Waddell v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm'rs of Cleveland Cnty.

• Decision Date: 15 April 2014
• Docket Number: Case No. CIV-11-1037-D
• Court: U.S. District Court — Western District of Oklahoma
• Parties: JASON WADDELL, as Guardian Ad Litem of Lacee Danielle Marez, an incapacitated person, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF CLEVELAND COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

JASON WADDELL, as Guardian Ad Litemof Lacee Danielle Marez, an incapacitated person, Plaintiff, v. BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS

OF CLEVELAND COUNTY, et al., Defendants.

Case No. CIV-11-1037-D

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE WESTERN DISTRICT OF OKLAHOMA

SO ORDERED: April 15, 2014

ORDER

Before the Court is the Motion to Dismiss of Defendants ESW Correctional Healthcare, LLC and Sooner Medical Staffing, LLC [Doc. No. 78]. Plaintiff has filed a Response [Doc. No. 79], Defendants have filed a Reply [Doc. No. 81] and Plaintiff has filed a Surreply [Doc. No. 101]. The matter is fully briefed and at issue.

Lacee Danielle Marez suffered injuries as the result of alleged denial of proper medical care while she was a detainee at the Cleveland County Detention Center in September 2009. Plaintiff, as Guardian Ad Litem of Ms. Marez, brings this action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging violations of Ms. Marez's constitutional rights. On June 20, 2013, Plaintiff filed a Fourth Amended Complaint [Doc. No. 71] and added supplemental state law claims against Defendants ESW Correctional Healthcare, LLC (ESW) and Sooner Medical Staffing, LLC (Sooner Medical) arising out of their contract with the Cleveland County Sheriff's Department to provide medical care to inmates at the Cleveland County Detention Center.

ESW and Sooner Medical (collectively, the Moving Defendants) seek dismissal of the state law claims brought against them in the Fourth Amended Complaint. Specifically, the Moving Defendants contend Plaintiff's state law tort claims are time-barred by the applicable limitationsperiod or, alternatively, the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act. The Moving Defendants further contend Plaintiff's breach of contract claim is barred because Plaintiff is not a third-party beneficiary of the subject contract.

Standard Governing Motions to Dismiss

Dismissal under Rule 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim is proper "if, viewing the well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint as true and in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, the complaint does not contain 'enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its face.'" MacArthur v. San Juan County, 497 F.3d 1057, 1064 (10th Cir.2007) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)); see also Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009); Robbins v. Oklahoma, 519 F.3d 1242, 1247 (10th Cir.2008). "A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged." Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678. The question to be decided is "whether the complaint sufficiently alleges facts supporting all the elements necessary to establish an entitlement to relief under the legal theory proposed." Lane v. Simon, 495 F.3d 1182, 1186 (10th Cir.2007) (internal quotation omitted).

Discussion

A. The Timeliness of Plaintiff's State Law Tort Claims

Plaintiff brings tort claims against the Moving Defendants related to and arising out of their contractual obligations to provide medical care to detainees at the Cleveland County Detention Center. See Fourth Amended Complaint, ¶¶ 34-43. Initially, in moving for dismissal of the tort claims as time barred, the Moving Defendants relied upon the two-year limitations period governing actions for "injury to the rights of another, not arising from contract," set forth in Okla. Stat. tit. 12,§ 95(A)(3). See Motion [Doc. No. 78] at pp. 4-5 ("Plaintiff's claims against ESW and Sooner Medical fall under Oklahoma law (alleged torts occurred in Oklahoma); the statute of limitations for such personal injury torts is two years."). The Moving Defendants contended they did not receive notice of Plaintiff's claims until March 2013, well beyond the expiration of the two-year limitations period.¹ The Moving Defendants further claimed the doctrine of relation back did not apply to render the state law tort claims timely.

In response, Plaintiff contended Defendants obstructed Plaintiff from timely identifying the Moving Defendants. Plaintiff further contended that because Ms. Marez is incapacitated, the two-year limitations period is tolled. See Okla. Stat tit. 12, § 96 ("If a person entitled to bring an action . . . be, at the time the cause of action accrued, under any legal disability, every such person shall be entitled to bring such action within one (1) year after such disability shall be removed.").

The allegations of the Fourth Amended Complaint state that Ms. Marez is permanently incapacitated and has been in a pervasive vegetative state since incurring her injuries in September 2009. See id., Doc. No. 71 at ¶¶ 1, 13. Those allegations, viewed as true for purposes of the Moving Defendant's motion to dismiss, are sufficient to establish tolling pursuant to § 96. Compare Walker v. Pacific Basin Trading Co., 536 F.2d 344, 347 (10th Cir. 1976) (recognizing that "[a] comatose condition might qualify as a legal disability" for purposes of Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 96 and denying motion to dismiss brought by defendant regarding claims brought against it in amended complaint filed after the two year limitations of Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95 had otherwise run); see also Freeman v. Alex Brown & Sons, Inc., 73 F.33d 279, 281-82 (10th Cir. 1996) (accord).

In their reply, the Moving Defendants appear to abandon their reliance on Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3) as barring Plaintiff's state law tort claims and concede that § 96 tolls the limitations period. They make no reference to either statutory provision. Nor do the Moving Defendants challenge the sufficiency of the allegations of the Fourth Amended Complaint regarding the incapacity of Ms. Marez. Accordingly, the Moving Defendants have not shown, for purposes of their Rule 12(b)(6) motion, that Plaintiff's claims are untimely pursuant to Okla. Stat. tit. 12, § 95(A)(3).

Instead, the Moving Defendants raised new grounds for dismissal of Plaintiff's tort claims. Couched in terms of further addressing Plaintiff's tolling argument, they contend the applicable tolling provisions are contained in the Oklahoma Governmental Tort Claims Act (GTCA), Okla. Stat. tit. 51, §§ 151 et seq.² The Moving Defendants' tolling argument presumes that Plaintiff's claims are subject to the GTCA.³

Through enactment of the GTCA, the Oklahoma Legislature expressly adopted the doctrine of sovereign immunity and extended immunity from tort liability to the "state, its political subdivisions, and all of their employees acting within the scope of their employment, whether performing governmental or proprietary functions." Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 152.1(A). The Moving Defendants contend they are "employees of the state" and, therefore, entitled to GTCA immunity. They did not raise this issue as grounds for dismissal in their motion. Nonetheless, Plaintiff has been provided the opportunity to respond to the GTCA issues raised by the Moving Defendants in their reply. See Order [Doc. No. 97]. Therefore, the Court will address the issue.

According to the Moving Defendants, they qualify as "employees" of the state as that term is defined by Okla. Stat. tit. 51, § 152(7)(b)(7) which provides:

For the purpose of The Governmental Tort Claims Act, the following are employees of this state, regardless of the place in this state where the duties are performed:

(7) licensed medical professionals under contract with city, county, or state entities who provide medical care to inmates or detainees in the custody or control of law enforcement agencies[.]

Id. (Emphasis added).

The phrase "licensed medical professionals" is not defined under the GTCA. Considering the plain language of the statute, however, the Moving Defendants are not "licensed medical professionals." Instead, Defendants are each limited liability companies. See Sullins v. American Medical Response of Oklahoma, Inc., 23 P.3d 259, 263 (Okla. 2001) (where the language of a statute is clear and unambiguous, no further construction is required or permitted).Under Oklahoma law, a limited liability company is a separate legal entity. Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 2004(B)(1); see also Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 2003(1). A limited liability company is not a person and cannot obtain a medical license. Compare Black's Law Dictionary,1246 (8^th ed. 2004) (defining "professional" as a "person who belongs to a learned profession") (emphasis added). Indeed, because a limited liability company is not a person, it cannot appear on its own behalf in court. Compare In re Shattuck, 411 B.R. 378, 384 (BAP 10th Cir. 2009) (recognizing that a limited liability company is an artificial entity that cannot appear in federal court except through licensed counsel).

The Moving Defendants, therefore, fail to demonstrate that the allegations of Plaintiff's Fourth Amended Complaint subject the tort claims brought against them to GTCA immunity on grounds that, as limited liability companies, they qualify as "licensed medical professionals" under§ 152(7)(b)(7).⁴ Because Defendants invoke no other provision of the GTCA to support dismissal of Plaintiff's state law tort claims, their motion to dismiss those claims is denied.⁵

B. Third-Party Beneficiary Breach of Contract Claim

As set forth previously, the Moving Defendants contracted with the Cleveland County Sheriff's Department to provide medical staffing and administration services at the Cleveland County Detention Center for persons detained there. Plaintiff brings a breach of contract claim against the Moving Defendants as a third-party beneficiary. See Fourth Amended Complaint at ¶¶ 44-47.

The Moving Defendants ask the Court to consider the subject contract (Contract) without converting the motion to dismiss into a motion for summary judgment. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(d) (providing that where matters outside the pleadings are presented to and not excluded by the court, in support of a 12(b)(6) motion, the motion must be treated as one for summary...