Waddell v. Metropolitan Street Railway Company
| Citation | 88 S.W. 765,113 Mo.App. 680 |
| Parties | LOUISA WADDELL, Respondent, v. METROPOLITAN STREET RAILWAY COMPANY, Appellant |
| Decision Date | 26 June 1905 |
| Court | Kansas Court of Appeals |
Appeal from Jackson Circuit Court.--Hon. Andrew F. Evans, Judge.
REVERSED AND REMANDED.
Judgment reversed and cause remanded.
John H Lucas and Chas. A. Loomis for appellant.
(1) The evidence at the trial and the undisputed facts clearly prove that respondent was guilty of such contributory negligence as would bar a recovery. Reno v. Railway, 180 Mo 487-8-9; Roenfelt v. Railway, 180 Mo. 554; Hook v. Railway, 162 Mo. 569; Tanner v. Railway, 161 Mo. 497; Holwerson v. Railway, 157 Mo. 216; Davies v. Railway, 159 Mo. 1; Peterson v Railway, 156 Mo. 561; Van Bach v. Railway, 171 Mo. 338, l. c. 347; Boyd v. Railway, 105 Mo. 371; Gettys v. Transit Co., 103 Mo.App. 564; Lien v. Railway, 79 Mo.App. 475; Watson v. Railway, 133 Mo. 246. (2) Where both parties have been guilty of negligence which directly contributed to cause the injury, there can be no recovery. Hogan v. Railway, 150 Mo. 55; Smith v. Railway, 52 Mo.App. 41; Watson v. Railway, 133 Mo. 251; Davies v. Railway, 159 Mo. 1; Moore v. Railway, 176 Mo. 528; Zumault v. Railroad, 175 Mo. 288; Fellens v. Railroad, 80 S.W. 51. (3) In the absence of evidence showing something in the manner, conduct or appearance of the plaintiff, that would indicate she was unmindful of her surroundings or that regardless of them she was intending to pass over defendant's track, unmindful of the advance of the fast approaching car, defendant's trainmen had the right to presume that plaintif would have stopped at some convenient distance in the street without the danger line of the car's fixed course, and permit it to pass in advance of her, and had the right to presume that the plaintiff would use her eyes and ears to observe or hear the approaching car. Reno v. Railway, 180 Mo. 489; Van Bach v. Railway, 171 Mo. 338; Guyer v. Railway, 174 Mo. 351. (4) Where the plaintiff is guilty of such contributory negligence as to preclude a recovery by heedlessly walking upon the track directly in front of a fast approaching car without looking or listening for its approach, she cannot recover unless, after plaintiff had thus put herself in a position of danger, the motorman of defendant employed in the operation and management of the train was guilty of such willful, reckless and wanton disregard of human life that the defendant should not be heard to say that the plaintiff was guilty of such negligence. Tanner v. Railway, 171 Mo. 511; Moore v. Railway, 176 Mo. 528; Gettys v. Railway, 103 Mo.App. 572; Zumault v. Railroad, 175 Mo. 313, 314, 315; Roenfelt v. Railway, 180 Mo. 554; Koons v. Railway, 178 Mo. 608. (5) If, however, the undisputed facts show that the injured party was guilty of such contributory negligence as will preclude a recovery and if there is no evidence of a willful, reckless or wanton disregard of human life, on the part of the operatives of the train, there is nothing for the jury to pass upon and the Court should have sustained a demurrer to the evidence. Moore v. Railway, 176 Mo. 528; l. c., 545; Tanner v. Railroad, 161 Mo. 497; Kelley v. Railroad, 101 Mo. 67; Holwerson v. Railroad, 157 Mo. 216; Van Bach v. Railroad, 171 Mo. 338; Guyer v. Railroad, 174 Mo. 344; Gettys v. Railroad, 103 Mo.App. 572; Zumault v. Railroad, 175 Mo. 288, l. c. 313, 314, 315; Roenfelt v. Railroad, 180 Mo. 554.
Bird & Pope and T. J. Madden for respondent, submitted a lengthy argument.
Action for damages resulting from injuries alleged to have been caused by defendant's negligence. The answer contained a general denial and a plea of contributory negligence. Plaintiff recovered judgment in the sum of two thousand dollars. It is first insisted by defendant that its request for a peremptory instruction should have been sustained. The facts are as follows:
Plaintiff, seventy-five years of age, in attempting to walk across Fourteenth street in Kansas City, near the intersection of that street with Penn avenue, was struck by a west bound car on the "Observation Park" line of defendant's street railway system and injured. The line ran east and west on Fourteenth street and consisted of two tracks, the north track being used for west-bound cars and the other for those going in the opposite direction. Plaintiff coming from the south on the west side of Penn avenue stopped when she reached the curb on the south line of Fourteenth street for an east-bound car to pass, after which she proceeded to walk across at an ordinary gait. She left the sidewalk on the south side of Fourteenth street a few feet west of a prolongation of the property line on the west side of Penn and walked in a northwesterly direction. In crossing she did not look to right or left and was unaware of the approach of the west-bound car. She wore a sunbonnet which confined her vision to the line of her travel. The testimony introduced by her shows that she was struck when about two feet north of the south rail of the north track; that the motorman in charge of the car was looking towards the north and did not see her, and that he failed to ring the bell or give any other warning. The time of the occurrence was in broad daylight. There was no obstruction to prevent plaintiff from seeing the car if she had looked, nor the motorman from observing plaintiff if he had been attending to his business. The car was going eight or nine miles per hour, up grade and carried a heavy load of passengers.
That plaintiff was guilty of contributory negligence in thus coming into collision with a moving car cannot be gainsaid. She had no right to be "oblivious to her surroundings" while crossing railroad tracks, but should have been on the lookout for approaching cars. Her eyesight and hearing were not defective. All she had to do was to use her senses and the accident would have been avoided. Her negligence concurred with that of the motorman in failing to give warning, from which it follows that defendant cannot be held liable without it appears that the motorman could have stopped the car in time to have prevented injuring plaintiff after he became aware, or by the exercise of reasonable care could have known of her ignorance of the danger which confronted her and of her purpose to enter into it.
The motorman, introduced as a witness by defendant, testified that when he entered Penn avenue he shut off the power (the car was propelled by electricity) for the purpose of slackening speed in making the crossing; that he was standing with his hand on the brake wheel, was looking ahead and was ringing the bell; that he first noticed plaintiff intent upon going ahead unmindful of the presence of the car when she was twelve or fifteen feet from the north track and the car twenty-five feet from the place of collision; that he "hollered" at plaintiff and started to apply the brakes with all possible speed; whereupon plaintiff, instead of stopping, started to run across ahead of the car.
An expert witness offered by plaintiff said that under the conditions described, the car could have been stopped in fifteen feet. If this evidence is to be considered, an issue of fact was presented under the admission of the motorman that he knew of plaintiff's peril when his car was twenty-five feet from the place of contact and the testimony of other witnesses that he made no attempt to stop and that plaintiff, up to the time the car struck her, had no knowledge of its presence. We do not feel justified in pronouncing plaintiff's expert evidence unworthy of belief as being in opposition to the law of physics. Under the conditions described it does not appear to be an unreasonable conclusion to say that the car could have been stopped, had a reasonable effort been made, in the distance the motorman says intervened between the car and the place of collision when he first observed the danger which threatened plaintiff. The issue was one of fact for the jury unless it can be said that the negligence of plaintiff concurred with that of defendant in producing the injury.
In the recent case of Ross v. Metropolitan Street Railroad Company, 113 Mo.App. 600, 88 S.W. 144, analogous in essential features to the one before us, we held that when a person is not wantonly entering into a certain danger, but is negligently ignorant of its presence, his negligence is superseded as a proximate cause by that of the driver of the vehicle who knowing, or being in position to know of his peril in time to prevent injury, negligently runs into him. This rule has the support of the weight of authority and is prompted by...
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