Vuyanich v. Republic Nat. Bank of Dallas
Citation | 505 F. Supp. 224 |
Decision Date | 22 October 1980 |
Docket Number | CA-3-7949-G.,No. CA-3-6982-G,CA-3-6982-G |
Parties | Joan Rance VUYANICH v. REPUBLIC NATIONAL BANK OF DALLAS. Ellen JOHNSON v. REPUBLIC NATIONAL BANK OF DALLAS. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Texas |
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JoAnn Peters, Anderson & Peters, Dallas, Tex., for Vuyanich.
Linda N. Coffee, Palmer, Palmer & Coffee, Dallas, Tex., for Johnson.
Richard L. Arnold, Tobolowsky & Schlinger, Dallas, Tex., for intervenor Fenton.
Wayne S. Bishop, Seyfarth, Shaw, Fairweather & Geraldson, Washington, D. C., for defendant.
This order constitutes the court's findings of fact and conclusions of law entered after a five-week trial to the court on the Phase I liability issues of a class action race and sex discrimination case under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. ?? 2000e et seq. ("Title VII").1 For the sake of clarity, and so that this opinion may stand as a self-contained unit, the facts and procedural history of the case will be set forth in full.
Plaintiff Joan Rance Vuyanich, a black female, was first employed with defendant Republic National Bank ("the Bank" or "Republic") on April 28, 1969, as an agent contact clerk in the Money Order Department. She was then the only black employee of her department. Soon after her arrival, she began to have problems with two white female co-workers, whom Ms. Vuyanich believed to be shouldering less than a fair share of the workload. Complaints to her supervisor resulted (in her view) in only temporary improvement. On June 29, 1969, Ms. Vuyanich married a white male whom she had met during previous employment. Her supervisors first met her new husband approximately one month later. A few days after this introduction, Ms. Vuyanich was called to her supervisor's office and told that there was a clash of personalities between herself and her co-workers, that the complaints about the workload were her fault, that she was not suitable for the job, and that she should resign. When asked about a transfer, her supervisor replied that Ms. Vuyanich probably did not need a job anymore since her husband was white.2 Ms. Vuyanich was discharged from the Bank on July 28, 1969.
On August 13, 1969, Ms. Vuyanich filed a charge against the Bank with the Austin Regional Office of the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission ("EEOC"), setting forth the above events and charging the Bank with violation of Title VII. On May 23, 1972, the Dallas District Director of the EEOC issued his findings of fact, in which he found, inter alia, that Vuyanich's supervisor had discharged her instead of taking other steps to resolve the racially motivated personality conflict between her and her co-workers. A determination of reasonable cause to believe that a violation of Title VII had occurred was issued on November 6, 1972. Conciliation efforts were unsuccessful, and on March 6, 1973, the EEOC issued a statutory right-to-sue letter. On March 22, 1973, three years and eight months after her discharge, Ms. Vuyanich filed the first of these two consolidated actions.
Plaintiff Ellen Johnson, a black female, applied for a job at the Bank on September 23, 1971. Ms. Johnson was a 1971 graduate of the University of Texas at Arlington with a major in government. She first applied for a position as a management trainee or in personnel administration, but was told that no such positions were available. She then expressed her willingness to accept any position available; she was not offered a position of any kind.3
On October 15, 1971, Ms. Johnson filed a discrimination charge with the Dallas District Office of the EEOC. This charge alleged across-the-board race and sex discrimination by the Bank with respect to hiring, recruiting, job requirements, training, promotion, and personnel rules. On August 14, 1973, the District Director issued a determination of reasonable cause with respect to most of these allegations. On November 1, 1973, the EEOC issued a right-to-sue letter, and on December 3, 1973, the second of the present actions was filed.
The procedural history of these cases is complex, the Vuyanich case having been assigned at one time or another to five different judges of this court. The first significant event in the cases took place on November 7, 1974, when Judge Mahon conditionally certified the Vuyanich case as a class action on behalf of female and black employees and potential employees of the Bank who were adversely affected by the practices alleged by Ms. Vuyanich. Except for sporadic discovery activities, the cases remained dormant until March 12, 1976. On that date, Judge Mahon consolidated the Vuyanich and Johnson cases for discovery purposes. Judge Mahon also granted plaintiffs' motions to strike the Bank's jury demand, basing his decision on...
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