Waddell v. State
| Decision Date | 30 June 1964 |
| Citation | 129 N.W.2d 201,24 Wis.2d 364 |
| Parties | Glen R. WADDELL, Plaintiff in Error, v. STATE of Wisconsin, Defendant in Error. |
| Court | Wisconsin Supreme Court |
Frank M. Coyne, Madison, for plaintiff in error.
George Thompson, Atty. Gen., William A. Platz, Betty R. Brown, Asst. Attys. Gen., Madison, for defendant in error.
Two issues are raised on this writ of error.
1. Was defendant's guilty plea induced by misrepresentations by the prosecuting attorney?
2. Was the sentencing court's rejection of probation, and the imposition of a ten-year prison term, an abuse of discretion under the circumstances of this case?
Waddell alleges in his petition for writ of error that the prosecuting attorney orally agreed to guarantee Waddell probation if he plead guilty to the charge. This agreement, he alleges, was a quid pro quo for his written promise to plead guilty if the polygraph test revealed deception in his answers to questions relating to the matter at issue.
Because the prosecuting attorney lacked the power to guarantee Waddel probation, and further, because the prosecuting attorney in fact vigorously argued that Waddell should be incarcerated for a substantial period of time, Waddell claims that his plea was induced by misrepresentation, and hence should be vacated and the judgment of conviction set aside.
However, in this record we simply have the defendant's assertions relating to the prosecutor's conduct. The record does not contain any facts to back up the defendant's charges and therefore, on this writ of error there is no basis for holding that the defendant's guilty plea was induced by any misrepresentation by the prosecuting attorney.
Waddell's claim that the ten-year prison term represents an abuse of discretion 1 by the sentencing judge is based upon two lines of argument: (1) The court was influenced by data coming from improper sources. (2) Considering all of the data, the sentence is unreasonably severe.
As to the first claim, the court relied upon information contained in the pre-sentence investigation report, data supplied by the prosecuting attorney in oral argument, and information communicated directly to the court by interested third parties.
The court may utilize data contained in a pre-sentence investigation report in determining an appropriate sentence. Although there is no express general statutory authorization for these reports they are widely used by sentencing judges. 2 Typically, such reports contain pertinent information relating to the defendant's personality, social circumstances and his prior criminal record (if any). The defendant's access to these reports depends solely upon the discretion of the sentencing judge. The United States supreme court has held that denying the defendant or his counsel access to these reports does not violate due process under the Fourteenth amendment. 3 We have held that such denial does not violate defendant's right 'to demand the nature and cause of the accusation against him' under sec. 7, art. 1, Wisconsin Constitution. 4
Whether this court should hold that, as a matter of law, the sentencing court must make the complete report, or any part of such report, available to the defendant and his counsel to permit them to offer rebuttal information or to make counter argument, 5 is a matter we need not decide here since in the instant case the trial court made the entire pre-sentence report available to defense counsel prior to the hearing on sentence. Neither the defendant nor his counsel offered any rebuttal information or argument and there was no abuse of discretion in the court's use of this information.
The prosecuting attorney may properly use information relating to complaints of other offenses in his argument on sentence. These complaints are evidence of a pattern of behavior which, in turn, is an index of the defendant's character, a critical factor in the sentencing. Here, the prosecution alleged that the particular instance of fraud for which the defendant pleaded guilty was only one example from an entire life pattern of confidence schemes. The prosecution pointed out that in 1938 Waddell had been convicted of arson and placed on probation, which was subsequently revoked because of his involvement in fraudulent schemes. Numerous complaints, charging that Waddell had obtained property through fraudulent representations had been recently made by persons (mostly women) in this jurisdiction, and in...
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D. H. v. State
...can accept or reject the information offered as reliable or unreliable in making a proper determination." See also Waddell v. State, 24 Wis.2d 364, 369, 129 N.W.2d 201 (1964); Lehmann v. State, 39 Wis.2d 619, 629, 630, 159 N.W.2d 607 (1968); Neely v. State, 47 Wis.2d 330, 334-336, 177 N.W.2......
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State v. Marzolf
...aff'd 71 N.J. 1, 362 A.2d 545 (1976); see also State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 454 P.2d 51, (Sup.Ct.1969); Waddell v. State, 24 Wis.2d 364, 129 N.W.2d 201 (Sup.Ct.1964); see generally, Annot., "Court's right in imposing sentence, to hear evidence of, or to consider other offenses committed by ......
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Stockwell v. State
...18 L.Ed.2d 527, were made a part of the pre-sentence report considered by the court in sentencing. Referring to Waddell v. State (1964) 24 Wis.2d 364, 368, 129 N.W.2d 201, and Deja v. State (1969), 43 Wis.2d 488, 493, 168 N.W.2d 856, respectively, this court in Neely, supra 47 Wis.2d at pag......
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State v. Green
...crime for which defendant was being sentenced. State v. Moore, 93 Idaho 14, 454 P.2d 51, 54--55 (Sup.Ct.1969); Waddell v. State, 24 Wis.2d 364, 129 N.W.2d 201 (Sup.Ct.1964).6 Case authority on the subject is somewhat limited possibly because as suggested in Annotation, 'Court's right, in im......