W. Baton Rouge Parish Council v. Tullier
| Decision Date | 11 January 2021 |
| Docket Number | 2018 CA 1722 |
| Citation | 317 So.3d 782 |
| Court | Court of Appeal of Louisiana — District of US |
| Parties | WEST BATON ROUGE PARISH COUNCIL v. Joseph Gordon TULLIER, Sr., Rae Q. Tullier, Barton James Tullier, and Phillip John Debenedetto |
John F. Crawford, II, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellants Defendants—Joseph Gordon Tullier, Sr.; Rae Q. Tullier; Barton James Tullier; and Phillip John Debenedetto
Richard J. Ward, Jr., District Attorney, Louis W. Delahaye, Assistant District Attorney, Plaquemine, Louisiana and A.M. "Tony" Clayton, Port Allen, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellee Plaintiff—West Baton Rouge Parish Council
Jeff Landry, Attorney General, Richard L. Traina, Ryan M. Seidemann, Assistant Attorneys General, Baton Rouge, Louisiana, Counsel for Appellee, State of Louisiana
Before: Whipple, C.J., Guidry, and Welch, JJ.
Defendants—Joseph Gordon Tullier, Sr., Rae Q. Tullier, Barton James Tullier, and Phillip John Debenedetto—appeal from the trial court's denial of their peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action and from the granting of a permanent injunction in favor of the plaintiff, West Baton Rouge Parish Council ("Council"). For the reasons that follow, we affirm.
The defendants are riparian landowners (collectively "landowners") along the Mississippi River in West Baton Rouge Parish. The landowners’ property is burdened with a permanent levee servitude in favor of the Atchafalaya Basin Levee District ("District"). On September 2, 1931, the District appropriated the landowners’ property for levee purposes.
In August 2012, the District entered into a Cooperative Endeavor Agreement with the Council to construct bicycle paths and walkways atop the levees in West Baton Rouge Parish.1 After securing funding for the project, the Council entered into a public works construction contract in April 2017 with R.J. Daigle & Sons Contractors, Inc. for construction of the bicycle paths and walkways atop the levees.
On October 5, 2017, the Council filed a petition for permanent injunction, preliminary injunction, temporary restraining order, and damages against the landowners, asserting that: La. R.S. 38:301 authorized the District to construct bicycle paths and walkways atop the levees and that the permanent levee servitude granted to the District pursuant to law included the construction of bicycle paths and walkways atop the levees; the landowners obstructed or attempted to obstruct the construction of the bicycle paths and walkways; and that such actions by the landowners would cause the Council immediate and irreparable injury, loss, and damages if the landowners were allowed to continue to interrupt or were allowed to attempt to continue to interrupt the construction of the bicycle paths and walkways. The Council sought issuance of a temporary restraining order, preliminary injunction, and permanent injunction prohibiting the landowners or persons acting on their behalf from interrupting or attempting to interrupt construction of the bicycle paths and walkways atop the levees. The Council also sought damages for construction delays and/or breach of contract, demobilization and remobilization costs, and security costs. The trial court issued a temporary restraining order that date, restraining and enjoining the landowners from obstructing or interfering with the construction of the levee top bicycle paths and walkways.
On November 13, 2017, the landowners filed a peremptory exception raising the objections of no right of action and nonjoinder of a party. They asserted that the Council had no right of action because it was not the owner of the permanent levee servitude and because the Council failed to comply with the stipulations in the Cooperative Endeavor Agreement. The landowners further asserted that the Council failed to join the District as a party, since the District is the owner of the permanent levee servitude. The landowners also filed a motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order in favor of the Council due to the Council's alleged failure to prove irreparable injury. Following a hearing, the trial court sustained the landowners’ exception raising the objections of no right of action and nonjoinder of a party and granted the landowners’ motion to dissolve the temporary restraining order.
Thereafter, the Council amended its petition, asserting that the Council and the District had entered into an Assignment of the Bike Trail Servitude, granting to the Council a servitude for the design, construction, maintenance, management, repair, and anything related to or incidental to the levee top bicycle paths and walkways.
In response, the landowners re-urged a peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action, asserting that the Council had no right of action because La. R.S. 38:301 (A)(3)-(4) : (1) does not retroactively apply to the levee or the landowners’ property pursuant to La. R.S. 1:2 and La. C.C. art. 6 ; (2) does not apply to the levee on the landowners’ property because the provisions of La. R.S. 38:301 (A)(3)-(4) unconstitutionally expand the permanent levee servitude granted to the District pursuant to La. C.C. art. 665 ; and (3) is unconstitutional by (a) increasing the burden of the permanent levee servitude granted by the landowners to the District and divesting the landowners’ of the right to use their private land in violation of impairment of obligation of contracts and divestiture of vested rights pursuant to La. Const, art. 4, § 15 and U.S. Const. Art. I, § 101; (b) depriving the landowners’ of their property without due process of law in violation of La. Const. art. 1, § 2 and the Fourteenth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution; and (c) violating the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution. The trial court held a hearing on the landowners’ peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action on June 18, 2018, and subsequently signed a judgment on June 20, 2018, denying the exception.
On August 17, 2018, the matter proceeded to trial on the Council's request for a permanent injunction, following which, the trial court signed a judgment on August 29, 2018, granting the Council's request for a permanent injunction against the landowners. The judgment permanently enjoined and prohibited the landowners or anyone acting on their behalf from interrupting, interfering, or attempting to interrupt or interfere with the construction of the levee top bicycle and walking paths; from taking any actions that interrupt or may interrupt, delay, or impede construction, repair, or maintenance by the Council, the Council's agent, or contractor; or interfere, obstruct, or attempt to interfere or obstruct the use of the levee top bicycle and walking paths by the general public.
The landowners now appeal the trial court's August 29, 2018 judgment contending that the trial court erred in denying their peremptory exception raising the objection of no right of action and erred in issuing a permanent injunction in favor of the Council and against the landowners.2
A threshold inquiry in any case is whether there is a basis for jurisdiction. Jurisdiction is the legal power and authority of a court to hear and determine an action or proceeding involving the legal relations of the parties and to grant the relief to which they are entitled. La. C.C.P. art. 1. Appellate courts have a duty to examine subject matter jurisdiction sua sponte , even when the litigants do not raise the issue. Advanced Leveling & Concrete Solutions v. Lathan Company, Inc., 2017-1250 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/18), 268 So. 3d 1044, 1046 (en banc ).
The Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure defines three types of judgments: (1) an interlocutory judgment, which determines preliminary matters in the course of an action, but does not determine the merits ( La. C.C.P. art. 1841 ); (2) a final judgment, which determines the merits of the case in whole or in part ( La. C.C.P. art. 1841 ); and (3) a partial final judgment, which disposes of some, but not all, of the issues on the merits, and in some instances requires a designation of finality by the trial court for the purpose of an immediate appeal ( La. C.C.P. art. 1915 ). Different rules govern the appealability of these three types of judgments.3 This court's appellate jurisdiction extends to final judgments, which determine the merits of an action, in whole or in part.4 See La. C.C.P. arts. 1841, 2081, and 2083(A). See also Quality Envtl. Processes, Inc. v. Energy Dev. Corp., 2016-0171, 2016-0172 (La. App. 1st Cir. 4/12/17), 218 So. 3d 1045, 1053.
A valid judgment must be "precise, definite, and certain." Advanced Leveling, 268 So. 3d at 1046. The specific nature and amount of damages must be determinable from a judgment so that a third person is able to determine from a judgment the amount owed without reference to other documents. Vanderbrook v. Coachmen Indus., Inc., 2001-0809 (La. App. 1st Cir. 5/10/02), 818 So. 2d 906, 913, overruled on other grounds, Advanced Leveling, 268 So. 3d at 1046.5 Moreover, a final appealable judgment must contain decretal language, and the judgment must name the party in favor of whom the ruling is ordered, the party against whom the judgment is ordered, and the relief that is granted or denied. Advanced Leveling, 268 So. 3d at 1046. These determinations must be evident from the language of the judgment without reference to other documents in the record. Laird v. St. Tammany Par. Safe Harbor, 2002-0045 (La. App. 1st Cir. 12/20/02), 836 So. 2d 364, 366.
In the instant case, the trial court signed the August 29, 2018 judgment after a full trial on the merits on the Council's request for a permanent injunction. In addition to granting a permanent injunction in favor of the Council and against the landowners, the August 29, 2018 judgment decreed, in pertinent part:
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREEED, that the Defendants’,...
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