W. Chester Area Sch. Dist. v. A.M.
Decision Date | 19 June 2017 |
Docket Number | No. 383 M.D. 2016,383 M.D. 2016 |
Citation | 164 A.3d 620 |
Parties | WEST CHESTER AREA SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner v. A.M. and K.M., individually and as parents and natural guardians of C.M. and Charles Jelley, Hearing Officer, Pennsylvania Office of Dispute Resolution, Respondents |
Court | Pennsylvania Commonwealth Court |
Sharon W. Montanye, New Britain, for petitioner.
A.M. and K.M., pro se.
BEFORE: HONORABLE ROBERT SIMPSON, Judge, HONORABLE MICHAEL H. WOJCIK, Judge, HONORABLE BONNIE BRIGANCE LEADBETTER, Senior Judge
OPINION BY JUDGE SIMPSON
In this appeal/declaratory judgment action, the West Chester Area School District (District) appeals from a final order of Hearing Officer Charles Jelley (Hearing Officer) of the Pennsylvania Office of Dispute Resolution (ODR) denying the District's motion to enforce a waiver agreement and release (Waiver Agreement).
In our appellate jurisdiction, the District asserts Hearing Officer erred in determining he lacked the authority to enforce a settlement agreement at a due process hearing. In addition, the District filed a declaratory judgment action seeking a declaration that A.M. and K.M. (Parents), parents and natural guardians of C.M. (Student), waived their rights to file any further due process claims for the 2015–16 school year. Upon review, we affirm Hearing Officer's order, and we remand the declaratory judgment action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
Student, a resident of the District, suffers from Asperger's Syndrome, a type of autism. As such, he is eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA).1 Based on our review of the limited record in this matter, it appears the present controversy began in early November of the 2015–16 school year. A dispute arose at a November 5, 2015 IEP (individualized educational plan) team meeting between Parents and the District as to what courses Student should be taking his junior year of high school. Principally, Parents requested that Student remain in an all honors curriculum. However, Student's teachers and Special Education Supervisor P.J. Dakes (Supervisor Dakes) believed the honors courses covered too much material, which overwhelmed Student, who began to struggle in some of his classes. As such, the IEP team recommended Student take academic level classes, which are also college preparatory, in order for him to graduate at the same time as his nondisabled peers. Parents, however, assert Student will be exposed to certain classmates in the lower level classes who bullied him since elementary school.
However, the merits of Parents' due process challenge under the IDEA are not the central issue in this case. On November 13, 2015, approximately a week after the November 2015 IEP meeting, Parents entered into the Waiver Agreement with the District. Essentially, the District would allow Student to remain in the honors classes, some of which he was failing, in exchange for Parents' agreement not to file any due process claims based on the decision to allow Student to remain in the honors classes. The Waiver Agreement states in pertinent part (with emphasis added):
District's Pet. for Review, Ex. B.
Despite the Waiver Agreement, Parents brought a special education due process complaint seeking relief, in part, for alleged claims which arose during the period of November 13, 2015 through the start of the 2016–2017 school year. Based on the Waiver Agreement, the District filed a motion to limit or dismiss Parents' due process complaint. See R.R. at 8a–11a.
On May 16 and June 3, 2016, Hearing Officer conducted telephonic hearings addressing the District's motion and the Waiver Agreement. At the hearings, Parents asserted the Waiver Agreement should not be enforced because they signed it under duress. However, Hearing Officer did not find that Parents' concerns constituted adequate proof of duress. Notes of Testimony (N.T.), 6/3/16, at 55–56; R.R. at 67a. Nonetheless, Hearing Officer determined that the enforceability of the Waiver Agreement is an issue for the courts, not the ODR. N.T. at 56; R.R. at 67a. To that end, Hearing Officer stated:
Id. (emphasis added).
On June 22, 2016, Hearing Officer entered what he labeled a "final order" denying the District's motion to enforce the Waiver Agreement, but granting the District's oral motion to file an action in the courts to enforce the Waiver Agreement. R.R. at 75a. The order specified that the District must file its court action within 45 days. Id. In addition, Hearing Officer scheduled a July 22, 2016 hearing on Parents' consolidated claims, including their claim for a denial of FAPE relief for the 2016–17 school year. Id.
On July 1, 2016, the District filed a petition for review in this Court appealing Hearing Officer's "final order." In addition, the District's petition includes a one-count complaint seeking declaratory judgment. Specifically, the District requests an order: (a) enjoining Hearing Officer from considering any claim for the period of November 13, 2015 through the start of the 2016–2017 school year; (b) declaring Parents waived their right to seek any claims or remedies for the period of November 13, 2015 through the start of the 2016–2017 school year; and, (c) declaring that Hearing Officer, at the scheduled July 2016 hearing, is not to consider any claim or remedy brought by Parents for the period of November 13, 2015 through the start of the 2016–2017 school year.
On July 11, 2016, the District filed an application for special relief in the nature of a preliminary injunction. The District sought to enjoin Hearing Officer from considering any claim for the period of November 13, 2015 through the start of the 2016–2017 school year until resolution of this case.
On July 14, 2016, this Court entered an order temporarily enjoining the scheduled ODR hearing on Parents' claims and scheduling a hearing on the District's application for a preliminary injunction. Following a hearing on the application two weeks later, Senior...
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