Voyles v. City of Nampa, 11764

• Decision Date: 22 April 1976
• Docket Number: No. 11764,11764
• Citation: 97 Idaho 597,548 P.2d 1217
• Parties: Allen Edward VOYLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The CITY OF NAMPA, Idaho, a Municipal Corporation, and Buster Baker, Chief of Police, Nampa, Idaho, Defendants-Respondents.
• Court: Idaho Supreme Court

Page 1217

548 P.2d 1217

97 Idaho 597

Allen Edward VOYLES, Petitioner-Appellant, v. The CITY OF NAMPA, Idaho, a Municipal Corporation, and Buster Baker, Chief of Police, Nampa, Idaho, Defendants-Respondents.

No. 11764.

Supreme Court of Idaho.

April 22, 1976.

James E. Schiller, of Schiller, Williams & Trabert, Nampa, for petitioner-appellant.

Reese E. Verner, Carl D. Hamilton, Nampa, for defendants-respondents.

McFADDEN, Chief Justice.

Allen E. Voyles, the appellant, brought this action before the district court on a writ of habeas corpus after his arrest for an alleged violation of Nampa City Code § 6-1-27, which provides:

'Any person who shall be drunk or intoxicated in a private motor vehicle while said vehicle is located upon any public or private road or street or upon any other place to which the public has, or is permitted to have access, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. A 'public place' as defined in this Section, includes any place, building, or conveyance, to which the public has, or is permitted to have, access, and any place, highway, street, lane, park, or place of public resort or amusement.'

He argued that the ordinance is unconstitutional and that a person accused of violating the ordinance cannot be compelled to submit to fingerprinting and photographing. The district court upheld the ordinance and the requirements of submitting to fingerprinting and photographing. We affirm the judgment.

A police officer of the Nampa Police Department arrested the appellant while the latter was seated in his automobile, which was parked in the parking lot of a bank in Nampa with the engine off. Voyles was arrested for an alleged violation of Nampa City Code § 6-1-27, taken into custody, transported to the police station, booked on that charge, and confined to a cell. The police agreed to release the appellant upon three conditions: that he agree to have his identification picture taken, to have his fingerprints taken, and to sign an Idaho Uniform Complaint and Summons. Voyles refused to comply with the first two conditions, but agreed to sign the complaint. His refusal to meet all three conditions caused the police to detain him through the night of his arrest.

An agreement was reached between the Chief of Police and the appellant's attorney whereby Voyles was released from custody upon signing an Idaho Uniform Complaint and Summons. The agreement further provided that, in an action for a writ of habeas corpus, the district court would determine whether the city police could require a defendant accused of this misdemeanor to be detained in custody until such defendant would submit to photographing and fingerprinting and other issues pertaining to the constitutionality of ordinance and the validity of the arrest.

The cause was heard on the issues framed by the application and return to the writ of habeas corpus. Thereafter, pursuant to a stipulation of facts, the court entered findings of fact and and its conclusions of law, which conclusions may be summarized as follows: The requirement of fingerprinting and photographing did not violate Voyles' constitutional rights, but instead was within the police powers of the municipality and was for the purpose of determining whether the appellant previously had been charged with or convicted of other crimes. The city is empowered to enact Nampa City Code § 6-1-27 under the authority of Idaho Const. Art. XII, § 2, and I.C. § 50-302. The ordinance is consistent with and a necessary extension of state statutes and is consistent with the Constitution of the State of Idaho. The ordinance, moreover, is sufficiently clear and certain to comply with the Constitutions of the State of Idaho and the United States. The ordinance's definition of 'public place' is not an essential portion of the ordinance, but when taken in context, gives the provision a plain-sense meaning, even though it may be overreaching. Voyles' arrest was legal and proper, and did not require the issuance of an Idaho Uniform Traffic Citation. The court thereafter ordered the appellant to submit to fingerprinting and photographing, pursuant to the reservation of that issue in the agreement between the Chief of Police and the appellant's attorney. This appeal followed.

Voyles first argued in his appeal that Nampa City Code § 6-1-27 violates the Constitution of the United States by being vague, uncertain, and overbroad. An examination of the language of the ordinance causes us to uphold its validity although we strike a word, which is surplusage, in the ordinance's second sentence. The due process clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution of the United States requires that a city ordinance must be definite and certain in its statement of prohibited conduct to enable a person of ordinary intelligence who reads the ordinance to understand what activity is proscribed and govern his actions accordingly. E.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 92 S.Ct. 2294, 33 L.Ed.2d 222 (1972); Papachristou v. City of Jacksonville, 405 U.S. 156, 92 S.Ct. 839, 31 L.Ed.2d 110 (1972). The Constitution of the State of Idaho also requires that city ordinances demonstrate a definiteness and certainty sufficient to permit a person to conform his conduct thereto. Idaho Const. Art. I, § 13; City of Lewiston v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 347, 303 P.2d 680 (1956). See also State v. Evans, 73 Idaho 50, 245 P.2d 788 (1952); State v. Musser, 67 Idaho 214, 176 P.2d 199 (1946). An ordinance which fulfills the requirements of certainty and definiteness still may be constitutionally infirm if its prohibition is overbroad, restricting constitutionally protected conduct. E. g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, supra, Zwickler v. Koota, 389 U.S. 241, 88 S.Ct. 391, 19 L.Ed.2d 444 (1967).

The second sentence of the ordinance at issue contains language which renders it vulnerable to the appellant's charges of vagueness, uncertainty, and overbreadth. That second sentence exists merely to define a 'public place.' In the definitional sentence, the term 'place' appears three times. The term is limited at its first appearance in the sentence by the clause 'to which the public has, or is permitted to have, access.' The term similarly is limited at its third appearance in the sentence by the phrase 'of public resort or amusement.' The term appears a second time, between 'any' and 'highway,' without any limitation or clarification. The second appearance of 'place' as 'any place,' with fining a 'public place' as 'any place,' with the result of causing a person to wonder about the extent of the prohibition created by the ordinance. The City of Nampa itself conceded on appeal that the second appearance pearance of 'place' was a mistake. The second appearance of 'place' in the second sentence of Nampa City Code § 6-1-27 has the effect of introducing the elements of vagueness, uncertainty, and overbreadty in to the ordinance.

The constitutionally infirm, second appearance of 'place' in the second sentence is not essential to the purpose and completeness of the ordinance, and accordingly, that word can be severed to permit Nampa City Code § 6-1-27 to fulfill the constitutional requirements of certainty, definiteness, and proper breadth. The ordinance, without the second appearance of 'place,' sets out the offense and includes the description of the locations where a person can commit that offense. No more is needed for the ordinance to be complete. When part of a statute or ordinance is unconstitutional and yet is not an integral or indispensable part of the measure, the invalid portion may be stricken without affecting the remainder of the statute or ordinance. State v. Finch, 79 Idaho 275, 315 P.2d 529 (1957); Idaho Mut. Benefit Ass'n Inc. v. Robison, 65 Idaho 793, 154 P.2d 156 (1944). The principle of striking a dispensable, unconstitutional part of a statute or ordinance permits the striking of a single word. State v. Reese, 222 So.2d 732 (Fla.1969); Ex parte Frye, 143 Tex. Cr.R. 9, 156 S.W.2d 531 (1941). We therefore strike the invalid, second appearance of 'place' in the second sentence of the ordinance and uphold the remainder of the ordinance as the embodiment of the essence of Nampa City Code § 6-1-27.

The appellant secondly argued that the ordinance, even if valide as a certain, definite, and properly broad measure, violates the Constitution of the State of Idaho by conflicting with the state's general laws relating to motor vehicles and municipal corporations. The Constitution of the State of Idaho empowers a political subdivision to make and enforce local police regulations which do not conflict with its charter or with general laws of the state. Idaho Const. Art. XII, § 2.

Voyles argued that Nampa City Code § 6-1-27 violates that state constitutional provision because it conflicts with the Uniform Act Regulating Traffic on Highways, S.L.1953, ch. 273, as codified at I.C. §§ 49-501-49-846, 47-1001-49-1126. We reject the suggestion of conflict because the ordinance at issue does not regulate traffic; it instead governs public intoxication. A key element of the offense defined in Nampa City Code § 6-1-27 is that the allegedly intoxicated person must be in a private motor vehicle. The mere presence of a motor vehicle among the language of an ordinance, however, does not automaticaly cause the measure to become a traffic ordinance. This measure focuses not upon the operation of a motor vehicle, but instead upon the inebriated condition of any occupants of such a private motor vehicle.

We similarly reject the appellant's argument that Nampa City Code § 6-1-27 violates Idaho Const. Art. XII, § 2, through an alleged conflict with statutory provisions which relate to the powers of municipal corporations. Idaho Code sections 50-313 and 50-314 provide cities with delineated authority to control traffic and roadways within their corporate limits. The ordinance at issue does not attempt to control traffic or to control roadways...