W. Jersey & S. R. Co. v. Atl. City & S. Traction Co.

• Decision Date: 08 January 1904
• Citation: 56 A. 890,65 N.J.E. 613
• Parties: WEST JERSEY & S. R. CO. v. ATLANTIC CITY & S. TRACTION CO. et al.
• Court: New Jersey Court of Chancery

56 A. 890

65 N.J.E. 613

WEST JERSEY & S. R. CO.

v. ATLANTIC CITY & S. TRACTION CO. et al.

Court of Chancery of New Jersey.

Jan. 8, 1904.

(Syllabus by the Court.)

Bill by the West Jersey & Seashore Railroad Company against the Atlantic City & Suburban Traction Company and others. Decree rendered.

J. H. Gaskill, for complainant. E. H. Chandler and W. H. Sponsler, for defendant.

Atlantic City & Suburban Traction Co. Harry Wootton, for defendant Atlantic City.

GREY, V. C. (orally). The questions argued in this cause, so far as they are affected by previous decisions, present points of law with which I am somewhat familiar. I have also had an opportunity during the argument to examine most of the cases cited by counsel. It is desirable that this case be speedily decided, as the defendant company's building of its railroad awaits its determination. The essential questions discussed are controlled by established principles, and can as well be decided now as upon further consideration.

The bill is tiled by the West Jersey & Seashore Railroad Company, alleging that the tracks of its Chelsea branch cross Florida avenue, in Atlantic City, at grade; that the defendant the Atlantic City & Suburban Traction Company, an electric trolley company, has a right of crossing at the same place, and is about to construct its crossing there, also at grade; that the Atlantic Coast Construction Company is engaged in building the trolley road and crossing, and claims a right, therefore, to the temporary occupation of the locus in quo under its contract; that the rieasautville & Atlantic Turnpike Company, or plankroad company, is a turnpike company also having a right to occupy Florida avenue at the same place, with the right to collect tolls, etc.; and that the city of Atlantic City, within whose bounds this particular crossing at Florida avenue lies, has, under its charter, the right to regulate the use of the city streets and all crossings. All these parties have been made defendants and brought into court in this suit by the complainant, the bill of complaint stating the claim of each defendant at the crossing in question.

The bill shows that the city of Atlantic City has by ordinance acted on the question of the crossing of the steam railroad tracks by the trolley company's tracks, by authorizing the trolley company to cross the steam railroad tracks at grade, with no other precautions against danger of collision between the trains or cars of the two companies than a direction that the approaching trolley car shall be stopped, and the conductor go ahead and signal to the motorman when the trolley car may safely cross. This method, the complainant insists, is dangerous at this crossing, because of the great quantity of railroad and highway and intended trolley travel at the place in question, and it asks that the trolley company be restrained from constructing its crossing of the steam railroad tracks, the right to build which is admitted, unless they build an overhead crossing, or, if that be not practicable, and the crossing be constructed at grade, that the defendant company may be required to install an interlocking system of signals, with provision for the derailing of cars on one or the other set of tracks before reaching the crossing, or may be required to arrange its crossing in such manner as the court may, under all the circumstances of the case, deem to be safe and proper; invoking the jurisdiction of this court to prescribe a mode in which the right to cross at grade shall be exercised. So far as an overhead crossing is concerned, the complainant has not attempted, either by proof or argument, to claim that the circumstances of this case justify a decree that such a crossing should be required at the locus in quo.

The defendant Atlantic City and the other defendants, the construction company and the turnpike company, are here by simple appearance, making no active defense.

The Atlantic City & Suburban Traction Company makes a most energetic defense, which stands practically upon two points: First, that this court has no jurisdiction to hear and determine the questions submitted by the bill (the locus in quo being conceded to be within the municipality of Atlantic City), because the defendant the Atlantic City & Suburban Traction Company has obtained a franchise from the state which authorizes it to cross the complainant's tracks at grade, and the city of Atlantic City has, by its charter, power to regulate grade crossings within that city, and, that city having by its ordinance prescribed a mode of crossing, that mode, even if it tends to injure or impair tire enjoyment of the easements of other parties at the same place, is conclusive, and this court has no jurisdiction to alter or change the mode prescribed by the city authorities. Shortly stated, the defendant contends that the legislative grants of power to the traction company and to Atlantic City, and the action taken under those grants, have conclusively settled the rights of the parties at the crossing in question, so that this court has no jurisdiction in the matter. That is the first and most strenuously argued point, largely because in the course of the testimony the other point, as to what plan for protection ought to be ordered, has been, by the very efficient exposition of the best and most scientific mode of crossing, pretty nearly agreed to, though not finally settled, by the evidence here produced, and by the concessions of the parties, each to the other.

Upon the question of jurisdiction, it being shown that two or more railroad companies, or a railroad company and a turnpike company, or a railroad company and electric road, or a railroad company and the general public using the public highway, or all of them, have easements of way over the same place, usable by each according to its grant and its necessary implications, and that at the crossing in that spot there is danger of obstruction or impairment of the easement of one by the manner in which another uses or proposes to use its easement, or danger to the traveling public, there seems to me no doubt that the Court of Chancery has jurisdiction, when invoked by any person interested in any of the easements which each may have a right there to enjoy, so to regulate the manner in which the parties shall use their several easements that each of them, and also the public, may be saved from the threatened interference or danger. It is of no significance to say that the defendant has a legislative grant authorizing it to cross at grade, or that the city of Atlantic City, under its right to regulate grade crossings, has prescribed a mode. The grant of the franchise from the Legislature, and the fixing of the mode of its enjoyment by the municipality, are essential incidents necessary to the existence of the defendant company's right; but they do not take away from the senior company, occupying the same place, its previously granted easement of way. When it appears that the new company's grant, as proposed to be used, threatens the impairment of the easement of the senior corporation at the same place, there must be some forum where this question can be judicially heard and determined. The application is a seeking to enforce the equitable maxim that every man shall so use his own as to do the least possible injury to his neighbor. The control of the manner in which conflicting easements may be enjoyed does not take away the rights of any of the companies holding the easements. It only judicially ascertains how each shall so use its own, that its use shall be the least disadvantage to the other. In the very nature of the case, the only forum in which relief can be sought must be a court of equity. No other has the remedies of injunction and receiver, which are necessary to the enforcement of the decree fixing the rights of the several parties.

The jurisdiction which is invoked is one which, in my judgment, is inherent in this court, and protected by the Constitution of this state. It existed as one of the general equitable powers of this court at the time the...