W. Watersheds Project v. Bernhardt
| Decision Date | 20 December 2019 |
| Docket Number | Case No. 2:19-cv-0750-SI |
| Citation | 428 F.Supp.3d 327 |
| Parties | WESTERN WATERSHEDS PROJECT, Center for Biological Diversity, and Wildearth Guardians, Plaintiffs, v. David BERNHARDT, Secretary of the Interior, Jeffrey Rose, District Manager Burns District Bureau of Land Management, and Bureau of Land Management, Defendants. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — District of Oregon |
David H. Becker, Law Office of David H. Becker, LLC, 4110 SE Hawthorne Blvd. No. 168, Portland, OR 97214; Talasi B. Brooks, Western Watersheds Project, Inc., PO Box 2863, Boise, ID 83701; Paul David Ruprecht, Western Watersheds Project, Inc., PO Box 12356, Reno, NV 89510. Of Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
Luther Langdon Hajek, United States Department of Justice, Environment and Natural Resources Division, 999 18th Street, South Terrace Suite 370, Denver, CO 80202. Of Attorneys for Defendants.
In this case, the Court is asked to determine, among other things, whether the then-Secretary of the Interior, on his last day in office, failed to comply with governing statutes and regulations, acknowledge his departure from established agency policies and practices, and provide a reasoned explanation for that departure when ordering that a specific grazing permit be renewed. The Court also is asked to decide, among other things, whether vacatur of that agency action is the appropriate remedy, if those alleged serious errors have been found to occur.
Plaintiffs bring this action challenging Defendants' grant of a Grazing Permit (the "Permit") to Hammond Ranches, Inc. ("HRI") on four allotments—Mud Creek, Hammond, Hammond FFR, and Hardie Summer. Plaintiffs argue that then-Secretary of the Interior Ryan Zinke1 and Defendant Bureau of Land Management ("BLM") acted arbitrarily and capriciously in violation of the Administrative Procedure Act ("APA")2 by failing to follow the requirements of the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 ("FLPMA),3 the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 ("NEPA"),4 and applicable BLM regulations. Plaintiffs contend that Defendants violated these statutes and regulations when Secretary Zinke ordered that HRI's previously-issued grazing permit be renewed without conducting the analyses required by the FLPMA, BLM regulations, NEPA, and the 2015 Oregon Greater Sage-Grouse Approved RMP Amendment. Plaintiffs also argue that Defendants violated these statutes and regulations when BLM issued a categorical exclusion environmental review and approval ("CX") and the approved the Permit without performing the required analyses.
Plaintiffs filed a motion for temporary restraining order ("TRO") to enjoin grazing on the four allotments. On June 4, 2019, the Court granted Plaintiffs' motion for a TRO and enjoined grazing on the Mud Creek and Hardie Summer allotments through July 2, 2019. By stipulation of the parties, the Court extended the TRO through July 17, 2019. On July 16, 2019, the Court granted in part Plaintiffs' amended motion for preliminary injunction, adopting a revised grazing plan proposed by Defendants. For the 2019 grazing season, the Court enjoined Defendants from allowing turnout and grazing of livestock on the Mud Creek allotment and the government-controlled portion of the Fir Creek pasture on the Hardie Summer allotment, and also enjoined turnout and grazing of livestock on the remainder of the government-controlled portions of the Hardie Summer allotment at greater than 30 percent utilization.
Now pending before the Court are cross-motions for summary judgment filed by the parties. Plaintiffs also move to supplement the administrative record. Defendants agree to supplement the administrative record with the maps and actual records of use submitted by Plaintiffs, but object to supplementing the record with the declarations of Plaintiffs' experts and certain exhibits attached to those declarations.
For the reasons that follow, Plaintiffs' motion for summary judgment is granted and Defendants' motion is denied on Plaintiffs' claim that Secretary Zinke violated the APA. Resolving this claim results in the vacatur of the Permit and remand to the agency. Thus, the Court need not resolve the pending motions relating to Plaintiffs' claims that Secretary Zinke and BLM violated NEPA and that BLM violated the APA. Whether there are additional violations that also would require vacatur need not be determined to resolve this dispute. Further, any potential future permit issued after remand would likely involve a different and more comprehensive NEPA analysis, particularly given the unique factual circumstances of the Permit issued in this case. Secretary Zinke allowed BLM 30 days to issue the Permit, but because of the government shutdown, BLM only had a few days to perform an expedited NEPA analysis and issue the Permit to comply with the Secretary's order. This makes any evaluation by the Court of BLM's current NEPA analysis likely irrelevant. The Court also need not resolve the disputed portion of Plaintiffs' motion to supplement the administrative record, because the disputed evidence relates to the portions of the cross-motions for summary judgment that the Court is not reaching at this time.
Grazing on federal lands is governed by, among other statutes and regulations, the Taylor Grazing Act of 19345 ("Taylor Grazing Act") and the FLPMA. The Taylor Grazing Act requires persons seeking to graze livestock on public lands to obtain a permit from the Department of the Interior. The Taylor Grazing Act provides for the "orderly use, improvement, and development of the range" on public lands. 43 U.S.C. § 315a. "The Taylor Grazing Act authorized the Secretary of the Interior ‘to issue or cause to be issued permits to graze livestock’ pursuant to ‘his rules and regulations.’ " United States v. Estate of Hage , 810 F.3d 712, 717 (9th Cir. 2016) (quoting 43 U.S.C. § 315b ). "[T]he implied license under which the United States has suffered its public domain to be used as a pasture for sheep and cattle ... was curtailed and qualified by Congress, to the extent that such privilege should not be exercised in contravention of the rules and regulations." United States v. Grimaud , 220 U.S. 506, 521, 31 S.Ct. 480, 55 L.Ed. 563 (1911) (citation omitted).
The goals of the Taylor Grazing Act "are to ‘stop injury’ to the lands from ‘overgrazing and soil deterioration,’ to "provide for their use, improvement and development," and ‘to stabilize the livestock industry dependent on the public range.’ " Pub. Lands Council v. Babbitt , 529 U.S. 728, 733, 120 S.Ct. 1815, 146 L.Ed.2d 753 (2000) (quoting 48 Stat. 1269). "As grazing allocations were determined, the Department would issue a permit measuring grazing privileges in terms of ‘animal unit months’ (AUMs), i.e. , the right to obtain the forage needed to sustain one cow (or five sheep) for one month." Id. at 735, 120 S.Ct. 1815 ; see also 43 C.F.R. § 4100.0-5 (defining AUM).
The FLPMA provides additional direction for the management of public lands. "In enacting FLPMA, ‘Congress declared that it is the policy of the United States to manage the public lands in a manner that will protect the quality of scientific, scenic, historical, ecological, environmental, air, and atmospheric, water resource, and archeological values.’ " W. Watersheds Project v. Kraayenbrink , 632 F.3d 472, 498-99 (9th Cir. 2011) (quoting Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. U.S. Dep't of Interior , 581 F.3d 1063, 1075 (9th Cir. 2009) ). The FLPMA instructs that permits for grazing on public lands ordinarily shall be issued for a 10-year term, subject to such terms and conditions as BLM deems appropriate and consistent with governing law. 43 U.S.C. § 1752(a). The FLPMA also establishes that a permittee holding an expiring grazing permit will be given first priority for renewal if the permittee "is in compliance with the rules and regulations issued [by the Secretary] and the terms and conditions of the permit." 43 U.S.C. § 1752(c).
BLM has issued regulations implementing the Taylor Grazing Act and the FLPMA. 43 C.F.R. §§ 4100- 4190.1 (2005).6 BLM's regulations specify "mandatory qualifications" for an applicant for a permit for grazing on public lands. 43 C.F.R. § 4110.1. These include the requirement that any applicant (and its affiliates) for renewal of a grazing permit "must be determined by the authorized officer to have a satisfactory record of performance." Id. § 4110.1(b) (emphasis added). An applicant is "deemed" to have a satisfactory record "if the authorized officer determines the applicant and affiliates to be in substantial compliance with the terms and conditions of the existing Federal grazing permit or lease for which renewal is sought, and with the rules and regulations applicable to the permit or lease." Id. § 4110.1-1(b)(1)(i). "The authorized officer may take into consideration circumstances beyond the control of the applicant or affiliate in determining whether the applicant and affiliates are in substantial compliance with permit or lease terms and conditions and applicable rules and regulations." Id. § 4110.1-1(b)(1)(ii).
BLM regulations applicable to a grazing permit prohibit, among other things: "(3) Cutting, burning, spraying, destroying, or removing vegetation without authorization"; and "(4) Damaging or removing U.S. property without authorization." Id. § 4140.l(b). BLM also has regulations applicable to preventing wildfires, which apply to users of public lands, including grazing permit holders. These regulations prohibit, without authorization, a user to, among other things: "[c]ause a fire, other than a campfire, or the industrial flaring of gas, to be ignited by any source; [b]urn, timber, trees, slash, brush, tundra or grass except as used in campfires; [l]eave a fire without extinguishing it; [or] [r]esist or interfere with the efforts of firefighter(s) to...
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