W. J. Howey Co. v. Williams

• Decision Date: 23 February 1940
• Citation: 195 So. 181,142 Fla. 415
• Parties: W. J. HOWEY CO. et al. v. WILLIAMS, Tax Collector, et al.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

195 So. 181

142 Fla. 415

W. J. HOWEY CO. et al. v. WILLIAMS, Tax Collector, et al.

Florida Supreme Court

February 23, 1940

Certiorari to Circuit Court, Lake County; J. C. B. Koonce, Judge.

Suit by W. J. Howey Company, a corporation, and others against B. A Williams, as Tax Collector, and others to enjoin defendants from imposing and collecting ad valorem taxes upon plaintiff's land included in overlapping road and bridge districts and other taxing units and for other relief. To review an adverse judgment plaintiff brings certiorari.

Writ awarded.

Rehearing denied in 195 So. 184.

COUNSEL

Thomas B. Adams, of Jacksonville, and Duncan, Hamlin & Duncan, of Tavares, for appellant.

J. W Hunter and Harry P. Johnson, both of Tavares, Robert J Pleus, of Orlando, D. C. Hull and Hull, Landis & Whitehair, all of De Land, for appellees.

OPINION

PER CURIAM.

Petitioners brought a suit in equity seeking to enjoin county officers in Lake County from imposing and collecting ad valorem taxes upon lands of plaintiff's included in overlapping road and bridge districts and other taxing units, and praying direct and incidental relief predicated upon detailed allegations challenging the legality of the tax sought to be imposed and collected, together with other allegations relative to various elements of relief sought by plaintiffs including relief as to the alleged illegality in the contracts and resolutions for issuing refunding bonds.

On motions of defendants the court struck many sections of the bill of complaint and denied the injunctive relief sought. An interlocutory certiorari was granted by this court under Rule 34 adopted April 30, 1939.

This case was submitted to this court along with the case of Dodge Taylor v. B. A. Williams, as Tax Collector, et al., Fla., 195 So. 175. Many of the questions presented are common to both cases and those discussed by this Court may be found in one or the other of the opinions in the two cases this day filed.

It is in effect contended that road and bridge district taxation is not lawfully authorized and also that the public roads for which taxes are levied by the districts are State roads; and that because of the now established policy of the State to pay for roads that have been taken over by it in the road and bridge districts, the lands in the districts cannot now lawfully be taxed by the districts to pay bonds issued by the districts for constructing the roads which have been taken over by the State as a part of the State system of public roads and made a State expense.

The 1930 amendment to section 6, Article IX of the constitution recognizes the existing statutes establishing and authorizing the establishment of districts, and expressly regulates future issues of district bonds and refunding bonds. This in effect approved the statutory policy of the legislature authorizing local districts with bond and taxing authority for duly authorized district purposes. See Taylor v. Williams, supra, filed with this opinion; Lee v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., Fla., 194 So. 252, filed January 2, 1940.

The constitution commands that 'no tax shall be levied except in pursuance of law.' Section 3, Article IX. Such quoted organic provision does not require taxes to be 'levied by law', but to be levied 'in pursuance of law.' While statutes may and do directly levy taxes in some cases, yet as a general rule statutes are by the constitution either required or authorized to provide for levying taxes. See sections 2 and 5, Article IX; sections 6, 8 and 10, Article XII.

The uniformity of taxation required by the constitution relates to uniformity in each of the many taxing units severally in the State and does not require collective uniformity of taxation for all taxation units; viz., ad valorem taxation for State purposes must be uniform throughout the State, for county purposes throughout the county, and for district purposes throughout the district, each severally. See Hunter v. Owens, 80 Fla. 812, 86 So. 839; Charlotte Harbor & Northern Ry. Co. v. Welles, 78 Fla. 227, 82 So. 770; Id., 260 U.S. 8, 43 S.Ct. 3, 67 L.Ed. 100.

In taking over roads constructed by counties and districts to become State roads or a part of the State highway system of roads, the statutes do not obligate the State to pay any county or district road bonds; and do not affect the obligations of the counties and districts to pay the interest and principal of the bonds issued by the counties and districts respectively for the construction of the roads so taken over by the State. See secs. 1, 8 and 20, Chap. 14486, Acts of 1929, Ex.Sess. Lawful ad valorem taxes levied, or that under statutory requirements should have been levied, and assessed and collected in the counties and districts respectively, to pay such road construction bonds as are binding obligations, may be duly enforced whether the State does or does not meet its obligations to the counties and districts for roads taken over for State purposes and made the subject of State expense. See State ex rel. Gillespie v. Carlton, 103 Fla. 810, 138 So. 612.

The fact that, in some road and bridge districts in the State, payments being made by the State to such districts for roads built by the district and taken over by the State have met the bond obligations of the districts so that no ad valorem taxes are being levied in such districts for bond paying purposes, does not relieve from such taxation the districts which do not receive enough from the State to pay their bond indebtedness. The bond debt is a district debt and not a State obligation or expense, though payment by the State for the roads taken over for State purposes becomes a subject of State expense under the statutes and the constitution.

The policy of establishing overlapping districts for the acquisition or maintenance of local public facilities or improvements may be unwise and may cause hardships or injustice in particular cases, but that is a matter of legislative discretion and judgment not remediable by the courts unless and until it be duly shown that such overlapping of districts directly violates organic law or operates to deprive persons of property rights in violation of the constitution. No such violation of organic law is shown by the petitioner. See Charlotte Harbor & Northern Ry. Co. v. Welles, 78 Fla. 227, 82 So. 770; Id., 260 U.S. 8, 43 S.Ct. 3, 67 L.Ed. 100.

When overlapping road and bridge...