Vranish v. Exxon Mobil Corp.

• Citation: 223 Cal.App.4th 103,166 Cal.Rptr.3d 845
• Decision Date: 30 April 2014
• Docket Number: B243443
• Court: California Court of Appeals
• Parties: George VRANISH, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants, v. EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.

223 Cal.App.4th 103

166 Cal.Rptr.3d 845

George VRANISH, Jr., et al., Plaintiffs and Appellants,

v.EXXON MOBIL CORPORATION, Defendant and Respondent.

B243443

Court of Appeal,

Second District, Division 2, California.

Filed January 22, 2014

Review Denied April 30, 2014

See 3 Witkin, Summary of Cal. Law (10th ed. 2005) Agency and Employment, § 361.

APPEAL from a judgment of the Superior Court of Los Angeles County. Mark V. Mooney, Judge. Affirmed. (Los Angeles County Super. Ct. No. BC450074)

Van Vleck Turner & Zaller and Brian F. Van Vleck, Los Angeles, for Plaintiffs and Appellants.

Stradling Yocca Carlson & Rauth, Jeffrey A. Dinkin, Santa Barbara, John F. Cannon, Newport Beach, and Gannon E. Johnson, Oxnard, for Defendant and Respondent.

ASHMANN–GERST, J.

Labor Code section 514¹ provides, in relevant part: “Sections 510 and 511 do not apply to an employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.”

Plaintiffs George Vranish, Jr., and Steve Teague are employees of defendant Exxon Mobil Corporation (Exxon). They are represented by a labor organization and their employment is governed by the terms of a collective bargaining agreement (CBA). At issue in this litigation is whether plaintiffs are owed monies for overtime hours worked. According to plaintiffs, the CBA does not provide for premium compensation for all “overtime hours worked” (§ 514), as the word “overtime” is defined by section 510. Thus, Exxon has not satisfied the requirements of section 514 and owes plaintiffs monies for overtime. According to Exxon, the CBA meets the requirements of section 514; because section 514 expressly provides that the daily overtime requirements of section 510 do not apply to employees covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement such as the one here, it owes plaintiffs nothing.

This appeal presents a legal question: Does Labor Code section 510 's definition of “overtime” apply to employees covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement (§ 514)? Based upon the plain language of section 514, legislative history, an opinion from the Department of Industrial Relations, Division of Labor Standards Enforcement (DLSE), and public policy, we conclude that section 510 does not apply to section 514. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court's award of summary judgment to Exxon.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

The Parties

Plaintiffs are Exxon employees. During their entire period of employment, plaintiffs have worked at Exxon's onshore facility near Gaviota, California (the Santa Ynez unit).

Plaintiffs are represented by a labor organization. Since at least 1989, the Exxon Employees Federation-Western Division, also known as Federation of Santa Ynez Unit Exxon Employees (the Federation) has been the exclusive bargaining representative for all production and maintenance employees at the Santa Ynez unit (the Covered Employees), including plaintiffs. Also since at least 1989, the CBA has been in effect between Exxon and the Federation pertaining to all Covered Employees, including plaintiffs.

Relevant Terms of the CBA

Consistent with the CBA, plaintiffs each worked a regularly scheduled workweek that required them to work more than eight hours in a 24-hour period. In accordance with the CBA and schedule, plaintiffs were each regularly scheduled to work seven 12-hour shifts in a seven-day period and then have seven days off.

The Federation and Exxon also agreed, as part of the CBA, that the workweek would be Monday at 12:01 a.m. through Sunday at midnight. It was further agreed in the CBA that the scheduled seven 12-hour shifts worked by employees in plaintiffs' classification would begin at 6:00 a.m. on Thursday and end at 6:00 p.m. on the following Wednesday for day shift employees, and start at 6:00 p.m. on Wednesday and end at 6:00 a.m. on the following Thursday for night shift employees.

Compensation

It is undisputed that plaintiffs were compensated for all overtime worked in accordance with the CBA. Specifically, plaintiffs were each paid at the overtime premium rate of one and one-half times their regular rate of pay for hours worked over 40 hours in a workweek or over 12 hours in a workday. The CBA provides that overtime is not paid for hours worked between eight and 12 in a workday.

Procedural History

Plaintiffs filed their initial class action complaint on November 23, 2010, and their first amended complaint on March 11, 2011. A second amended complaint, the operative pleading, was filed on September 22, 2011. It alleges three causes of action: failure to pay overtime wages in violation of section 510; violation of the California unfair practices law (Bus. & Prof.Code, § 17200); and violation of the Labor Code Private Attorneys General Act of 2004 (§ 2698 et seq.).

Exxon filed its motion for summary judgment on February 14, 2012. The motion was heard on May 3, 2012. Following supplemental briefing, further argument was heard on May 22, 2012, at which time the trial court granted Exxon's motion. The trial court reasoned: “Plaintiffs' contention is fundamentally flawed because it fails to acknowledge that they are completely exempt from section 510 by the collective bargaining exception contained in section 514, as well as under section 510[, subdivision] (a)(2). The plain language of sections 514 and 510[, subdivision] (a)(2), the legislative history, the relevant case law, a 1991 DLSE Opinion Letter, and the Statement As To The Basis for the amendments to the Wage Orders following the adoption of AB 60 confirm that section 514, as well as section 510[, subdivision] (a)(2), provide a complete exception to the overtime requirements of section 510 [, subdivision] (a) upon which Plaintiffs' claims are based. Therefore, the undisputed material facts establish that Plaintiffs' claims for additional overtime compensation under Labor Code section 510 fails as a matter of law.”

The trial court further found that section 514 applied because the requirements for coverage under that section had been met. And, the collective bargaining agreement exception under section 510, subdivision (a)(2), also applied because plaintiffs worked an alternative workweek schedule that was adopted pursuant to the CBA. Thus, even if section 514 did not entirely exempt plaintiffs from the overtime provisions of section 510, subdivision (a), their claim for daily overtime would have failed because they were exempted pursuant to section 510, subdivision (a)(2).

Judgment for Exxon was entered, and plaintiffs' timely appeal ensued.

DISCUSSION

I. Standard of review

As the parties agree, we review the trial court's order de novo. (Guz v. Bechtel National, Inc. (2000) 24 Cal.4th 317, 334, 100 Cal.Rptr.2d 352, 8 P.3d 1089; Schachter v. Citigroup, Inc. (2009) 47 Cal.4th 610, 619, 101 Cal.Rptr.3d 2, 218 P.3d 262 [de novo review of an order granting summary judgment along with the trial court's resolution of any underlying issues of statutory construction].)

II. Because plaintiffs are covered by a qualifying collective bargaining agreement, section 510 's definition of “overtime” does not apply

Section 510, subdivision (a), provides, in relevant part: “Eight hours of labor constitutes a day's work.” The statute continues to set forth the payment of overtime compensation. (§ 510, subd. (a).)

Section 514, covering exempt employees, provides, in relevant part: “Section[ ] 510 ... do[es] not apply to an employee covered by a valid collective bargaining agreement if the agreement expressly provides for the wages, hours of work, and working conditions of the employees, and if the agreement provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked and a regular hourly rate of pay for those employees of not less than 30 percent more than the state minimum wage.”

Plaintiffs do not dispute that the CBA is a valid collective bargaining agreement; that the CBA provides for wages, hours of work, and working conditions for Covered Employees, including plaintiffs; and that the CBA provides for a regular hourly rate of pay for Covered Employees, including plaintiffs, which is not less than 30 percent more than the State of California minimum wage requirement. Plaintiffs also do not dispute that the CBA provides premium wage rates for all overtime hours worked as designated in the CBA. At issue in this appeal is whether the phrase “all overtime hours worked” in section 514 means “overtime” as defined in section 510, subdivision (a); said otherwise, was Exxon required to pay plaintiffs “overtime”, as that word is defined in section 510, subdivision (a), or was it only required to pay a premium for overtime worked as that word is defined in the CBA?

“ ‘In construing a statute, our fundamental task is to ascertain the Legislature's intent so as to effectuate the purpose of the statute. [Citation.] We begin with the language of the statute, giving the words their usual and ordinary meaning. [Citation.] The language must be construed “in the context of the statute as a whole and the overall statutory scheme, and we give ‘significance to every word, phrase, sentence, and part of an act in pursuance of the legislative purpose.’ ” [Citation.] In other words, “ ‘we do not construe statutes in isolation, but rather read every statute “with reference to the entire scheme of law of which it is part so that the whole may be harmonized and retain effectiveness.” [Citation.]’ ” [Citation.] If the statutory terms are ambiguous, we may examine extrinsic sources, including the ostensible objects to be achieved and the legislative history. [Citation.] In such circumstances, we choose the construction that comports most closely with the Legislature's apparent intent, endeavoring to...