Wabash Railroad Company v. John Hayes

• Citation: 34 S.Ct. 729,58 L.Ed. 1226,234 U.S. 86
• Decision Date: 25 May 1914
• Docket Number: No. 843,843
• Parties: WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err., v. JOHN R. HAYES
• Court: United States Supreme Court

234 U.S. 86

34 S.Ct. 729

58 L.Ed. 1226

WABASH RAILROAD COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v JOHN R. HAYES.

No. 843.

Submitted April 27, 1914.

Decided May 25, 1914.

Messrs. J. L. Minnis, John Maxey zane, and charles F. Morse for plaintiff in error.

Mr. James C. McShane for defendant in error.

[Argument of Counsel from page 87 intentionally omitted] Mr. Justice Van Devanter delivered the opinion of the court:

This was an action against a railroad company to recover for a personal injury sustained by the plaintiff through the negligence of the company while he was employed as a switchman in its railroad yard in Cook county, Illinois. The action was brought in the superior court of that county, and a trial to the court and a jury resulted in a verdict and judgment for the plaintiff. The judgment was affirmed by the appellate court for that district (180 Ill. App. 511), which was the highest court of the state in which a decision of the case could be had, and this writ of error was then sued out by the company. By a motion to dismiss the writ our jurisdiction to review the judgment is challenged. Shortly stated, the facts bearing upon the disposition of the motion are these:

The plaintiff's declaration alleged that the injury occurred while the defendant was engaged, and while the plaintiff was employed by it, in interstate commerce. The other allegations were such that, with that one, they stated a good cause of action under the Federal employers' liability act (35 Stat. at L. 65, chap. 149, U. S. Comp. Stat. Supp. 1911, p. 1322), and, without it, they stated a good cause of action under the common law prevailing in the state. There was a plea of not guilty; and upon the trial, the proof failing to show that the injury occurred in interstate commerce, the court, at the defendant's request, instructed the jury that the Federal employers' liability act had no application to the case. Then, over the defendant's objection, the court treated the allegation respecting interstate commerce as eliminated, and submitted the case to the jury as one controlled by the common law prevailing in the state. The plaintiff recovered under that law. In the appellate court the defendant contended that, even though the allegation that the injury occurred in interstate commerce proved unwarranted, the declaration could not be treated, consistently with the Federal act, as affording any basis for a recovery under the law of the state, common or statutory. But the court held otherwise and sustained the recovery under the state law. Whether that ruling operated as a denial of a right or immunity to which the defendant was entitled under the Federal act is the question, and the only question, sought to be presented by the assignments of error.

Had the injury occurred in interstate commerce, as was alleged, the Federal act undoubtedly would have been controlling, and a recovery could not have been had under the common or statute law of the state; in other words, the Federal act would have been exclusive in its operation, not merely cumulative. Second Employers' Liability Cases (Mondou v. New York, N. H. & H. R. Co.) 223 U. S. 1, 53-55, 56 L. ed. 327, 347, 348, 38 L.R.A.(N.S.) 44, 32 Sup. Ct. Rep. 169, 1 N. C. C. A. 875; St. Louis, S. F. & T. R. Co. v. Seale, 229 U. S. 156, 158, 57 L. ed. 1129, 1133, 33 Sup. Ct. Rep. 651; North Carolina R. Co. v. Zachary, 232 U. S. 248, 256, 58 L. Ed. ——, 34 Sup. Ct. Rep. 305; Seaboard Air Line R. Co....