A.W. v. State
| Decision Date | 29 July 2022 |
| Docket Number | Court of Appeals Case No. 22A-JV-150 |
| Citation | 192 N.E.3d 227 |
| Parties | A.W., Appellant-Respondent, v. STATE of Indiana, Appellee-Petitioner. |
| Court | Indiana Appellate Court |
Attorney for Appellant: Lisa M. Johnson, Brownsburg, Indiana
Attorneys for Appellee: Theodore E. Rokita, Attorney General of Indiana, Justin F. Roebel, Supervising Deputy Attorney General, Indianapolis, Indiana
[1] A.W. challenges his juvenile delinquency adjudications for possession of a machine gun, a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult, and dangerous possession of a firearm, as a Class A misdemeanor.1 He presents two issues for our review:
[2] We affirm in part and reverse in part.
[3] On July 13, 2021, two officers with the Speedway Police Department were on patrol when they saw a white Pontiac Grand Prix driving sixty miles per hour in a thirty-five-mile-per-hour zone on High School Road. The officers pursued the car with the lights and siren activated, and the Grand Prix eventually stopped. At that point, a young man later identified as A.W., age seventeen, exited the car from a rear passenger seat. A.W. began to run from the scene, and officers saw a gun in his hand. Officer Scott Highland ordered A.W. to stop multiple times, but A.W. continued to run. Finally, A.W. tripped over something and, as he started to fall to the ground, he tossed the gun towards a house. The gun struck a window, breaking the glass, and landed in the yard.
[4] Officer Highland arrested A.W., and, during a pat down search, Officer Highland found a phone and a "large sum of money" in A.W.’s pants pocket. Tr. at 11. Sergeant Hodges2 recovered the gun, which was identified as a Glock fitted with a laser pointer and an extended magazine. Officer Highland recognized the Glock as being "essentially" the same as his own firearm, except something was "different" about A.W.’s Glock. Id. at 12.
[5] On July 14, the State filed a delinquency petition alleging that A.W. had committed conduct which, if committed by an adult, amounted to three Class A misdemeanors, namely, carrying a handgun without a license, resisting law enforcement, and criminal mischief. And the State alleged that A.W. committed dangerous possession of a firearm, as a Class A misdemeanor. The State later discovered that the Glock A.W. had possessed had been converted from a semiautomatic weapon to an automatic weapon through the addition of an after-market device known as a "Glock switch," which is a square black box about the size of a quarter that attaches to the rear slide of the gun. Id. at 21. Accordingly, on August 5, the State amended the delinquency petition to add a count of possession of a machine gun, a Level 5 felony if committed by an adult. Following a factfinding hearing, the juvenile court entered a true finding that A.W. had committed each of the offenses as alleged in the amended petition. The trial court placed A.W. on probation and released him to his father's custody. This appeal ensued.
[6] A.W. challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain the court's true finding of possession of a machine gun. Specifically, he contends that the State presented insufficient evidence to demonstrate that he knew that the Glock in his possession had been converted to a machine gun. Our standard of review is well settled:
We neither reweigh the evidence nor judge the credibility of witnesses. The State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile committed the charged offense. We examine only the evidence most favorable to the judgment along with all reasonable inferences to be drawn therefrom. We will affirm if there exists substanti[al] evidence of probative value to establish every material element of the offense. Further, it is the function of the trier of fact to resolve conflicts in testimony and to determine the weight of the evidence and the credibility of the witnesses.
J.C. v. State , 131 N.E.3d 610, 612 (Ind. Ct. App. 2019) (citation omitted). We will affirm a juvenile delinquency adjudication unless no reasonable factfinder could have found the respondent guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. B.T.E. v. State , 108 N.E.3d 322, 326 (Ind. 2018).
[7] To prove that A.W. was a juvenile delinquent for possession of a machine gun, the State was required to prove that he knowingly or intentionally owned or possessed a machine gun. See Ind. Code § 35-47-5-8 (2022). A.W. does not dispute that he possessed the Glock found at the scene. But he contends that he did not know that the Glock had been modified with a Glock switch to convert the firearm from a semiautomatic weapon to a machine gun. And he asserts that the State did not present any evidence that would support a reasonable inference that he knew it was a machine gun.
[8] Knowledge and intent are both mental states and, absent an admission by the defendant, the trier of fact must resort to reasonable inferences from both the direct and circumstantial evidence to determine whether the defendant had the requisite knowledge or intent to commit the offense in question. Stokes v. State , 922 N.E.2d 758, 764 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010), trans. denied. Accordingly, knowledge or intent may be proven by circumstantial evidence, and it may be inferred from a defendant's conduct and the natural and usual sequence to which such conduct logically and reasonably points. Id. Indiana courts have repeatedly found that exclusive possession of contraband supports an inference that the person "knows of the contraband's presence and of its forbidden character." Carnes v. State , 480 N.E.2d 581, 586 (Ind. Ct. App. 1985).
[9] Here, A.W. had exclusive possession of the machine gun while the officers were chasing him. That evidence supports a reasonable inference that A.W. knew the gun was a machine gun. See id. Further, the juvenile court found that A.W.’s conduct, namely, his flight from the traffic stop, supported an inference that he knew that the gun was a machine gun. See Stokes , 922 N.E.2d at 764. A.W.’s contention to the contrary amounts to a request that we reweigh the evidence, which we cannot do. The juvenile court did not err when it entered a true finding that A.W. possessed a machine gun.
[10] A.W. next contends that the true findings for possession of a machine gun and dangerous possession of a firearm violate the Indiana Constitution's prohibition against double jeopardy. A.W. asserts that the dangerous possession of a firearm finding was both an inherently included lesser offense and a factually included lesser offense to his possession of a machine gun finding.
[11] Our Supreme Court has recently made clear that Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution prohibits multiple convictions for the same act, and, where there is an allegation that one act is being punished under multiple statutes, we are to consider whether one of those offenses "is an included offense of the other (either inherently or as charged)." Wadle v. State , 151 N.E.3d 227, 248 (Ind. 2020). If one offense is not included within the other, "there is no violation of double jeopardy." Id. However, there is a double jeopardy violation if one offense is factually included within the other and the defendant's actions were "so compressed in terms of time, place, singleness of purpose, and continuity of action as to constitute a single transaction." Id. at 253. Thus, in applying the Wadle test, we first determine under our included-offense statutes whether one charged offense encompasses another charged offense. Id. Second, we must look at the underlying facts—as alleged in the information and as adduced at trial—to determine whether the charged offenses are the "same." Id.
[12] Here, we have a single act supporting the two findings, namely, A.W.’s possession of the machine gun for approximately thirty seconds before he was apprehended. We disagree with A.W. that the dangerous possession of a firearm is an inherently included offense to possession of a machine gun. The former can only be committed by a child, see Ind. Code § 35-47-10-5, and the latter does not include that material element, see I.C. § 35-47-5-8.
[13] However, as our Supreme Court made clear in Wadle , "[a]n offense is ‘factually included’ when ‘the charging instrument alleges that the means used to commit the crime charged include all of the elements of the alleged lesser included offense.’ " 151 N.E.3d at 251 n.30 (quoting Young v. State , 30 N.E.3d 719, 724 (Ind. 2015) (emphasis omitted)) (emphasis added). In other words, as we stated in Phillips v. State , two offenses "could be factually included depending on the manner in which the State charged the defendant and the evidence produced at trial." 174 N.E.3d 635, 647 (Ind. Ct. App. 2021). "[A] prosecutor cannot secure two convictions for the same act using the exact same evidence." Id.
[14] As charged and as proven at A.W.’s hearing, unlawful...
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