Vreeland v. Vreeland

• Decision Date: 06 March 1911
• Citation: 78 N.J.E. 256,79 A. 336
• Parties: VREELAND v. VREELAND.
• Court: New Jersey Supreme Court

79 A. 336

78 N.J.E. 256

VREELAND

v. VREELAND.

Court of Errors and Appeals of New Jersey.

March 6, 1911.

Appeal from Court of Chancery; Howell, Vice Chancellor.

Suit by Helen K. Vreeland against Richard M. Vreeland. From a decree for complainant, defendant appeals. Affirmed.

Peter W. Stagg, for appellant.

Jerome D. Gedney, for respondent.

GUMMERE, C. J. This is a suit for maintenance brought by the complainant under the statute, upon the ground that the defendant, her husband, has abandoned her without justifiable cause, and refuses and neglects to provide for her support. Two defenses were interposed: (1) That the complainant deserted her husband without cause and went to live with her mother; and (2) that the marriage between the parties was void, because the complainant had another husband then living and from whom she had not been divorced. The complainant had a decree.

We concur in the view expressed by the learned vice chancellor before whom the case was tried that, upon the proofs submitted, the complainant is entitled to the relief which she seeks, unless her marriage to the defendant was shown to be void. The parties were married on the 15th of April, 1875, and two children were born to them, who are now living. It was proved in the case, and not denied, that a little more than four years before the complainant and the defendant were married, to wit, in March, 1871, she went through a marriage ceremony with one James McGinn, and that the marriage was solemnized by a priest of the Roman Catholic Church. She declared, however, upon the witness stand that at the time this ceremony was performed she was only 11 years old; that in conducting it the priest used the Latin language; and that she did not understand that she was being married to McGinn, but supposed that she was being "made a Catholic," that being what she was told by the priest and by McGinn. She also testified that she and McGinn separated immediately after the ceremony was performed, and that she never saw him afterward. The vice chancellor accepted this story of the complainant as true, and held that as the marriage between her and McGinn had been contracted before she bad reached the age of consent it was null and void.

We are not all convinced of the truth of the complainant's story with relation to her marriage with McGinn. The unlikelihood of a Roman Catholic priest being willing to perform a marriage ceremony where one of the parties was a little girl of 11 years, without knowing whether or not it met with the approval of her parents or guardians, is apparent. Equally apparent is the improbability that he would be guilty of so gross a fraud as is charged against him in leading the child to believe that it was something other than a marriage ceremony which was being performed. We might, perhaps, be compelled to accept the plaintiff's testimony upon this point, notwithstanding its improbability, if she appeared in other respects to be an entirely credible and trustworthy witness. But this is not the fact. There is much in the proofs which affect unfavorably the credit to be accorded to her testimony, and she is directly contradicted by the defendant upon the matter of her age; for her marriage with him followed four years and one month after that with McGinn, and he testifies that she was then 20 or 21 years old. Moreover, we consider it significant that, although contradicted upon this vital point, the complainant made no effort to support her statement as to her age by other proof, notwithstanding that her mother was living with her at the time of the trial, and, presumably, better than any one else could have proved the exact date of her birth. We conclude that the contention of the defendant that his marriage with the complainant was void cannot be decided adversely to him upon the ground that the marriage of the latter with McGinn was a nullity.

Assuming, then, that by the solemnization of the marriage between the complainant and McGinn she became his lawful wife, is that fact a bar to the relief which she seeks? It was proved in the case that in June, 1874, a suit for divorce was instituted in the superior court of Fairfield county in the state of Connecticut (a court of competent jurisdiction) in the name of the complainant and against James McGinn; and that such proceedings were had thereon that, at its August term of that year, a decree was pronounced by the court, divorcing the parties and adjudging the complainant to be single and unmarried. If full force and effect be given to this decree, the subsequent marriage of the complainant and defendant must, of course, be held to be entirely valid. The defendant, however, insists that it must be disregarded (1) because of the fact (which he claims has been shown by the proofs) that neither the complainant nor McGinn were residents of the state of Connecticut at the time of the institution of the suit, or during its pendency; and (2) because the suit was not instituted by the complainant, or by her authority, but by her mother and brother without her knowledge, as she herself stated on the witness stand.

Assuming, for the purpose of deciding the case, that the contention of the defendant must prevail, and the decree of the Connecticut court must be disregarded, what is the situation? There was no testimony, except hearsay, as to McGinn's being alive or dead at any time later than 10 months after his marriage with the complainant. He may have been dead at the time of the marriage of the complainant with the defendant, or he may have been alive. What the fact is we are not shown. The law presumes a continuation of life until seven years have elapsed after a person has been last heard of; and. If this presumption is accepted as equivalent to proof of the fact, the marriage of the complainant and defendan...