Waddell v. Waddell

Citation904 So.2d 1275
Decision Date24 September 2004
Docket NumberNo. 2020219.,2020219.
PartiesEdward Lee WADDELL, Jr. v. Holayne Lester WADDELL.
CourtAlabama Court of Civil Appeals

Lindsey Mussleman Davis of Holt, Mussleman, Holt & Morgan, Florence, for appellant.

Charles W. Cochran III, Florence, for appellee.

Alabama Supreme Court 1040046.

MURDOCK, Judge.

This case was commenced by the filing of a petition by Holayne Lester Waddell ("the mother") seeking a modification of a 1995 judgment divorcing her from Edward Lee Waddell, Jr. ("the father"). Among other things, the mother's petition sought an award of postminority educational support for the benefit of the parties' two sons in accordance with our Supreme Court's holding in Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So.2d 986 (Ala.1989), and an award of periodic alimony. The father responded to the mother's petition by, among other things, filing an answer in which he denied that the mother was entitled to the relief she requested and filing what he styled as a "motion" seeking a reduction of his child-support obligation. From a final judgment generally favoring the mother on these and other issues, the father appeals.

The mother and the father were married in 1979. The parties had two minor sons at the time of the divorce in 1995. Based on his annual income of $65,000 at the time of the divorce, the father was ordered to pay child support in the amount of $464 biweekly, as well as a portion of his sons' medical expenses. The trial court did not award the mother any alimony at the time of the divorce, but it reserved the right to do so in the future.

Following the divorce, the father moved to Missouri and married a woman with whom he had been having an adulterous relationship that had led to the divorce. Subsequently, in 1997, the father petitioned to modify his child-support obligation on the ground that his annual income had decreased from $65,000 at the time of the divorce to only $20,000 at the time he filed the petition. The trial court denied the petition; neither party appealed from that judgment.

In April 2001, when the parties' older son was 18 years old and the younger son was 16 years old, the mother filed her petition requesting postminority educational support for the benefit of each of the parties' sons and an award of alimony. The mother also complained that the father had failed to reimburse her for $650 in medical expenses she had incurred on behalf of the parties' sons and sought an order from the trial court holding the father in contempt. In June 2001, the father filed his motion requesting a reduction in his child-support obligation, asserting as grounds therefor the fact that the parties' older son had turned 19 years old on June 1, 2001.

Following a hearing at which both parties presented testimony and documentary evidence, the trial court entered a judgment on August 13, 2002, terminating the father's obligation to pay child support for the older child and setting the father's child-support obligation at $298 per month for the younger child until he reached the age of majority. The judgment also required the father to pay one-half of the college expenses for both sons, but denied the mother's request for alimony. The trial court also ordered the father to reimburse the mother for $658 in medical expenses for the children and $1,500 in attorney fees.

The mother filed a Rule 59, Ala. R. Civ. P., motion asking the trial court to amend its August 13, 2002, judgment; the trial court granted the motion. The amended judgment, entered by the trial court on October 29, 2002, required the father to pay all college expenses for both of the parties' sons, to reimburse the mother $5,451.72 for college expenses she had already incurred, and to pay child support in the amount of $464 per month for the younger son. The trial court also awarded the mother $300 per month in periodic alimony.

The father appeals and argues that the trial court erred (1) in awarding any postminority support, because of the breakdown in the relationship between the father and his sons, (2) in ordering postminority support for an unspecified period of time, (3) in requiring the father to pay room and board as postminority support while the parties' sons continue to reside with the mother, (4) in requiring the father simultaneously to pay child support and "postminority" educational support for the parties' younger son, who was still a minor, (5) in requiring the father to continue to provide health insurance for the parties' sons past the age of majority while they attend college, (6) in calculating the amount of the father's child-support obligation for the parties younger son, and (7) in awarding the mother periodic alimony.

I. Postminority-Support Issues

In Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So.2d 986 (Ala. 1989), our Supreme Court held that the trial court has discretion whether to order postminority educational support at all, and that, in exercising that discretion, the trial court shall consider

"all relevant factors that shall appear reasonable and necessary, including primarily the financial resources of the parents and the child and the child's commitment to, and aptitude for, the requested education."

Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So.2d at 987 (emphasis in original). In addition, the trial court may consider

"the standard of living that the child would have enjoyed if the marriage had not been dissolved and the family unit had been preserved and the child's relationship with his parents and responsiveness to parental advice and guidance."

Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So.2d at 987.

After he graduated from high school, the parties' older son attended Shoals Community College for two years on a tuition scholarship. The mother paid the older son's college-related expenses other than tuition, which totaled $1,199.04 for both years. In 2002, following his sophomore year, the older son transferred to the University of North Alabama ("UNA"), where the parties' younger son also enrolled as a freshman. The mother paid the Fall 2002 tuition and enrollment fees for both sons, which she testified totaled $4,252.68.1

There is no dispute that both of the parties' sons have the aptitude for and commitment to continuing their college educations. There is also no dispute that the father has sufficient financial resources to pay for the sons' educations. At the time of the divorce, the father had already established a brokerage account specifically intended to pay for the sons' college expenses. At the time of the divorce, the account had a value of $27,000; as of the August 2002 hearing, according to the father's testimony, the account's value had grown to approximately $165,000.

A. The Effect of the Relationship of the Father and His Sons on the Award of Postminority Support

The father first contends that the trial court has wrongly required him to provide postminority support when the parties' sons do not respect him and are not responsive to his parental advice and guidance. The father testified that his sons refuse to visit him or to communicate with him and that he was not even invited to the younger son's high-school graduation. The mother testified that she had discussed with the sons their obligation to communicate with their father but that the father no longer called them. With the approval of both parties, the trial judge met with both sons in chambers before issuing his original judgment; however, there is no transcript of their discussion.

The Alabama Supreme Court held in Ex parte Bayliss, 550 So.2d 986 (Ala. 1989), that a trial court "may" consider "the child's relationship with his parents and responsiveness to parental advice and guidance" in deciding whether and to what extent a noncustodial parent should be obligated to provide postminority educational support for his or her children following a divorce. 550 So.2d at 987. The existence of a strained relationship between a parent and his or her child does not necessarily prevent the child from having the opportunity to obtain a college education. See Penney v. Penney, 785 So.2d 376 (Ala.Civ. App.2000), and the cases cited therein.

In addition, as this court noted in Thrasher v. Wilburn, 574 So.2d 839 (Ala. Civ.App.1990):

"Where evidence is presented ore tenus, as in this instance, the trial court's judgment is presumed correct unless it is so unsupported by the evidence that it is plainly and palpably wrong. Furthermore, matters concerning child support are within the trial court's discretion and will be reversed only upon a showing that the trial court abused its discretion or that its determination is plainly and palpably wrong."

Thrasher, 574 So.2d at 841 (citation omitted). Further, in the absence of a transcript of the in camera interview of the children, we assume that the trial court's interview of the parties' sons supports the trial court's judgment. See, e.g., Hughes v. Hughes, 685 So.2d 755, 757 (Ala.Civ. App.1996) ("Although the trial court's in camera interviews with the children were not transcribed and are not contained in the record, we presume that the interviews further support the trial court's order.").

Although the relationship between the father and his sons may be strained, the trial court concluded that this was at least partially the result of the father's adulterous conduct that led to the divorce. Based on our review of the record and the judgment of the trial court, we cannot conclude that the trial court abused its discretion in awarding postminority support in this case.

B. The Temporal Limitations on the Award of Postminority Support

The father next argues that the trial court should have limited the father's duty to provide postminority support to a definite period of time. The portion of the trial court's judgment awarding postminority support reads as follows:

"There exists a `College Fund' that was specifically set up by the father/defendant to pay the college expenses for the two sons. Therefore, al
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