W.O. Broyles Stove & Furniture Co. v. Hines

• Decision Date: 28 October 1920
• Docket Number: 6 Div. 120
• Citation: 204 Ala. 584,87 So. 19
• Court: Alabama Supreme Court
• Parties: W.O. BROYLES STOVE & FURNITURE CO. v. HINES, Director General.

87 So. 19

204 Ala. 584

W.O. BROYLES STOVE & FURNITURE CO. v. HINES, Director General.

6 Div. 120

Supreme Court of Alabama

October 28, 1920

Appeal from Circuit Court, Jefferson County; Romain Boyd, Judge.

Action by the W.O. Broyles Stove & Furniture Company against Walker D. Hines, as Director General operating the Southern Railway Company. From judgment for defendant, plaintiff appeals. Transferred from Court of Appeals under section 6, Acts 1911 p. 450. Reversed and remanded.

Weatherly Deedmeyer & Birch, of Birmingham, for appellant.

Stokely Scrivner & Dominick, of Birmingham, for appellee.

ANDERSON C.J.

While it is a well-settled legal principle that one who has a special as well as a general interest or title to personal property can maintain trover for the conversion of same, it is also settled that one who has a special interest can only recover the value of his special interest in the property. McGowen v. Young, 2 Stew. & P. 160; Zimmerman v. Dunn, 151 Ala. 438, 44 So. 533. Especially does this rule apply to those plaintiffs in trover who sue for a general conversion and who merely hold a mortgage or lien upon the property converted. Seibold v. Rodgers, 110 Ala. 438, 18 So. 312; Ryan v. Young, 147 Ala. 660, 41 So. 954. The defendant's special plea 4 negatives any general interest or title of the plaintiff in or to the property, and sets up a state of facts showing that the gravamen of its action was the delivery to the consignee of certain goods before the payment of a draft for $54 covering certain shipping charges, freight, etc. In other words, the wrong complained of was not in the conversion of plaintiff's property, but in delivering certain property to the rightful consignee prior to the payment of said draft covering the shipping charges. Had the $54 been paid before the delivery of the goods to E. Peck, the plaintiff, under the facts disclosed by the pleading, would have no right of action against this defendant. Therefore the plaintiff's special interest in the property claimed to have been converted is analogous to that of a lienee or mortgagee, and the measure of recovery should be confined to the $54 with interest from the time of the alleged conversion.

The defendant's plea 4, however, purporting to be one of tender, should have averred that the $54 offered the plaintiff was tendered immediately after the delivery of the goods, or else should have included interest in said...