Waddell v. State

• Decision Date: 01 September 1985
• Docket Number: No. 463,463
• Citation: 501 A.2d 865,65 Md.App. 606
• Parties: Donald Everett WADDELL v. STATE of Maryland
• Court: Court of Special Appeals of Maryland

Page 606

65 Md.App. 606

501 A.2d 865

Donald Everett WADDELL v. STATE of Maryland.

No. 463 Sept. Term, 1985.

Court of Special Appeals of Maryland.

Dec. 16, 1985.

Nancy Cook, Assigned Public Defender of Washington, D.C. (Alan H. Murrell, Public Defender on brief, Baltimore), for appellant.

Valerie W. Loftin, Asst. Atty. Gen. (Stephen H. Sachs, Atty. Gen., Baltimore) (Joseph I. Cassilly, State's Atty. for Harford County and Edward Lilly, Asst. State's Atty. for Harford County, Bel Air, on brief), for appellee.

Argued Before MOYLAN, KARWACKI, and BELL, (ROBERT M.), JJ.

KARWACKI, Judge.

Shawana Blackburn was last seen alive in the early evening hours of June 27, 1984. She was found dead in her AMC Concord automobile the following day--the victim of a brutal assault. Blackburn had been a waitress at a bowling alley owned by a Mr. and Mrs. Klein. The Kleins also owned a nearby grocery store in which they employed Donald Waddell, the appellant, as a clerk in the produce section. Blackburn, who knew the appellant from work, had given the appellant a ride in her Concord. Where the two were going is not clear from the record, but apparently the appellant was angry with some of the things that Blackburn had been telling people about his honesty--references that were made by Blackburn regarding a previous illegal drug transaction between the two. Not far from where this journey began, Blackburn was killed. Her death resulted from a fractured skull, strangulation, and a razor inflicted "large gaping wound" on the side of her neck.

The appellant was convicted by a jury in the Circuit Court for Harford County (CLOSE, J. presiding) of the first degree murder of Blackburn and was sentenced to life imprisonment. In his appeal from that conviction he raises seven issues. As we respond to his arguments, we will supplement the facts of the case as needed.

The appellant contends:

1. the trial court erred in admitting the portion of the appellant's statement that related to his prior drug dealings with the victim;

2. the trial court erred in allowing the jury to view the crime scene, and it erred in following the route that the State alleged the perpetrator of the crime had taken;

3. the appellant was denied a fair trial by virtue of the jury having discussed the case among themselves prior to the close of the case;

4. the trial court erred in denying the appellant's request for additional jury instructions;

5. the trial court erred in denying the appellant's motion to suppress articles seized in a search of the appellant's home--a search to which the appellant's parents, who owned the home, consented;

6. the appellant's statement should not have been admitted into evidence as it was the product of coercive tactics; and

7. the evidence was insufficient to support a finding that the appellant was the perpetrator of the crime.

1. Prior Drug Dealings with the Victim

On June 28, 1984, the day that the victim's body was discovered, the appellant voluntarily agreed to answer police questions at the Harford County Sheriff's Department in Bel Air, Maryland. Two times during the questioning, the appellant made reference to his having had prior drug dealings with the victim.

Prior to trial, the appellant filed a motion to suppress the statements. A hearing was held, and the motion was denied. At trial, the appellant objected to the statements' being admitted into evidence, and the objection was overruled.

While it is true that evidence of crimes which are independent of those for which an accused is on trial are generally inadmissible, Ross v. State, 276 Md. 664, 350 A.2d 680 (1976), it is also true that evidence of other crimes is admissible when the evidence is substantially relevant for some other purpose than to show that the accused committed the crime on trial because of his criminal character. Tichnell v. State, 287 Md. 695, 711, 415 A.2d 830 (1980). There are generally five categories within which such evidence of other crimes is admissible. Such evidence will be admitted if it tends to establish motive, intent, absence of mistake, a common plan or scheme, or the identity of the person on trial charged with the commission of a crime. Tichnell, 287 Md. at 711-12, 415 A.2d 830.

In this case, the appellant's statements were properly admitted as tending to show both a motive for the commission of the crime on trial, and the identity of the person charged with that crime. One of the appellant's statements disclosed that the appellant and the victim had argued about a previous drug transaction. This was the State's only evidence regarding the appellant's motive for committing murder. Likewise, the statements also tended to show the identity of the appellant because they were probative on the issue of why the appellant was in the victim's car on the day of the murder. There was ample reason to admit the appellant's statements, and we perceive no abuse of discretion by the trial judge in their admission.

2. View of the Crime Scene

The process of having the trier of fact go and look at an object or place which is either impractical or impossible to bring to the courtroom is known as a "view." 4 Wigmore, Evidence § 1162 (Chadbourn rev. 1972). The view has been recognized as a proper trial tool since the beginnings of trial by jury. 4 Wigmore, supra. A trial court is empowered to order a view as a "consequence of its ordinary common law function." 4 Wigmore, supra, § 1163.

The appellant maintains that it was error for the trial court to allow the jury to view the crime scene. The judge had ordered a view of the scene and of the route taken by the perpetrator after receiving a request from the jury that they be allowed to see the scene. Several days prior to the close of the evidence, the jury had requested a view of the scene to "enable the members of the jury to better understand the witnesses' testimony." The court did not respond to the question until the close of all the evidence on the final day of trial. The court waited until descriptions of the scene and of the routes, including aerial photographs, had been entered into evidence. Despite this evidence, the jury still expressed a desire to view the area. The court received no objections at that time from either the appellant or the State, and scheduled a view for the next morning, before the closing arguments of both sides.

On the morning of the view, the appellant did register an objection. He argued that a view by the jury would be prejudicial to his case because the jury would infer from the route to be taken to and from the scene of the crime that the appellant himself traveled that route. The appellant believed that the testimony and exhibits already in evidence sufficed to inform the jury as to the crime scene and the surrounding roads.

The court ruled that a view would be conducted because the testimony with regard to the various roads leading to and from the crime scene was confusing. It is settled that Maryland follows "the general rule, accepted both in this country and in England, that the granting or refusing of a request to allow the jury to view the premises where a crime is alleged to have been committed is within the discretion of the trial court." Corens v. State, 185 Md. 561, 573, 45 A.2d 340 (1946); Hutchinson v. State, 36 Md.App. 58, 65-66, 373 A.2d 50, cert. denied, 281 Md. 739 (1977). The ruling of the trial court will not be disturbed absent a clear showing of an abuse of such discretion. We find no abuse of discretion here.

A view should not be conducted unless the trial court is reasonably certain that it will aid the trier of fact in reaching its verdict, and it is impracticable or inefficient to present the elements to them by maps, photos, or diagrams. See generally 75 Am.Jur.2d, Trial § 74 (1974). In this case, the trial court was careful to make sure that the jury had a chance to hear testimony regarding the crime scene and the roads leading to and from the scene, before responding to the jury's request to view the crime scene. Only after the court learned from the jury that there was still confusion on their part regarding the site did it allow a view.

Furthermore, the appellant was not prejudiced by the method of conducting the view. While on the view, the jury was not allowed to ask any questions. The record reflects that the jury was driven by bus along the various roads that had been the subject of testimony, and that a Deputy Sheriff who accompanied them simply pointed out to the jurors the names of the various roads and pointed out the houses of the various witnesses who had testified at trial.

After the jury returned to the courthouse, the trial judge began his instructions to the jury. The court began by telling them that it allowed the view to clarify for the jury where the houses and roads that had been the subject of testimony were located. The court then instructed the jury that it was not to infer that the routes to and from the scene were necessarily taken by the perpetrator of the crime, and that the jury was to base its verdict only on evidence presented in the courtroom. The court's directions on conducting the view and its subsequent instructions with regard thereto were prudent and proper.

3. Jury Discussion of the Case

During the course of the trial, the jury on numerous occasions passed notes with questions or requests to the judge. On each occasion, these notes were read aloud to both counsel and the appellant, and appropriate responses to the jury were discussed. The appellant contends that these notes showed that the jury was discussing the case among themselves, and that the appellant was denied a fair trial by virtue of those discussions.

The short answer to the appellant's argument is that he has failed to preserve the point for our review. Md.Rule 1085. The appellant was aware of the basis for the objection throughout the trial, and he failed to make any objection.

4. Jury Instructions

Foll...