Waddington v. Sarausad

• Court: U.S. Supreme Court
• Writing for the Court: Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.
• Citation: Waddington v. Sarausad, 129 S. Ct. 823, 172 L.Ed.2d 532, 555 U.S. 179, 77 USLW 4056 (2009)
• Decision Date: 21 January 2009
• Docket Number: No. 07–772.,07–772.
• Parties: Doug WADDINGTON, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center, Petitioner, v. Cesar SARAUSAD.

555 U.S. 179

129 S.Ct. 823

172 L.Ed.2d 532

77 USLW 4056

Doug WADDINGTON, Superintendent, Washington Corrections Center, Petitioner,

v.Cesar SARAUSAD.

No. 07–772.

Supreme Court of the United States

Argued Oct. 15, 2008.

Decided Jan. 21, 2009.

Syllabus^*

Respondent Sarausad drove the car in a driveby shooting at a high school, which was the culmination of a gang dispute. En route to school, Ronquillo, the front seat passenger, covered his lower face and readied a handgun. Sarausad abruptly slowed down upon reaching the school, Ronquillo fired at a group of students, killing one and wounding another, and Sarausad then sped away. He, Ronquillo, and Reyes, another passenger, were tried on murder and related charges. Sarausad and Reyes, who were tried as accomplices, argued that they were not accomplices to murder because they had not known Ronquillo's plan and had expected at most another fistfight. In her closing argument, the prosecutor stressed Sarausad's knowledge of a shooting, noting how he drove at the scene, that he knew that fighting alone would not regain respect for his gang, and that he was “in for a dime, in for a dollar.” The jury received two instructions that directly quoted Washington's accomplice-liability law. When it failed to reach a verdict as to Reyes, the judge declared a mistrial as to him. The jury then convicted Ronquillo on all counts and convicted Sarausad of second-degree murder and related crimes. In affirming Sarausad's conviction, the State Court of Appeals, among other things, referred to an “in for a dime, in for a dollar” accomplice-liability theory. The State Supreme Court denied review, but in its subsequent Roberts case, it clarified that “in for a dime, in for a dollar” was not the best descriptor of accomplice liability because an accomplice must have knowledge of the crime that occurred. The court also explicitly reaffirmed its precedent that the type of jury instructions used at Sarausad's trial comport with Washington law. Sarausad sought state postconviction relief, arguing that the prosecutor's improper “in for a dime, in for a dollar” argument may have led the jury to convict him as an accomplice to murder based solely on a finding that he had anticipated that an assault would occur. The state appeals court reexamined the trial record in light of Roberts, but found no error requiring correction. The State Supreme Court denied Sarausad's petition, holding that the trial court correctly instructed the jury and that no prejudicial error resulted from the prosecutor's potentially improper hypothetical. Sarausad then sought review under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which, inter alia, permits a federal court to grant habeas relief on a claim “adjudicated on the merits” in state court only if the decision “was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by” this Court, § 2254(d)(1). The District Court granted the petition, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding it unreasonable for the state court to affirm Sarausad's conviction because the jury instruction on accomplice liability was ambiguous and there was a reasonable likelihood that the jury misinterpreted the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving Sarausad's knowledge of a shooting beyond a reasonable doubt.

Held: Because the state-court decision did not result in an “unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law,” § 2254(d)(1), the Ninth Circuit erred in granting habeas relief to Sarausad. Pp. 831 – 835.

(a) When a state court's application of governing federal law is challenged, the decision “ ‘must be shown to be not only erroneous, but objectively unreasonable.’ ” Middleton v. McNeil, 541 U.S. 433, 436, 124 S.Ct. 1830, 158 L.Ed.2d 701(per curiam). A defendant challenging the constitutionality of a jury instruction that quotes a state statute must show both that the instruction was ambiguous and that there was “ ‘a reasonable likelihood’ ” that the jury applied the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Estelle v. McGuire, 502 U.S. 62, 72, 112 S.Ct. 475, 116 L.Ed.2d 385. The instruction “must be considered in the context of the instructions as a whole and the trial record,” ibid., and the pertinent question is whether the “ ‘instruction by itself so infected the entire trial that the resulting conviction violates due process,’ ” ibid. Pp. 831 – 832.

(b) Because the Washington courts' conclusion that the jury instruction was unambiguous was not objectively unreasonable, the Ninth Circuit should have ended its § 2254(d)(1) inquiry there. The instruction parroted the state statute's language, requiring the jury to find Sarausad guilty as an accomplice “in the commission of the [murder]” if he acted “with knowledge that [his conduct would] promote or facilitate the commission of the [murder],” Wash. Rev.Code §§ 9A.08.020(2)(c), (3)(a). The instruction cannot be assigned any meaning different from the one given to it by the Washington courts. P. 832.

(c) Even if the instruction were ambiguous, the Ninth Circuit still erred in finding it so ambiguous as to cause a federal constitutional violation requiring reversal under AEDPA. The Washington courts reasonably applied this Court's precedent when they found no “reasonable likelihood” that the prosecutor's closing argument caused the jury to apply the instruction in a way that relieved the State of its burden to prove every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. The prosecutor consistently argued that Sarausad was guilty as an accomplice because he acted with knowledge that he was facilitating a driveby shooting. She never argued that the admission by Sarausad and Reyes that they anticipated a fight was a concession of accomplice liability for murder. Sarausad's attorney also homed in on the key question, stressing a lack of evidence showing that Sarausad knew that his assistance would promote or facilitate a premeditated murder. Every state and federal appellate court that reviewed the verdict found the evidence supporting Sarausad's knowledge of a shooting legally sufficient to convict him under Washington law. Given the strength of that evidence, and the jury's failure to convict Reyes—who had also been charged as an accomplice to murder and admitted knowledge of a possible fight—it was not objectively unreasonable for the Washington courts to conclude that the jury convicted Sarausad because it believed that he, unlike Reyes, had knowledge of more than just a fistfight. The Ninth Circuit's contrary reasoning is unconvincing. Pp. 833 – 835.

479 F.3d 671, reversed and remanded.

THOMAS, J., delivered the opinion of the Court, in which ROBERTS, C.J., and SCALIA, KENNEDY, BREYER, and ALITO, JJ., joined. SOUTER, J., filed a dissenting opinion, in which STEVENS and GINSBURG, JJ., joined.

William B. Collins, for petitioner.

Jeffrey Fisher, for respondent.

William Berggren Collins, Jay D. Geck, Deputy Solicitors General, Robert M. McKenna, Attorney General, Paul D. Weisser, John J. Samson, Counsel of Record, Assistant Attorneys General, Olympia, WA, for Petitioner.

Mark E. Haddad, Sean A. Commons, Johari N. Townes, Anand Singh, Sidley Austin LLP, Los Angeles, CA, David Zuckerman, Seattle, WA, Patricia Novotny, Counsel of Record, Seattle, WA, Jeffrey T. Green, Sidley Austin LLP, Washington, D.C., Vanessa Soriano Power, Stoel Rives LLP, Seattle, WA, for respondent.

Justice THOMAS delivered the opinion of the Court.

This case arose from a fatal driveby shooting into a group of students standing in front of a Seattle high school. Brian Ronquillo was ultimately identified as the gunman; at the time of the shooting, he was a passenger in a car driven by respondent Cesar Sarausad II. A jury convicted Sarausad as an accomplice to second-degree murder, attempted murder, and assault; he was sentenced to just over 27 years of imprisonment. The Washington courts affirmed his conviction and sentence on direct review, and his state-court motions for postconviction relief were denied.

Respondent, then, filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The District Court granted the writ. On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit agreed with the District Court that the state-court decision was an objectively “unreasonable application of ... clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States.” 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1). The Court of Appeals found it unreasonable for the state court to reject Sarausad's argument that certain jury instructions used at his trial were ambiguous and were likely misinterpreted by the jury to relieve the State of its burden of proving every element of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt. Sarausad v. Porter, 479 F.3d 671 (2007). We disagree. Because the Washington courts reasonably applied our precedent to the facts of this case, we reverse the judgment below.

I

A

The driveby shooting was the culmination of a gang dispute between the 23d Street Diablos, of which Cesar Sarausad was a member, and the Bad Side Posse, which was headquartered at Ballard High School in Seattle, Washington. A member of the Diablos, Jerome Reyes, had been chased from Ballard by members of the Bad Side Posse, so the Diablos decided to go “to Ballard High School to show that the Diablos were not afraid” of the rival gang. App. to Pet. for Cert. 235a. The Diablos started a fight with the Bad Side Posse, but left quickly after someone indicated that police were nearby. They went to a gang member's house, still angry because the Bad Side Posse had “called [them] weak.” Tr. 2660–2661. Brian Ronquillo retrieved a handgun, and the gang decided to return to Ballard and “get [their] respect back.” Id., at 2699.

Sarausad drove, with Ronquillo in the front passenger seat and Reyes and two other Diablos in the back seat. En route, someone in the car...