Wabbaseka School Dist. No. 7 of Jefferson County v. Johnson, 5-847

• Decision Date: 13 February 1956
• Docket Number: No. 5-847,5-847
• Citation: 286 S.W.2d 841,225 Ark. 982
• Parties: WABBASEKA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7 OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, Arkansas, Appellant, v. Rubye JOHNSON, Appellee.
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

Page 841

286 S.W.2d 841

225 Ark. 982

WABBASEKA SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 7 OF JEFFERSON COUNTY, Arkansas, Appellant, v. Rubye JOHNSON, Appellee.

No. 5-847.

Supreme Court of Arkansas.

Feb. 13, 1956.

Coleman, Gantt & Ramsay, Pine Bluff, for appellant.

Wiley A. Branton, Pine Bluff, for appellee.

WARD, Justice.

Appellee, Rubye Johnson, sued the Wabbaseka School District No. 7, Jefferson County, for damages because of the District's refusal to allow her to teach a term of school in accordance with an alleged contract. The Circuit Judge, sitting as a jury, found in favor of appellee, and in doing so he made several specific findings of fact. Since these findings need be supported only by substantial testimony we shall not deem it necessary to set out the voluminous testimony at any great length.

Appellee taught during the 1951-1952 term of school under a written contract, holding a Fourth grade emergency license which expired on or about the first of September 1952. When the term of school ended the latter part of May 1952, neither party notified the other that the contract would not be continued through the next succeeding school term as is provided for in Ark.Stats. § 80-1304(b). Appellee's contract, which was on a regular printed form, contained a renewal provision with practically the same wording as contained in the statute hereafter quoted.

Within ten days or two weeks after school had closed appellee enrolled at the A. M. & N. College in Pine Bluff and attended said school until August 8th or 9th, 1952, and on September 11, 1952 she was issued a five year Junior High teacher's license which she recorded in the County Supervisor's office on September 22, 1952.

In answer to appellee's complaint, appellant, in substance stated: (a) At the close of the 1951-1952 term it was understood by appellee that her selection as a teacher for the ensuing term was conditioned on a sufficient enrollment to justify retaining her as a teacher, and that it was ascertained that there was no such enrollment and that she was so notified; (b) Appellee's contract could be and was cancelled by 30 days' notice; (c) Appellee did not keep herself available to teach, and, if available, she could have secured other employment at equal compensation, and; (d) Appellee earned as much as she would have had she been allowed to teach.

Some of the above contentions may have been abandoned by appellant. At least its arguments for a reversal are based on somewhat different points which we shall examine in order, viz.: 1. Appellee had no contract of employment; 2. Appellee was ineligible for employment, and; 3. Appellee was not available for employment.

1. Under the undisputed facts in this case together with the facts found by the trial judge to exist, it is our conclusion that appellee did have a contract with the school district to teach during the 1952-1953 school term. The pertinent part of Ark.Stats. § 80-1304(b) reads as follows:

'Every contract of employment hereafter made between a teacher and a board of school directors shall be renewed in writing on the same terms and for the same salary, unless increased or decreased under the provisions of the law, or the school year next succeeding the date of termination fixed therein; unless within ten (10) days after the date of the termination of said school term, the teacher shall be notified by the school board in writing * * * or unless the teacher within ten (10) days after close of school shall deliver or mail by registered mail to such school board his or her written resignation as such teacher, * * *.'

It is not contended that appellant gave appellee notice of the kind or within the time mentioned in the above statute, nor is it contended that appellee notified appellant that she would not accept such employment. There was introduced some testimony on behalf of appellant that a member of the board attempted to give appellee notice that she would not be re-employed. It is not contended that notice was given to appellee but to her mother. Moreover the time of giving this notice does not appear to be definite and on the whole the trial judge was justified in finding that the statutory notice had not been given. Introduced into the evidence was a letter dated May 19, 1952 [a few days before school closed] signed by the school superintendent and delivered to appellee. Portions of this letter read as follows: 'The school board has asked me to inform you that you have been re-employed * * * for the next school term (1952-1953). If you plan to leave us for work elsewhere I wish you would let me know as soon as possible; * * *' It is not contended that appellee answered this letter. The first notice appellee actually...