W. S. Rockwell Co. v. Lindquist Hardware Co.

• Decision Date: 17 July 1956
• Citation: 143 Conn. 684,125 A.2d 173
• Court: Connecticut Supreme Court
• Parties: W. S. ROCKWELL COMPANY v. The LINDQUIST HARDWARE COMPANY. Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut

Page 173

125 A.2d 173

143 Conn. 684

W. S. ROCKWELL COMPANY v. The LINDQUIST HARDWARE COMPANY.

Supreme Court of Errors of Connecticut.

July 17, 1956.

Austin K. Wolf, Bridgeport, with whom, on the brief, were Herbert L. Cohen, Bridgeport, and Martin F. Wolf, for appellant (plaintiff).

Francis A. Smith, Jr., Bridgeport, for appellee (defendant).

Before INGLIS, C. J., and O'SULLIVAN, WYNNE, DALY and PHILLIPS, ^* JJ.

INGLIS, Chief Justice.

The question determinative of this appeal is whether an action for breach of implied warranties of merchantable quality and fitness is premature if it is instituted before the vendee has sustained actual damage.

The complaint contains the following allegations: The plaintiff bought by description 100 feet of chain from the defendant, which dealt in goods of that nature. The plaintiff used a section of the chain as a counterweight chain to a lever operating the furnace door on an oven which it later sold in the regular course of its business to the Bullard Company. While the oven was being operated by that company, the chain broke, causing the furnace door to close upon the hand of an employee. He sued the plaintiff for damages, and the suit is still pending. As a result, the plaintiff has suffered loss and expense in that its assets have been attached and it has spent money in preparation for the defense of the suit. As a further result, the plaintiff may suffer financial loss, depending on the outcome of the suit. 'The said losses and expenses of the plaintiff constitute a breach of the implied warranty of the defendant that the aforesaid chain was of merchantable quality, all of which has caused and will cause the plaintiff to sustain great financial harm. The said losses and expenses * * * constitute a breach of the implied warranty * * * as to the fitness of the * * * chain for the * * * purpose for which it was to be used. * * *'

The defendant filed a plea in abatement on the ground that the action was prematurely brought because, it claims, before any cause of action can accrue to the plaintiff a final judgment must be rendered against it in the suit brought by the employee of the Bullard Company. A demurrer to the plea in abatement was overruled, the plea was sustained and judgment was rendered dismissing the instant action. From that judgment the plaintiff has appealed.

It is fundamental that the legal injury caused by a breach of contract is sustained at the time the contract is broken, even though the actual damage resulting from the breach is not received until a later time. Kennedy v. Johns-Manville Sales Corporation, 135 Conn. 176, 178, 62 A.2d 771. Accordingly, it is the general rule that, inasmuch as a breach of a warranty implied from a sale occurs at the time of the sale, the right of action for the breach accrues at that time. Peterson v. Brown, 216 Ark. 709, 711, 227 S.W.2d 142; Liberty Mutual Ins. Co. v. Sheila-Lynn, Inc., 185 Misc. 689, 692, 57 N.Y.S.2d 707, affirmed 270 App.Div. 835, 61 N.Y.S.2d 373; Woodland Oil Co. v. A. M. Byers & Co., 223 Pa. 241, 245, 72 A....