Waddell v. HW3 Inv. Grp.
Decision Date | 27 September 2022 |
Docket Number | 5:21-cv-55-AW/MJF |
Parties | TYRELL WADDELL and KENDREALL FINKLEA, Plaintiffs, v. HW3 INVESTMENT GROUP, LLC, and HOWARD WOLF, Defendants. |
Court | U.S. District Court — Northern District of Florida |
REPORT AND RECOMMENDATION
This matter is before the court on Plaintiffs' verified motion to determine amount of attorney's fees and costs. Doc 61. Defendants filed a response. Doc. 63. The District Court referred this motion to the undersigned. Doc. 62. For the reasons set forth below, the undersigned respectfully recommends that Plaintiffs' motion be granted in part and denied in part.
Plaintiffs Tyrell Waddell and Kendreall Finklea commenced this action against Defendants under the Fair Labor Standards Act (“FLSA”) to recover overtime wages. Doc. 1. The parties settled the matter. Docs. 52, 53. Pursuant to the settlement agreement, Waddell received $18,400.00, which was only $957 less than the potential “maximum recovery.” Doc. 61 at 12; Doc. 52 at 5. As for Finklea, he received total compensation of $21,600. Doc. 61 at 12. Plaintiffs' counsel represents that this is “equal to or only slightly less than the estimated total recovery.”[1]Id.; Doc. 52 at 5-6. Additionally, Plaintiffs' counsel received $10,000 in attorney's fees under the settlement agreement. Plaintiffs now seek an additional $91,187.00 in attorney's fees.[2] Doc. 61 at 8.
Under the “American Rule” parties “are ordinarily required to bear their own attorney's fees.” Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, Inc. v. W.Va. Dep't of Health & Hum. Res., 532 U.S. 598, 602 (2001). That is, the “default assumption is that each party is responsible for its own legal fees, and thus fees ordinarily will not be awarded to the prevailing party without express statutory authority.” Johnson v. Florida, 348 F.3d 1334, 1350 (11th Cir. 2003) (citing Buckhannon Bd. & Care Home, 532 U.S. at 602). Congress, however, may explicitly override this commonlaw rule. Peer v. Liberty Life Assurance Co. of Bos., 992 F.3d 1258, 1262 (11th Cir. 2021). In FLSA actions, Congress has done so. Dionne v. Floormasters Enter., Inc., 667 F.3d 1199, 1205 (11th Cir. 2012) ( )(quoting 29 U.S.C. § 216(b)). Thus, for prevailing plaintiffs, an award of attorney's fees and costs is mandatory under the FLSA. Id.; Laney v. BBB Logistics Inc., 844 Fed.Appx. 203, 207 (11th Cir. 2021) (citing Kreager v. Solomon & Flannagan, P.A., 775 F.2d 1541, 1542 (11th Cir. 1985)).
As part of the settlement agreement-which was approved by the District Court-Defendants conceded that Plaintiffs were the prevailing parties. Doc. 61 ¶ 14; Docs. 52, 53. In response to Plaintiffs' motion, Defendants do not dispute that Plaintiffs are the prevailing party. Doc. 63. Defendants also do not dispute that Plaintiffs are entitled to an award of costs in the amount of $7,589.39. Doc. 61 ¶¶ 2628; Doc. 63 ¶ 1.
Thus, the only issue before the court is Plaintiffs' request for attorney's fees of $91,187.00.
To calculate reasonable attorney's fees, a court must multiply the number of hours reasonably expended on a case by a reasonable hourly rate. P&K Rest. Enter., LLC v. Jackson, 758 Fed.Appx. 844, 850 (11th Cir. 2019); Norman v. Hous. Auth. of Montgomery, 836 F.2d 1292, 1299 (11th Cir. 1988). In evaluating the reasonableness of the request for attorney's fees, courts may consider the following factors:
(1) the time and labor required; (2) the novelty and difficulty of the questions; (3) the skill requisite to perform the legal service properly; (4) the preclusion of other employment by the attorney due to the acceptance of the case; (5) the customary fee; (6) whether the fee is fixed or contingent; (7) time limitations imposed by the client or the circumstances; (8) the amount involved and the results obtained; (9) the experience, reputation and ability of the attorneys; (10) the “undesirability” of the case; (11) the nature and length of the professional relationship with the client; and (12) awards in similar cases.
Maner v. Linkan LLC, 602 Fed.Appx. 489, 493 (11th Cir. 2015); Brown v. Lawn Enf't Agency, Inc., 369 F.Supp.3d 1224, 1226 (N.D. Fla. 2019) (citing Bivins v. Wrap It Up, Inc., 548 F.3d 1348, 1350 n.2 (11th Cir. 2008)). The moving party bears the burden of documenting reasonable hours expended and stating reasonable hourly rates. Conner v. BCC Fin. Mgmt. Servs., Inc., 597 F.Supp.2d 1299, 1310 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing ACLU v. Barnes, 168 F.3d 423, 427 (11th Cir.1999)).
After the court determines the lodestar amount, the court must evaluate the significance of the relief counsel obtained for a plaintiff. Silva v. Miller, 547 F.Supp.2d 1299, 1305 (S.D. Fla. 2008) (citing Norman, 836 F.2d at 1302). Although the lodestar amount is “strongly presumed to represent an appropriate attorney's fee,” the district court may adjust the award upward in exceptional circumstances or downward for an attorney's limited success in the litigation. Johnston v. Borders, 36 F.4th 1254, 1277 n.40 (11th Cir. 2022). Ultimately, the determination of a reasonable fee pursuant to § 216(b) lies in the sound discretion of the district court. Kreager, 775 F.2d at 1543.
A reasonable hourly rate is the “prevailing market rate in the relevant legal community for similar services by lawyers of reasonably comparable skills, experience, and reputation.” Norman, 836 F.2d at 1299 (citing Blum v. Stenson, 465 U.S. 886, 895-96 n.11 (1984)). The party seeking attorney's fees bears the burden of proving that the hourly rate requested is “in line with prevailing market rates.” Id. The party may do so by adducing “direct evidence of charges by lawyers under similar circumstance or by opinion evidence.” Id. Additionally, a court “is itself an expert on the question and may consider its own knowledge and experience concerning reasonable and proper fees and may form an independent judgment either with or without the aid of witnesses as to value.” Id. at 1303. Under the Local Rules of the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida, a party that objects to the “claimed hourly rate, . . . must set out the rate that the party asserts is reasonable.” N.D. Fla. Loc. R. 54.1(F).
Here, Plaintiffs ask for the following hourly rates for each of the five attorneys that worked on the case:
Dates
Attorney
Hourly Rate
1/3/22-5/17/22
Gabriel D. Pinilla
$ 395
2/18/21-1/2/22
$ 365
11/24/20-5/12/22
Benjamin S. Briggs
$ 395
8/28/20-11/17/20
$ 355
6/29/21-9/17/21
Katherine Heffner
$ 300
12/8/20-7/1/20
James Barlow
$ 275
4/14/20-11/17/20
$ 250
9/14/20-11/24/20
Richard Anderson
$ 200
Plaintiffs provide the declaration of an attorney, Richard N. Asfar, to attest that the rates charged by Plaintiffs' attorneys are consistent with the prevailing market rates. Doc. 61-4. Specifically, Mr. Asfar explained:
Id. at 6-8 ¶ 16(c).
In their motion, Defendants did not contest these hourly rates or provide an expert witness to attest to the reasonableness of the hourly rates requested. Doc. 63. For that reason alone, the undersigned concludes that the rates set forth above are reasonable.
Mr. Asfar's declaration also indicates that the rates charged by Plaintiffs' attorneys are reasonable.
Finally, a survey of decisions issued by various federal courts indicates that the rates charged by Plaintiffs' attorneys are reasonable. See, e.g., Blais v. Williston Cross E., LLC, 2020 WL 10728692, at *3, *5 (N.D. Fla. Aug. 13, 2020) ( ); Brown, 369 F.Supp.3d at 1227 & n.2 ( ); Am. Civ. Liberties Union of Fla., Inc. v. Dixie Cnty. Fla., 2012 WL 384925, at *4 (N.D. Fla. Feb. 6, 2012) ( ).
Attorneys “must exercise their own billing judgment to exclude any hours that are excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary.” Galdames v. N & D Inv Corp., 432 Fed.Appx. 801, 806 (11th Cir. 2011). A court may reduce excessive, redundant, or otherwise unnecessary hours, or may engage in “an across-the-board cut,” as long as the court adequately explains its reasons for doing so. Id.; see also Bivins, 548 F.3d at 1350 (...
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