W.P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Crossley

Decision Date16 May 1935
Docket Number6 Div. 685
Citation230 Ala. 403,161 So. 536
PartiesW.P. BROWN & SONS LUMBER CO. v. CROSSLEY.
CourtAlabama Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court, Lamar County; R.L. Blanton, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by Walter Crossley against W.P. Brown & Sons Lumber Company to recover compensation on account of injuries arising out of employment. Judgment awarding compensation, and the employer brings certiorari.

Affirmed.

O.E Young, of Vernon, and S.T. Wright, of Fayette, for appellant.

Pennington & Tweedy, of Jasper, and Wilson Kelley, of Vernon, for appellee.

FOSTER Justice.

Appellant owned and operated a sawmill at Fayette, Ala., where it had its main office. It owned much timber land situated in Lamar county. Appellee was engaged by Lee Newman to help him cut and skid timber from defendant's timber land to a point of concentration and load it on trucks. It was hauled to defendant's mill independent of contract with Newman. If Newman was an independent contractor, appellee was not an employee of appellant. We will refer to them as plaintiff and defendant. On the other hand, if Newman was one who did what "is commonly known as 'piece work,' or in any [some] way where the system of employment used merely provides a method of fixing the workman's wages," or if he performed "his work upon the employer's premises, and with the employer's tools or appliances and under the employer's directions," he is an employee as defined by section 7585, Code.

If he was such an employee, he was not an independent contractor. If it was such as that his employer contemplated the necessity of his having helpers in his work, the employment of those helpers did not make them the servants solely of the main employee, as contemplated by the Workmen's Compensation Law. It is not necessary that they shall have a claim against defendant for wages to enable them to come within the Workmen's Compensation Law. Their relation to it depends upon the relation of Newman. If Newman was an employee, and his employment with defendant contemplated the use of others, such as plaintiff, plaintiff was also an employee within that law.

Newman had been employed by one Cobb who had a similar contact. He had no funds nor equipment, and had been working as a laborer. The services required the use of a skidder which we understand to be a kind of tractor by which the timber was skidded to location. Cobb had purchased two skidders which were paid for by defendant and charged to him. Newman had no funds nor equipment, but agreed to purchase Cobb's outfit, by which defendant credited Cobb and charged Newman. Newman had no contract for any definite amount of timber to be handled. There was no time limit. The contract could be terminated by either at pleasure.

Defendant's foremen were frequently in the woods directing the lengths to be cut, criticizing the work, seeing that no waste or injury to other timber was done; that timber cut was of the right size; and that the land was cut clean.

When plaintiff was hurt, defendant wrote to the hospital referring to him as its employee, assumed and paid the hospital bill of $160, and charged it to Newman, though plaintiff had only earned and been paid $10.50, by check given by Newman, and defendant then knew that plaintiff was one of Newman's helpers.

This court has in more than one opinion referred to the case of State v. District Court of St. Louis Co., 128 Minn 43, 150 N.W. 211. It was shown to be authoritative, since it was prior to our adoption of the Minnesota Workmen's Compensation Law. Ex parte W.T. Smith Lumber Co., 206 Ala 485, 90 So. 807; Martin v. Republic Steel Co., 226 Ala. 209, 146 So. 276. The facts of that case are in all material respects similar to those we are considering. It was there shown that the fundamental test of whether the laborer was an employee or an independent contractor related to the right of control, and it was there stated, as it had been in many other...

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12 cases
  • Payne v. Alabama Cemetery Ass'n, Inc.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • April 23, 1982
    ...281, 259 So.2d 829 (1972); Solmica of the Gulf Coast, Inc. v. Braggs, 285 Ala. 396, 232 So.2d 638 (1970); W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Crossley, 230 Ala. 403, 161 So. 536 (1935). A review of the facts makes it evident that sufficient evidence existed to defeat a motion for summary judgm......
  • DeBardeleben Coal Corp. v. Richards
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 30, 1948
    ... ... disturbed.' Majors v. Jackson Lumber Co., 244 ... Ala. 418, 13 So.2d 885, 887; Ex parte ... Corporation within the meaning of that law. Brown & Sons ... Lumber Co. v. Crossley, 230 Ala. 403, 161 So ... ...
  • Thompson Tractor Co. v. Cobb
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • September 26, 1968
    ...v. C. L. Dickert Lumber Co., 270 Ala. 713, 121 So.2d 894; Riddle v. Smith, 252 Ala. 369, 41 So.2d 288; W. P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co. v. Crossley, 230 Ala. 403, 161 So. 536, 538, and cases Southeastern also contends that Count Three, which will be hereafter set out, was also subject to the g......
  • Majors v. Jackson Lumber Co.
    • United States
    • Alabama Supreme Court
    • June 5, 1943
    ... ... defendant within that law. W.P. Brown & Sons Lumber Co ... v. Crossley, 230 Ala. 403, 161 So. 536 ... ...
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