Wachsberger v. Pepper
| Decision Date | 06 December 1990 |
| Docket Number | No. 89-347-A,89-347-A |
| Citation | 583 A.2d 77 |
| Parties | Janina WACHSBERGER v. William PEPPER et al. ppeal. |
| Court | Rhode Island Supreme Court |
This matter comes before the Supreme Court on the plaintiff's appeal from a Superior Court order denying the plaintiff's motion for leave to file an amended complaint. We reverse.
The case concerns an ownership dispute over an improved parcel of real estate located in Westerly, Rhode Island. In 1975 the real estate was purchased by William and Marie Pepper, defendants in this appeal. In 1978, the Peppers began experiencing financial difficulties and approached Janina Wachsberger, Mrs. Pepper's aunt and plaintiff in this appeal, for assistance. That same year the Peppers and Wachsberger entered into a purchase-and-sale agreement whereby a 25 percent interest in the real estate would go to Wachsberger in return for certain monetary payments. This transfer was duly recorded in the Westerly Land Evidence Records. The Peppers retained a 50 percent interest in the real estate. The remaining 25 percent interest in the real estate was held by Helen Tenev, a codefendant in this appeal. Tenev is Mrs. Pepper's mother and also Wachsberger's sister.
In 1979 the Peppers executed a second purchase-and-sale agreement with Wachsberger, transferring their remaining 50 percent interest in the real estate to Wachsberger in exchange for monetary payments and her assumption of certain mortgage obligations. A warranty deed for this transfer was prepared and signed but was not to be recorded until Wachsberger completed her obligations under the agreement. In April 1980 the warranty deed was recorded in the Westerly Land Evidence Records, allegedly without the consent of the Peppers.
In October 1980 the Peppers and Tenev instituted suit against Wachsberger, claiming a breach of the 1979 purchase-and-sale agreement and a wrongful conversion of the warranty deed. Wachsberger failed to answer or personally appear to defend against the allegations contained in the complaint. Subsequent to an oral offer of proof by Mr. Pepper, the trial justice entered a default judgment against Wachsberger in July 1981. The default judgment granted the Peppers and Tenev compensatory and punitive damages as well as a rescission of the 1979 purchase-and-sale agreement.
There was no further legal action until January 1986, when Wachsberger filed the complaint that is the subject of this appeal. Wachsberger's complaint sought to vacate the default judgment, to enjoin enforcement of the default judgment, and to collect damages based upon an unspecified fraud.
The Peppers and Tenev asserted that the complaint failed to state a claim upon which relief may be granted. Additionally the Peppers and Tenev claimed that Wachsberger was guilty of laches and excessive delay in bringing her action. In February 1989 the Peppers and Tenev filed a motion to dismiss based upon Rule 12(b)(6) of the Superior Court Rules of Civil Procedure. Wachsberger, admitting that her complaint insufficiently pleaded the allegation of fraud, filed a motion to amend her complaint. The amended complaint attempted to specify further the fraud alleged in the original complaint in addition to making new allegations concerning Wachsberger's failure to answer the Peppers' and Tenev's prior complaint. The trial justice denied Wachsberger's motion to amend and granted the Peppers' and Tenev's motion to dismiss.
On appeal Wachsberger argues that the trial justice improperly denied her motion to amend her complaint. 1 Wachsberger relies, in part, on Rule 15(a), which states in relevant part:
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Cranston Police Retirees Action Comm. v. City of Cranston
...creates substantial prejudice to the opposing party." Lomastro v. Iacovelli , 56 A.3d 92, 96 (R.I. 2012) (quoting Wachsberger v. Pepper , 583 A.2d 77, 79 (R.I. 1990) ).The plaintiff was given an opportunity to explain to the trial justice how it would be prejudiced by the addition of the af......
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Harodite Indus. Inc. v. Warren Electric Corp..
...delay in moving to amend, we have previously stated that, “mere delay is an insufficient reason to deny an amendment.” Wachsberger v. Pepper, 583 A.2d 77, 79 (R.I.1990); see Inleasing Corp., 475 A.2d at 992. Rather, it is incumbent upon the hearing justice to “find that such delay creates s......
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Cady v. IMC Mortgage Co., Inc.
...burden rests on the party opposing the motion to show it would incur substantial prejudice if the motion to amend were granted." Wachsberger, 583 A.2d at 78-79. in arguing he would be prejudiced if the motion were granted, argues that a significant amount of time, money and effort went into......
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Williams v. Stoddard
...an insufficient reason to deny an amendment.'" Harodite Indus., Inc. v. Warren Elec. Corp., 24 A.3d 514, 531 (R.I. 2011) (quoting Wachsberger, 583 A.2d at 79) (additional omitted). Rather, this Court must find that "such delay creates substantial prejudice to the opposing party." Id. (inter......