W. Mich. Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church v. City of Grand Rapids

• Decision Date: 25 February 2021
• Docket Number: No. 352703,352703
• Citation: 969 N.W.2d 813,336 Mich.App. 132
• Parties: WEST MICHIGAN ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Petitioner-Appellee, v. CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS, Respondent-Appellant.
• Court: Court of Appeal of Michigan — District of US

336 Mich.App. 132

969 N.W.2d 813

WEST MICHIGAN ANNUAL CONFERENCE OF THE UNITED METHODIST CHURCH, Petitioner-Appellee,

v.CITY OF GRAND RAPIDS, Respondent-Appellant.

No. 352703

Court of Appeals of Michigan.

Submitted February 9, 2021, at Detroit.

Decided February 25, 2021, 9:05 a.m.

Lennon, Miller, O'Connor & Bartosiewicz, Kalamazoo (by Andrew J. Vorbrich and Christopher D. Morris ) for the West Michigan Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church.

Toby Koenig and Jason C. Grinnell, Assistant City Attorneys, for the city of Grand Rapids.

Before: Swartzle, P.J., and Markey and Tukel, JJ.

Tukel, J.

Since 1893, the General Property Tax Act has generally excluded a "parsonage" from being subject to the property tax. In this case, respondent, the city of Grand Rapids, argues that a home owned by petitioner and lived in by Reverend Doctor Margie Crawford, an ordained minister who does not have a designated congregation but who occupies an administrative role overseeing multiple congregations for petitioner, does not meet the statutory definition of "parsonage." The Michigan Tax Tribunal (the MTT) disagreed, upholding the exemption. Respondent thus appeals as of right the MTT's order which denied respondent's motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) and which granted summary disposition under MCR 2.116(I)(2) to petitioner, the West Michigan Annual Conference of the United Methodist Church.

In essence, the dispute boils down to which of two possible interpretations of the term "parsonage" is correct: does that term require that (1) property be owned by a religious society and occupied by an ordained minister who serves a particular congregation; or (2) does property owned by a religious society and occupied by an ordained minister who does not serve a particular congregation, but who otherwise works as a minister on behalf of the religious society also qualify. Respondent argues for the first option, while petitioner argues that the second, more expansive, possibility applies. We agree with petitioner that given the undisputed facts of this case and the legal definition of parsonage, the house qualifies for the tax exemption. We therefore find no legal error in the MTT's grant of summary disposition to petitioner, and we affirm its order.

I. UNDERLYING FACTS

The basic facts of this case are straightforward and agreed to by the parties. Rev. Dr. Crawford is an ordained minister who works for petitioner in an administrative capacity in the church hierarchy. Rev. Dr. Crawford does not serve any specific congregation but instead occupies an administrative role as the District Superintendent overseeing petitioner's Midwest District, which encompasses 91 individual churches. In her role as District Superintendent, Rev. Dr. Crawford "oversee[s] the total ministry of the clergy and of the churches in the communities of the District." As part of this function, Rev. Dr. Crawford gives at least one guest sermon per year at each of the churches in her district; she also provides pastoral care "to anyone with a physical or mental ailment within [her] District" and could be "called upon to serve as Chaplain, if needed."

Rev. Dr. Crawford lives in a residential house owned by petitioner and located in Grand Rapids (the residence). Petitioner applied for tax exemption for the residence for tax year 2019, but respondent denied petitioner's application and assessed the residence as having a taxable value of $98,200. Petitioner then made the same request for tax exemption "before the appropriate local Board of Review," but the Board of Review also denied petitioner's request. Petitioner then appealed that decision to the MTT.

Respondent eventually moved for summary disposition and argued that the residence did not qualify as a "parsonage" under MCL 211.7s because Rev. Dr. Crawford does not minister to a specific congregation.¹ Petitioner responded that Rev. Dr. Crawford was not required to minister to a specific congregation for the residence to qualify as a parsonage. The MTT agreed with petitioner and granted it summary disposition, concluding that the residence qualifies as a parsonage. This appeal followed.

II. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Unless there is fraud, this Court's review of MTT "decisions is limited to determining whether the MTT erred in applying the law or adopted a wrong legal principle." VanderWerp v. Plainfield Charter Twp. , 278 Mich. App. 624, 627, 752 N.W.2d 479 (2008). If this Court's "review requires the interpretation and application of a statute, that review is de novo." Power v. Dep't of Treasury , 301 Mich. App. 226, 230, 835 N.W.2d 622 (2013). "Though this Court will generally ‘defer to the Tax Tribunal's interpretation of a statute that it is delegated to administer,’ that deference will not extend to cases in which the tribunal makes a legal error. Thus, agency interpretations are entitled to ‘respectful consideration’ but cannot control in the face of contradictory statutory text." SBC Health Midwest, Inc. v. Kentwood , 500 Mich. 65, 71, 894 N.W.2d 535 (2017) (citations omitted).

A motion for summary disposition under MCR 2.116(C)(10) tests the factual sufficiency of a complaint and is reviewed de novo. Joseph v. Auto Club Ins. Ass'n , 491 Mich. 200, 205-206, 815 N.W.2d 412 (2012). This Court reviews a motion brought under MCR 2.116(C)(10) "by considering the pleadings, admissions, and other evidence submitted by the parties in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Patrick v. Turkelson , 322 Mich. App. 595, 605, 913 N.W.2d 369 (2018) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Summary disposition "is appropriate ... if there is no genuine issue regarding any material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). "There is a genuine issue of material fact when reasonable minds could differ on an issue after viewing the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party." Allison v. AEW Capital Mgt., L.L.P. , 481 Mich. 419, 425, 751 N.W.2d 8 (2008). "Only the substantively admissible evidence actually proffered may be considered." 1300 Lafayette East Coop., Inc. v. Savoy , 284 Mich. App. 522, 525, 773 N.W.2d 57 (2009) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

Finally, "[s]ummary disposition is properly granted to the opposing party [under MCR 2.116(I)(2) ] if it appears to the court that that party, rather than the moving party, is entitled to judgment." Sharper Image Corp. v. Dep't of Treasury , 216 Mich. App. 698, 701, 550 N.W.2d 596 (1996). "Additionally, statutory interpretation is a question of law subject to review de novo." Mich. Milk Producers Ass'n v. Dep't of Treasury , 242 Mich. App. 486, 491, 618 N.W.2d 917 (2000).

III. ANALYSIS

The MTT correctly applied the general definition of "parsonage"—that is, the home of a parson—as well as the remainder of the statutory language of the exemption.² Contrary to respondent's argument, the statute has no requirement that in order for a residence to constitute a "parsonage," its resident must be a pastor who ministers to a particular congregation. The statute does require, though, that the residence be used as a parsonage. Therefore, so long as the resident is a minister who is not retired or otherwise unconnected to church functions, such a home is used as a parsonage and therefore qualifies for the exemption.

A. LEGISLATIVE ACQUIESCENCE

As an initial matter, petitioner argues that because the Legislature has not overruled or modified St. Joseph's Church v. Detroit , 189 Mich. 408, 155 N.W. 588 (1915), the rule set down in that case is settled and we cannot modify it by virtue of a doctrine known as "legislative acquiescence." That argument is not viable, however, because "it has been the rule in Michigan since at least Donajkowski v. Alpena Power Co. , 460 Mich. 243, 261, 596 N.W.2d 574 (1999), that the doctrine of legislative acquiescence is not recognized in this state." Rowland v. Washtenaw Co. Rd. Comm. , 477 Mich. 197, 209 n. 8, 731 N.W.2d 41 (2007). Indeed, "the legislative acquiescence doctrine is a highly disfavored doctrine of statutory construction; sound principles of statutory construction require that Michigan courts determine the Legislature's intent from its words, not from its silence." Id. (quotation marks and citation omitted). Thus, the doctrine of legislative acquiescence has no force in this state, and we instead rely on normal principles of statutory interpretation to determine the meaning of "parsonage" as used in MCL 211.7s.³

B. THE PARSONAGE EXCEPTION

The parties agree that petitioner is a religious society and that it owns the residence. They further agree that Rev. Dr. Crawford is an ordained minister; that she lives in the residence; and that, in her role as District Superintendent, she does not minister to a particular congregation. The purely legal issue before us is whether an ordained pastor must minister to a particular congregation for his or her residence to qualify as a parsonage. As such, this case presents a question of statutory interpretation regarding the definition of a "parsonage" within the meaning of MCL 211.7s, which we review de novo.

1. RULES OF CONSTRUCTION

This Court and the Michigan Supreme Court have described the rules of statutory construction as follows:

"The paramount rule of statutory interpretation is that we are to effect the intent of the Legislature. To do so, we begin with the statute's language. If the statute's language is clear and unambiguous, we assume that the Legislature intended its plain meaning, and we enforce the statute as written. In reviewing the statute's language, every word should be given meaning, and we should avoid a construction that would render any part of the statute surplusage or nugatory." [ PNC Nat'l Bank Ass'n v. Dep't of Treasury , 285 Mich. App. 504, 506, 778 N.W.2d 282 (2009), quoting Wickens v. Oakwood Healthcare Sys. , 465 Mich. 53, 60, 631 N.W.2d 686 (2001).]

"Unless defined in the...