W.M. v. Scranton Sch. Dist.
| Decision Date | 22 September 2022 |
| Docket Number | Civil Action 3:21-cv-01266 |
| Parties | W.M., et al., Plaintiffs, v. SCRANTON SCHOOL DISTRICT, Defendant and Third-Party Plaintiff, v. THE CENTER FOR DISCOVERY, Third-Party Defendant. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Middle District of Pennsylvania |
This federal civil rights action commenced when the plaintiffs- W.M. and T.M., minors, and A.T., individually and as parent and guardian of W.M. and T.M., all appearing through counsel-filed their complaint on July 19, 2021. (Doc. 1.) W.M. is a student enrolled in Scranton School District (the “District”), the defendant in this action. A.T is W.M's parent, and T.M. is W.M.'s younger sibling. In their sevencount complaint, the plaintiffs have asserted claims for damages and injunctive relief against the District arising under 42. U.S.C. § 1983, Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act (the “RA”) 29 U.S.C. § 794, Title III of the Americans with Disabilities Act (the “ADA”), 42 U.S.C. § 12181 et seq., and the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (the “IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.
The District answered the complaint and then filed a third-party complaint against the Center for Discovery (the “Center”), a private special-education school located in Harris, New York. (Doc. 16.) The District subsequently filed an amended third-party complaint against the Center. (Doc. 31.) In its four-count amended third-party complaint, the District has asserted federal damages claims against the Center under the IDEA and the ADA, and state-law damages claims for negligence and common law indemnification.
The Center has moved to dismiss or to strike the amended third-party complaint for lack of jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) or Rule 14(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or, in the alternative, to dismiss it for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 34.) The Center's motion is now fully briefed and ripe for decision. (Doc. 37; Doc. 39; Doc. 41.)
W.M. is a minor and a student enrolled in the District. He has profound disabilities that severely limit his abilities in the areas of intelligence, communication, self-care, gross-motor skills, and fine-motor skills. He is eligible for special education services under the IDA categories of intellectual disabilities, autism, and speech and language impairment.
Prior to the 2019-20 school year, the plaintiffs resided in the State of New York. While residing there, Yonkers Public Schools (“Yonkers”) was the local educational agency responsible for providing W.M. with educational services. Pursuant to an agreement between W.M.'s parent and guardian, A.T., and Yonkers, W.M. was placed as a residential student at the Center, a private residential facility and special education school, at a cost of about $33,000 per month.
For the 2019-20 school year, A.T. and T.M. moved and resided within the District, where T.M. was enrolled as a student. Despite this change of residency, however, W.M. remained at the Center, and the District was unaware of his existence.
In July 2020, A.T. attempted to enroll W.M. with the District. Due to administrative issues, he was not formally enrolled with the District until August 6, 2020. But in mid-July, A.T. informed Yonkers that W.M. had been registered for school in the District. Yonkers immediately terminated funding for W.M.'s placement at the Center.
On July 24, 2020, the Center emailed the District and asked it to continue funding W.M.'s placement there.[1] The District did not respond to the email in writing, but District staff did speak with Center staff by telephone, requesting that it forward a contract and other documents.
On July 28, 2020, an internal District email documented a phone conversation between District staff and Center staff, in which the District learned that: W.M. was residing at the Center; A.T. was unable to care for W.M. because of his needs; W.M. had autism and several other severe mental health diagnoses; W.M. had a lengthy list of behaviors; W.M.'s sister, T.M., was already enrolled in the District; and the Center was interested in entering into an interstate compact with the District to temporarily maintain W.M.'s placement there pending transition to a local residential facility.
On July 31, 2020, the Center emailed the District to follow up, indicating that the District had not responded to the Center's previous requests to enter into an agreement to continue W.M.'s placement at the Center, despite the Center having forwarded a proposed contract covering interim funding on July 29, 2020.[2] The email stated that the Center preferred for W.M. to have a continuity of placement and successful transition, but that, in the absence of any contact from the District regarding the contract or next steps, the Center would be discharging W.M. to his parent's care the next week. The Center also noted that it had continued to provide care to W.M. without any funding at all for ten days at that point. The District did not respond in writing.
On August 4, 2020, the Center once again emailed the District to request a response to their proposed contract, advising that it planned to discharge W.M. to his parent's care that week in the absence of a funding arrangement. The Center requested that the District advise it as soon as possible if it had an alternative solution. The District did not respond in writing.
On August 10, 2020, the Center transported W.M. to A.T.'s home and discharged him into her care. The Center also contacted the Pennsylvania child protective services hotline to report A.T.'s expressed inability to care for W.M. with his special needs. The Center sent an email to the District providing a summary of the foregoing on August 12, 2020. The District did not respond in writing.
A.T. resided in a second-floor apartment that was effectively inaccessible to W.M. His discharge into her care resulted in a cascading series of events, including the family's displacement from that apartment to a hotel for several weeks, the exacerbation of a pre-existing depressive disorder suffered by T.M., and a complete deprivation of any special education services to W.M. during this period of displacement.[3]
The Center has moved to dismiss or to strike the amended third- party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction or, in the alternative, to dismiss it for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted.
The Center has moved to dismiss the amended third-party complaint for lack of personal jurisdiction, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, or alternatively to strike it on the same basis, pursuant to Rule 14(a)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. But it is beyond any reasonable dispute that this court may properly exercise personal jurisdiction over the Center.
It is undisputed that the Center maintains its principal place of business in Harris, New York. (See Doc. 37, at 11; Doc. 31 ¶ 4; see also Doc. 16 ¶ 4.) On October 26, 2021, shortly after the original third-party complaint was filed, the clerk issued a summons addressed to the Center at its Harris, New York, address. (Doc. 18.) On November 11, 2021, The Center waived formal service of process pursuant to Rule 4(d) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. (Doc. 21.) In waiving formal service of the summons, however, the Center did not waive any objection to personal jurisdiction. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(d)(5).
We take judicial notice that Harris, New York, is approximately 50 miles “as the crow flies” from the federal courthouse located in Scranton, Pennsylvania, from whence the summons was issued, and it is approximately 68 miles “as the crow flies” from the federal courthouse located in Wilkes-Barre, Pennsylvania, where the undersigned United States magistrate judge is stationed. Using either courthouse as our starting point, it is clear that the Center falls well within the proper exercise of personal jurisdiction by this court pursuant to the 100-mile “bulge rule” set forth in Rule 4(k)(1)(B) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. See Fed.R.Civ.P. 4(k)(1)(B); see also Assocs. Commercial Corp. v. Mahoning Nat'l Bank, 702 F.Supp. 104, 106 (W.D. Pa. 1988); Realco Servs., Inc. v. Holt, 479 F.Supp. 880, 885 (E.D. Pa. 1979); Lee v. Ohio Cas. Ins. Co., 445 F.Supp. 189, 192-94 (D. Del. 1978). Under this rule, courts have held that “[t]he ‘minimum contacts' requirement of due process need not be satisfied independently.” Realco Servs., 479 F.Supp. at 885. But even if it did, based on the nature and location of its operations in Harris, New York, the Center clearly has the minimum contacts necessary to satisfy due process in this case. See Assocs. Commercial Corp., 702 F.Supp. at 106 (); Lee, 445 F.Supp. at 193-94 ( that courts have considered other standards, including measuring minimum contacts within the bulge area only, but finding that, regardless of standard, minimum contacts were clearly established where the party contesting personal jurisdiction transacted the business at issue within 100 miles of the federal courthouse that issued the summons).
Accordingly, the Center's motion to dismiss or to strike for lack of personal jurisdiction will be denied.
In the alternative, the Center has moved to dismiss the amended third-party complaint for failure to state a claim upon which relief can be granted, pursuant to Rule 12(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
The District has articulated its third-party...
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