W.T. Grant Company v. Taylor

Decision Date23 March 1928
Citation223 Ky. 812
PartiesW.T. Grant Company v. Taylor.
CourtUnited States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky

1. Malicious Prosecution. — In action for damages for malicious prosecution, evidence held sufficient to authorize a submission to jury of question of want of probable cause and existence of malice.

2. Malicious prosecution. — In action for malicious prosecution, existence of malice is always question of fact for the jury, but malice may be inferred from proof of want of probable cause.

3. Appeal and Error. — New trial will not be granted by appellate court because of excessive damages, except when damages allowed are so obviously disproportionate to injury shown to have been sustained as to warrant belief that jury must have been influenced by passion or prejudice.

4. Appeal and Error. — Ascertainment of damages, in action for malicious prosecution, is a matter for the jury, and the court will not disturb verdict of a properly instructed jury on account of damages allowed being excessive, unless it appears that there was flagrant abuse of discretion, or that jury was actuated by passion or prejudice.

5. Malicious Prosecution. — In action for malicious prosecution, compensatory damages in the sum of $12,500 held so excessive as to amount to flagrant abuse of discretion by jury, in view of fact that only injuries sustained were mental suffering and injury to reputation.

6. Malicious Prosecution. — Exemplary damages may be recovered in action for malicious prosecution, in addition to compensatory damages, when authorized by facts.

7. Corporations. — Corporation, as well as a natural person, may be held liable in punitive damages for injuries inflicted by tortious acts of its employees committed within scope of their authority.

8. Malicious Prosecution. — In determining amount of compensatory damages to be awarded in an action for malicious prosecution, jury may consider any pecuniary loss suffered by plaintiff, any mental or physical suffering endured, or any injury to reputation caused by prosecution.

9. Malicious Prosecution. — Actions for malicious prosecution are not favored in law, since public policy favors the exposure of crime, and large verdicts in such actions should be viewed with more concern than similar verdicts in other cases involving tortious acts.

Appeal from Jefferson Circuit Court.

H.H. HUFFAKER and WALTER P. LINCOLN for appellant.

HUBBARD & HUBBARD and JAMES W. GARRISON for appellee.

OPINION OF THE COURT BY JUDGE REES.

Reversing.

Mrs. Cora E. Taylor brought this action against the W.T. Grant Company to recover damages for malicious prosecution. There have been three trials. On the first trial the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $6,000, and on the second trial there was a verdict in her favor for $25,000. Both verdicts were set aside by the trial court. It appears that in each instance the verdict was set aside and a new trial granted because the damages were excessive. On the third trial, the jury returned a verdict in favor of the plaintiff for $12,500, and from the judgment entered thereon this appeal is prosecuted.

The appellant insists that the trial court should have directed a verdict in its favor, because the evidence is insufficient to show malice or want of probable cause. It also insists the instructions are erroneous and the verdict is excessive. Other alleged errors, including the manner of selecting the jury and the trial of the case during vacation, are relied on for a reversal, but, in view of our conclusion that a new trial must be granted, and since these alleged errors will, in all probability, not occur on another trial, we deem it unnecessary to discuss them.

The W.T. Grant Company is a corporation operating a store in Louisville, Ky., in which are sold articles of merchandise ranging in value from 25 cents to $1. The proof for appellee, Mrs. Cora E. Taylor, tends to show that on the morning of December 11, 1923, she, accompanied by a friend, Mrs. Kavanaugh, went to the Grant Company's store for the purpose of exchanging two brassieres she had purchased for her daughter about a week or ten days before. Mrs. Taylor, a young married woman, was at the time, the owner of a grocery store on Eighth street near Broadway in Louisville, Ky. After entering the store, they walked to the counter on which the brassieres were kept. At the time Miss Heil the salesgirl in charge of the counter, was waiting on another customer.

Mrs. Taylor had carried the brassieres from her home that morning in a Herman Strauss & Son envelop. After standing near the counter a few minutes, Mrs. Taylor approached Miss Heil, and requested her to exchange the articles, as they were too small. Miss Heil asked her for her purchase slip, and Mrs. Taylor informed her that she had misplaced or lost it. She was then informed that it would be necessary for her to go to the office and get an exchange slip before she could exchange the articles. It seems that, when a sale is made, the purchaser is given a purchase slip showing the date, the article purchased, the price paid, and the identification mark of the clerk making the sale, which, if returned with the article purchased within a reasonable time, entitles the purchaser to an exchange of the article for other articles of equal value, or a return of the purchase price. Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Kavanaugh started to the office in the rear of the store for the purpose of obtaining the exchange slip, but were intercepted on their way by Edward A. Daly, the manager of the store, and W.T. Blanford, the house detective. Daly accused the women of having stolen the articles, and told them that Blandford had seen them take them from the counter. Both Mrs. Taylor and Mrs. Kavanaugh denied they had taken the articles, and explained to Daly that they had brought them from Mrs. Taylor's home that morning for the purpose of exchanging them, and that they had been purchased at the store about a week before. He was shown the Herman Strauss & Son envelope in which the articles had been carried to the store, but he took the two brassieres and the envelope from Mrs. Taylor, and forced both women to accompany him to his office on the second floor, where he again accused them of stealing the articles. They insisted that they were innocent, and Mrs. Taylor requested him to telephone to the Carter Dry Goods Company, where she had placed an order that morning for goods, to the two banks where she did business, to her physician, her attorneys, and a number of other people, and to inquire of them as to her reputation. Daly refused to call any one, and said:

"That is what they all say, when they get caught. We don't care anything about any of these people; we just happen to have the goods on you."

Mrs. Taylor then requested Daly to call up her home and ask for the woman that worked for her and ask her if she left with anything to exchange that morning. She also requested that he telephone to her husband. He still refused to call any one, and finally wrote out a confession, and told Mrs. Taylor, if she would sign it, he would permit her to go to her home, otherwise she would have to go to jail. The appellee testified that she was detained in Daly's office for more than two hours, and during all that time was compelled to stand outside the railing on the balcony, in full view of people in the store, while Daly plied her with questions, laughed and jeered at her, and insisted that she sign a writing prepared by him, which was to the effect that she had stolen the articles. She refused to sign the confession that had been prepared by him, and Daly called for a police officer, and, upon being advised by the officer that a warrant was necessary, he sent his assistant manager, W.L. Sharrett, to swear out a warrant for Mrs. Taylor. She was then taken to the city hall, and in a short time she got in communication with her husband, who obtained bond for her. She was tried in police court on the following morning on the charge of petit larceny, and was dismissed. On the same day this action was filed.

The proof for the defendant was, in substance, that Blandford, at the time appellee approached the counter on which the brassieres were kept, was standing near by so as not to be observed by any one near the counter. As there was no clerk near, he watched the two women, and he claimed that he saw them handling and examining the brassieres, and saw the appellee take two brassieres from the counter and walk up the aisle to where Miss Heil was standing, and speak to her, and then return to the rear of the store. He ascertained from Miss Heil that appellee wanted to exchange two brassieres she had in her hand for others as they were too small, and that she asked her for her purchase slip, and was told that it was lost, and that she had sent appellee to the exchange desk at the rear to procure an exchange slip. Blandford immediately informed the manager, Daly, of these facts. Daly approached the appellee, and asked what he could do for her, and she replied that she wanted to exchange two brassieres which she had purchased about ten days before, but that she had lost her purchase slip. He asked her if she could identify the girl who sold them to her and she indicated Miss Heil as the seller. Miss Heil was asked in appellee's presence if she made the sale, and she replied, "No, how could I? I only came here to work yesterday." Upon these facts Daly caused the warrant to be issued. He denied that he grilled Mrs. Taylor or insisted that she should sign the confession, or that he jeered or laughed at her at any time, or that she was in his office more than 10 or 15 minutes before the arrival of the officer. He admitted that she requested him to call a number of persons; that she called his attention to the Herman Strauss & Son envelope, in which she claimed to have carried the articles from her home to the store; and that sh...

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