Wabash Ry. Co. v. Koenig

• Decision Date: 16 July 1921
• Docket Number: 5793.
• Citation: 274 F. 909
• Parties: WABASH RY. CO. v. KOENIG et al.
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

274 F. 909

WABASH RY. CO. v. KOENIG et al.

No. 5793.

United States Court of Appeals, Eighth Circuit.

July 16, 1921

Rehearing Denied October 7, 1921.

N. S Brown, of St. Louis, Mo. (L. H. Strasser and Homer Hall, both of St. Louis, on the brief), for appellant.

Clifford B. Allen, of St. Louis, Mo. (Lee B. Ewing, of Nevada, Mo., on the brief), for appellees.

Before HOOK, Circuit Judge, and TRIEBER and NEBLETT, District Judges.

TRIEBER District Judge.

This is an appeal from a decree awarding appellees a recovery for charges for the transportation of grain between stations in the state of Missouri, alleged to have been in excess of the rates prescribed by the statutes of the state and the Railroad Commissioners of the State of Missouri under and by virtue of the laws of said state; that the rates prescribed by the acts of the Legislature and the Railroad Commissioners were attacked as unconstitutional by the appellant in an action instituted in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Missouri and the officers of the state, as well as the shippers enjoined from instituting any suits or taking any steps to enforce said acts of the Legislature; that appellees were not made parties defendant to said injunction suit, it was a class suit against all shippers, and by reason thereof included them; that said injunction remained in force and effect until February 6 1914, at which time a decree was entered dissolving the injunction and dismissing the bill in said suit, without prejudice.

The material pleas in the answer so far as necessary for the determination of this appeal are:

1. That appellees were not parties to the injunction suit and therefore not in any way bound or restrained by the injunction, and that they had at all times the right to institute suits against the railroad company to recover judgment on any valid claims by reason of any unlawful rates or charges collected from them.

2. A denial that the rates charged and collected were without authority of law.

3. That the acts of the state of Missouri establishing freight rates were unconstitutional as being confiscatory.

4. That the rates fixed under the said laws of the state were void in violation of the Interstate Commerce Act of the United States (24 Stat. 379), as being unlawfully discriminatory between localities in the state of Missouri and localities in other states; that heretofore the Southwestern Missouri Millers' Club and the Merchants' Exchange of St. Louis, Mo., filed their complaints against appellant and other railroad companies before the Interstate Commerce Commission, wherein it was charged that the use by the shippers of Missouri and the charging of said statutory rates by the carriers in Missouri of grain between points in said state were unlawful, because they created an unlawful discrimination against interstate commerce, and on a hearing by the Interstate Commerce Commission, the charge was sustained. The opinion and order of the Commission is found in 34 Interst.Com.Com'n R. 351, 359. That in the proceeding before the Interstate Commerce Commission the Public Service Commission of the State of Missouri made itself a party, representing the state and every shipper therein, including appellees, and therefore they are concluded by the finding and order of the said Commission.

The petition was referred to a special master, who recommended that the petition of appellees be dismissed upon the ground that the Interstate Commerce Commission in the Southwestern Missouri Miller's Club Case, reported in 34 Interst.Com.Comn.R. 351, had decided that the Missouri state rates on grain were discriminatory and the appellant and the other railroads, parties to that proceeding, ordered...