the connection between the other accidents and the plaintiff's injuries, that did not mean that the burden of proof shifted to the defendant. Caley, 29 Ill. App.2d at 327, 173 N.E.2d 209. The court explained:

"Proximate cause was a part of plaintiff's case. It was as indispensable as the elements of defendant's negligence, plaintiff's freedom therefrom, and damage. Without it, plaintiff's action would have failed. But when he has borne the burden of proof and established the material elements necessary to make out a case, it is then the defendant's right, but certainly not his duty—to put on his defense. This is not shifting the burden of proof. One cannot be said to have a burden if one may pick it up or not as he pleases. Obviously if there is evidence negative of causation, a defendant should show it, but the law in according him the privilege of going forward in no wise shifts to him the burden of proof as the law knows that phrase." (Emphasis added.) Caley, 29 Ill.App.2d at 328-29, 173 N.E.2d 209.

The court then explained that, although other causes of the injury may be a relevant area of inquiry, "the evidence elicited on this cross-examination does not establish even remotely, a possible `cause' o...