Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff's Office

Decision Date08 May 2003
Docket NumberNo. 00-11000.,No. 01-16032.,00-11000.,01-16032.
Citation329 F.3d 1300
PartiesLarry Norman WADDELL, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kristina Waddell, and in his individual capacity, Plaintiff-Appellant, Erik S. Hemerson, Gary Leonard Wheeler, Jr., Consolidated Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The HENDRY COUNTY SHERIFF'S OFFICE, Ronnie Lee, in his individual and official capacity as Sheriff of Hendry County, Florida, Susan Sibbald, in her individual capacity, Consolidated Defendants-Appellees. Larry Norman Waddell, as Personal Representative of the Estate of Kristina Waddell, and in his individual capacity, Plaintiff-Appellant, Erik S. Hemerson, Gary Leonard Wheeler, Jr., Consolidated Plaintiffs-Appellants, v. The Hendry County Sheriff's Office, Ronnie Lee, in his official capacity as Sheriff of Hendry County, Florida and in his individual capacity, Susan Sibbald, in her individual capacity, Defendants-Appellees.
CourtU.S. Court of Appeals — Eleventh Circuit

Patrick E. Geraghty, Fort Myers, FL, Mark C. Menser, Viles Law firm, P.A., Fort Myers, FL, for Hemerson and Wheeler.

Jeffrey D. Kottkamp, Gerald W. Pierce, Henderson, Franklin, Starnes & Holt, P.A., Fort Myers, FL, for Defendants-Appellees.

Appeals from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Florida.

Before EDMONDSON, Chief Judge, and CARNES and SILER*, Circuit Judges.

EDMONDSON, Chief Judge:

In this consolidated appeal, Larry Waddell, as personal representative of Kristina Waddell's estate, Erik Hemerson, and Gary Wheeler ("Plaintiffs") appeal the district court's grant of summary judgment to Hendry County Sheriff's Office, Sheriff Ronnie Lee, Jr., and Lieutenant Susan Sibbald ("Defendants") in an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Plaintiffs also appeal the district court's denial of their motion for relief from judgment. No reversible error has been shown; we affirm.

BACKGROUND

In October 1997, Terry Garnto, a long-time resident of Clewiston, Florida, was convicted of battery. In November 1997, Garnto was sentenced to 364 days' imprisonment, reduced by 29-days' credit for time served in the Hendry County Jail. While serving his sentence as a "trusty" in the Hendry County Jail, Garnto spoke with Sheriff Lee of the Hendry County Sheriff's Office ("HCSO") about becoming a confidential informant on the illegal drug trade in Hendry County. After Sheriff Lee spoke with Garnto, the matter was turned over to HCSO Captain John Vetter and narcotics investigators Richard Notaro and Grady Johnson, Jr. When Officer Notaro learned of Garnto's extensive criminal record1, Officer Notaro expressed concern about using Garnto as a confidential informant. Captain Vetter, however, reasoned that Garnto's record was no worse than that of confidential informants used in federal criminal prosecutions and approved use of Garnto as a confidential informant.

In February 1998, Garnto was enrolled as a confidential informant. That same day HCSO's jail administrator, Lieutenant Sibbald, released Garnto from jail under a "work release" agreement. Under the agreement, Garnto worked at the HCSO's Clewiston substation by day and stayed with his mother at night. Pursuant to the work release agreement, Garnto signed a document promising to consume no drugs or alcohol. Lieutenant Sibbald maintains that she did not know Garnto was to be used as a confidential informant for HCSO.

Five days after his release, in the early morning hours of 8 February 1998, a police officer found Garnto wandering around Clewiston. Garnto was intoxicated. Upon discovering that Garnto, in Palm Beach County, had an outstanding warrant2 for failure to appear on a charge of attempting to obtain a controlled substance by fraud, the officer arrested Garnto. Garnto later was transferred to a jail in Palm Beach County.

On 25 February 1998, Lieutenant Sibbald wrote to the Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office. She requested that Garnto, if convicted in Palm Beach County, be returned to Hendry County to serve his sentence. Lieutenant Sibbald wrote that Garnto was "working with us on several projects" and indicated that Garnto would be incarcerated at the Hendry County Jail. On 2 April 1998, Garnto was sentenced to one-year imprisonment on the Palm Beach County charge. The judge recommended that Garnto be allowed to serve his sentence in Hendry County.

On 19 April 1998, Garnto was returned to Hendry County and immediately was returned to work-release status. Garnto continued to make controlled drug purchases for HCSO. One of the alleged drug traffickers HCSO had targeted was Jesus Sanchez. Because HCSO had limited funds with which to conduct its drug operations, Officer Notaro contacted Dennis Eads, a Federal DEA agent, to see if the DEA was interested in using Garnto to purchase drugs from Sanchez.

After observing Garnto act in his confidential informant capacity, Agent Eads had Garnto sign an agreement to work with the DEA as a confidential informant. Under the supervision of Agent Eads, Garnto purchased drugs from Marcus Dennis, an associate of Sanchez. After the DEA signed Garnto as a confidential informant, HCSO assisted the DEA by providing equipment and personnel to perform controlled drug purchases. Officer Notaro informed Garnto, however, that, if Garnto had information pertaining to Sanchez or Dennis, Garnto needed to call Agent Eads. HCSO continued to use Garnto for controlled drug purchases with other suspected drug dealers.

Garnto sought to introduce Agent Eads — in an undercover capacity — to Dennis so that Agent Eads could purchase cocaine from Dennis. At a debriefing on 3 July 1998, Garnto told Agent Eads that Garnto was planning to spend the Fourth of July weekend with Dennis at Fort Myers Beach in neighboring Lee County and that it might be possible to arrange a meeting between Agent Eads and Dennis at that time. Agent Eads told Garnto to page him if Dennis wished to meet. Agent Eads also asked Officer Notaro if he would be available to attend the possible meeting between Agent Eads and Dennis. Officer Notaro indicated he would be available but stated that he had to check with his supervisor.

On 4 July, Garnto went to Fort Myers Beach with Dennis, Mary Harper and another woman. On 5 July, Garnto consumed substantial quantities of alcohol. Upon leaving the beach, Garnto drove away in Harper's car. Garnto later claimed that Sanchez began following him and that Garnto was on his way to page Agent Eads for instructions when Garnto lost control of the car. Gantro crossed into the oncoming lane of traffic and ran into a vehicle occupied by Erik Hemerson, Gary Wheeler, and Kristina Waddell. Waddell died as a result of the injuries she sustained in the collision, and Hemerson and Wheeler suffered serious injuries. On 7 July 1998, HCSO terminated its confidential informant contract with Garnto.

Plaintiffs filed against Defendants three separate complaints which were consolidated by the district court. Plaintiffs alleged that HCSO and Sheriff Lee, in his official capacity, had violated Plaintiffs' substantive due process rights by unlawfully releasing Garnto, making him a paid agent, and failing to monitor him. Plaintiffs further alleged that HCSO, through its agents Sheriff Lee and Lieutenant Sibbald, had acted with willful and wanton disregard for the safety of the public and with willful indifference to Plaintiffs' rights. Plaintiffs also brought claims against Sheriff Lee and Lieutenant Sibbald in their individual capacities, alleging that they acted with gross negligence and deliberate indifference to foreseeable damage.3

The district court granted Defendants' motion for summary judgment. The district court concluded that (1) no reasonable jury could find that Garnto was a state actor for the Defendants at the time of the traffic collision, (2) that Defendants' conduct did not meet the conscience-shocking standard necessary to constitute a substantive due process violation, and (3) that, even assuming Defendants' behavior was wrongful in a constitutional sense, this conduct was not the legal cause of the accident. The district court also determined that it would be an unwarranted and impermissible extension of substantive due process to hold Defendants responsible for the losses caused by the incident. Plaintiffs appealed.

While Appeal No. 00-11000 was before this Court, Plaintiffs filed a motion to expand the record on appeal to include Garnto's testimony at his subsequent trial on the criminal charges resulting from the accident. We denied the motion, but granted Plaintiffs a stay to allow them to seek relief from the district court pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 60(b). In the district court, Plaintiffs filed their motion for relief from judgment under Rule 60(b) based upon newly discovered evidence and fraud by Defendants. The district court denied the motion. Plaintiffs appeal.

DISCUSSION
Appeal No. 00-11000

Plaintiffs contend that Defendants engaged in a deliberate course of misconduct to ensure Garnto's freedom and that the collision in this case was foreseeable in the light of Garnto's criminal record, his propensity for irresponsible intoxication, his being sent to a beach party with drug dealers, and his lack of supervision. Plaintiffs argue that Garnto was an agent for HCSO and that the district court erred by concluding that Garnto's "independent act" of drinking and driving insulated Defendants from their misconduct.4

We review a district court's decision to grant summary judgment de novo, viewing the evidence and all reasonable inferences in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party. Chapman v. AI Transport, 229 F.3d 1012, 1023 (11th Cir. 2000). Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(c) provides that summary judgment shall be granted, "if the pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the...

To continue reading

Request your trial
224 cases
  • Aselton v. Town of East Hartford, No. 17383.
    • United States
    • Connecticut Supreme Court
    • February 7, 2006
    ...because it had been superseded by the "shocks the conscience" standard under Collins and Lewis; see Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff's Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir.2003); we do not find that court's reasoning persuasive. Neither Collins nor Lewis rejected the theory as articulated ......
  • Dearman v. State
    • United States
    • Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals
    • August 5, 2022
    ...shocking."' Alabama Republican Party v. McGinley, 893 So.2d 337, 344 (Ala. 2004) (quoting Waddell v. Hendry Cty. Sheriff's Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th 2003)). In doing so, substantive due process 'protects those fundamental rights and liberties which are, objectively, "deeply rooted i......
  • Ray v. Judicial Corr. Servs., Inc.
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • September 12, 2017
    ...must be egregious—that is, shock the conscience—at the time the government actor made the decision." Waddell v. Hendry Cty. Sheriff's Office , 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir. 2003) (emphasis omitted).Here, Plaintiffs argue that the imposition of the aggregate fines and fees against them viol......
  • Alexander v. City of Muscle Shoals
    • United States
    • U.S. District Court — Northern District of Alabama
    • January 26, 2011
    ...will rise to the level of a substantive due process violation only if it also ‘shocks the conscience.’ ” Waddell v. Hendry County Sheriff's Office, 329 F.3d 1300, 1305 (11th Cir.2003) (quoting Dacosta v. Nwachukwa, 304 F.3d 1045, 1048 (11th Cir.2002)). Conduct by a government actor [as oppo......
  • Request a trial to view additional results
1 books & journal articles

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT